Portland State University

PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations and Theses

1972

The transition to Nazism, the history of the German
town of Pfungstadt, 1928 to 1935
David E. Arns
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
Part of the Political History Commons, Politics and Social Change Commons, and the Public Affairs,
Public Policy and Public Administration Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Arns, David E., "The transition to Nazism, the history of the German town of Pfungstadt, 1928 to 1935"
(1972). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 968.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.968

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

,

I

I

I
~ I
I ,
I

I

I

I

I

I

'

i

I

!'
I
,

I

'
L

II

J;il'l>

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF David E. Arns for the
Master of Arts in History presented July 24, 1912.
Title: The Transition to Nazism, The History of the German
Town of Pfungstadt, 1928 to 1935.
APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMI'lhrEE:

Frankl1n:west, Chairmc.:.n

susanBOle s

I

Pfungstadt is a small German town which to date ha&
not earned a footnote in the histories of either the Weimar
Republic or the Third Reich.

Based upon the efforts of

men in towns like Pfungstadt (and towns which were not like
Pfungstadt) the members of the Nuzi party built a polltical
structure which reached to the pinnacle upon which Adolf
Hitler st0od.

Researching the growth of the Nazi party,

the intense struggles that occurred with democratic forces,
the seizure of power and the installation of a workable
system of government is the problem.

This thesis in no
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way purposts to be more than a study of the history of the
town of Pfungstadt between 1928 and 1935.
Suth a research problem demands field research.

Dur

a period of four months (September, 1971, to January, 1972)
I lived in Pfungstadt.

The main sources of the date which

I gathered during that time were the town's newspaper, the
Pfungstidter

Anzeige~,

and the SPD newspaper, which was

published in Darmstadt, the

Hes3~scher

Volksfreund. Daily

accounts of the political and social events in Pfungstadt
were carried in the Anzeiger; the Volksfreund contained a
predominate amount of SPD party activities.

Also consult

ed were various records from the town hall's archives.
Supplementing, putting sone flesh on the bones of the
written records of Pfungstadt's history, were personal in
terviews with all of the living political leaders of the
age, plus a broad cross-section of the general populace.
The backbone of Pfungstadt's sociAty was the middle
class.

Imbedded within that class were the seeds of

Nazism.

The working class was dlvided along political

lines between the SPD (Social Democrats) and the KPD (Com
munists).

The working class and the rn1ddle class (the

burgerlich),
political competitors since the 1890's, grew
......-
wider and wider apart in political outlook with the advent
of the depression in 1929.

Ign~:ing

their old association

with llberalism, first a small portion, and then, by 1932,
nearly the entire middle class fell into the Nazi's hands.
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The working class fought a double-barreled battle of its
own.

The KPD constantly scored the SPD for losing its

"class ia.entityll and took,a sizable portion of the SPD's
traditional electorate.

The SPD, not desiring the radi

cal programs of the KPD, formulated a liberal set of ob
Jectives J but was not able to stem the tide which was
running for a "change."
Democracy died in Pfungstadt because of the short
Sighted vision of the middle class, a shortsightedness
brought on by the seemingly insolvable depression.

Fac

ed with a choice, in their minds, between losing their
social and political significance and voting for a change
(any change) the middle class succumbed

~o

an overwhelm

ing political immaturity and voted for the Nazis.

On

March 7, 1933, with the middle class support assured, the
Nazis seized power with the assistance of SA members from
Darmstadt.

Once in physical control of the town, a system

atic series of measures assisted the Nazis in coordinating
the town into their system.

Everyone in Pfungstadt then

\'laS forced to pay an exorbitant price for thepolltical
blindness of the burgerlich.
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PART I

THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL DISENCHANTMENT

1928 TO 1931

CHAPTER I
THE BACKGROUND
Situated in southwestern Germany is the pleasant
little town of Pfungstadt.

It is located six miles south

•

ot Darmstadt, seven miles east of the Rhine River, five
miles west of the Odenwald (hills), and thirty-six miles
north of Heidelberg. l Beauty, learning, and history lit
erally encircle it.

Within these confines the people of

Pfungstadt played their roles on the stage of history.
A considerable collection of Roman artifacts attest
to the early presence of inhabitants in the area, although
the oldest survivir.g written reference to the town of
"?hungestat" dates from 785. 2 In that year the records ot
the abbey Lorsch report the bequest of three mills to the
monks.

The records periodically mention other gifts as
as 1037. 3 No other town under Lorseh's administration

~ate

could claim so many mills, because the Modau, which flows
from the Odenwald through Pfungstadt, 1s one of only three
streams between
into the Rhine.

Dar~stadt

and Heidelberg which discharge

Past Pfungst<-.dt the land becomes too flat

tor the stream to generate a ., urrent strong enough to turn

•Darmstadt

Hesse-Darmstadt

was the capital of the r~and (state)
the Weimar Hepubl1c.

throughoul~

.- ...•.... , ..,.- ,;

-.',)

.. -. - • •HUM

Nt
.....

"

·7 i)

-. - -

_.... ,
,,

....

-.....---

=

autobahn

~
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a mill-wheel. 5

No records exist that establish whether or

not the abbey still controlled its interests in Pfungstadt
after 1232.
The noble Katzenellnbogen family certainly had ac
quired possession of the territory around the town by 131S
and held sway over the area until the marriage of Anna,
the daughter of the last of the Katzenellnbogens to Henry
III of Ressen in 1479. 6
From the 16th until the early lSth century, the town
and the business of the mills stagnated under the impact of
a succession of wars.

The Reformation brought with it

Landgraf Phillip of Hessen who assembled his soldiers near
Pfungstadt in 1534 irl order to face the challenge of the
.,
Schwabischer Bund. The Thirty Years War exposed Pfungstadt
to suffering which it had only tasted earlior.

In 1622 an

army passed through the area leaving the town reeling under
the effects of robbery, murder, and the plague.

The vic

tory of the Holy Roman Emperor and his Spanish allies over
the Swedish troops at Nordlingen in 1634 produced much the
sarue results. 7 Seven mills had been destroyed and only
forty homes of the original two hundred were still

ir~ab

itable.

It was not until 1750 that the town could again
claim close to one thousand inhabitants. S
French and Swedish forces marched pastPfungstadt in
1645, but their departure did not bring a long period of
relief.

The outbreak of the War of InheI'itance in the

,
ii

5
Pfalz (1688-1697) brought more French troops into the sur
rounding land.

When Prince Eugen and his army faced the

French between Mainz and Darmstadt in 1734-35, the cown
once again learned a bitter lesson. 9
The people made repeated attempts to reorganize their
mills in the peaceful interludes between 1534 and 1735.
Because of continuous, dreadful devastation, milling had
declined significantly by 1770.

But the old mills offer

ed the opportunity for the introduction of other forms of
production, since they provided a cheap and readily avail
able supply of (water) power.

A dye business was set up

in 1767 and was housed in an old mill.

Together with the

Kelsterbach porcelain works, it was the first factory type
industrial undertaking in the state of Hesse-Darmstadt. 10
From 1838 peat was cut in the old Neckar River bed which
lay near the town.

These activities laid a groundwork for

the later introduction of other industrial developments.

.

but the town had to wait for the leadership of Wilhelm

-

Buchner
stadt.

.

to awaken the full industrial potential of Pfung

He established an ultramarine factory in the town

in 1845.

Before the tumultuous year of 1848. a brewery
also moved into the thriving little town. il
The revolution of 1848 had a striking impact on the
inhabitants of Pfungstadt. especially the Jewish members of
,,,

.The brother of the writer Georg Buehner.

I
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the community, who had to bear the brant ot the revolution.
Early in 1848, inflammatory orations pictured the Jews as
the town's misfortune.

Wh~n

the revolution was proclaimed

on March 6, the windows ot Jewish businesses were broken
and goods destroyed.

In the weeks which followed, older

Jews were robbed and molested in their homes.
The leader of the movement, Otto Kinz, controlled the
town by summer.

He called on the citizens to arm themselves

tor the revolutionary struggle at hand, which resulted in
the formation of a Burgerwehr (militia), but it did not
survive long because its members were accused of having a
greater interest in liqueur than in order.

By

the end of

the year, the town's inhabitants were beginning to ignore
Kinz for more productive undertakings.
not reconcile himself to the diminishing

Kinz, who could
revolution~ry

en

thusiasm of the people, made one -last desperate effort to
ignite revolt when he shot a Jew on New Year's Eve, 1848/49,
but was arrested.*12
The economic tempo of Ptungstadt increased again after
the revolution.

The town was undergoing a fundamental

change in its social structure.

Whereas in 1175 farmers

had composed over 10% ot the population, by 1850 they rep
resented only 40%, a.percentage which was destined to tall

•

Some of his cohorts carried out an escape plan
which succeeded in freeing him. He shaved his beard and
made his way to Holland on ~ river boat. Contact with him
was lost after he reached the United States.

7
further.

Jobs created by the establishment of new firms
also induced people to emigrate into the town. 13 (See
population graph p. 462 in appendix.)

The face of the

town was changing, as Pfungstadt began to enjoy a new
role as a center of small industry.
,

"Io~',

Naturally enough, economic changes led to a change
in the political forces of the town.

The dominance of

the farmers was broken by the growth of the power of the
Handwerker (craftsman) whose influence became particularly
marked after the 1848 revolution.

Buchner, already close

ly associated with industrial life. became the first real
politician in Pfungstadt.

Beginning in 1850, he was elect

ed five times to the lower chamber of the Hessen Landtag
(state legislature) as a (left wing) liberal. 14 Together
with the brewery owner, Ulrich, Buchner was active in the
town council.
Other factories were built in Pfungstadt over the
course of the following years.

The match industry, in

itiated in 1853, totaled five factories among its ranks by
1874.

In the year 1860, the paper industry was founded

in Pfungstadt.

The first factory employed seventeen work

ers and was followed by two more ventures.

The most im

portant undertaking to open its doors for business before
the turn of the century was a tannery which employed over
one hundred and fifty people by 1880.

The money eminating

from the upswing in business was deposited in the bank

II . 'III IIII Iii:' II
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(Vo1ksban.lf) set up in 1863, while the townspeople read news

ot their town and the outside world from a paper beginning
in 1873. 15

A veritable golden age of hometown proQ~ction

bad swept Pfungstadt after 1850.
Buchner's political and economic involvement did not
stop him from finding the time in 1870 to establish a
private accident and sickness insurance program; to found
a kindergarden, which he materially supported; and to set
up Red Cross societies.

He also gave his workers a per
centage of his profits each year. 16
In 1877 Buchner founded the first organized politi
cal group in Pfungstadt. an affiliate of the Deutsche
Fortschr1ttspartei (German Progressive Liberal Party).

That same year Buchner was to lead his party to victory
in three separate elections.

First he triumphed in his

quest f()r a seat in the Reichstag from the Darmstadt

CiI'o~-Gerau district. 17

The overpowering> personal magnetism

of Buchner is attested to by the poor showing of the SPD
(Social Democratic Party of Germany) in the Reichstag
election» when they could capture only seven votes. Desp1te
Buc~,er's

passed.

negative vote. the anti-socialist laws were
That was the signal for the town's Protestant

minister, Dr. Muller, to launch a bitter attack from his
pulpit on socialism and liberalism.

Muller. a member of

the Stocker movement, unleashed a discussion which raged
tor weeks in the local paper. 18 The result ot his ~~tlons

i
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was a massive drop in church participation by the "liber
als", a practice which became customary over the years.
'ruis controversy set the stage for Buchner's next triumph.
He led a group of liberals to victory, over Muller and
his cohorts, in a hotly contested election to the commit
tee in charge of the local church.

Finally, his party
captured three of the four seats in thewtown council. 19

1877 had proved that Pfungstadt was the domain of the li
beral Buchner.
Not only had political awareness grown in Pfungstadt;
the industrial sector had grown as well.

A cigar factory

began production in 1878, and was joined in 1880 by two
more firms.

The brick industry, which was one of the old

est industries in Pfungstadt--records exist of a brick
works in.1582--numbered five concerns in 1880.

Toe

con

tinued development of the town into an industrial node de
manded that a tie to the railway network be established
with theMain-Neckarbahn which was built between 1843-46.
In 1869 Buchner had introduced legislation in the

Landta~

to have a railway spur built to Pfungstadt, backing up his
motion with the offer of partial financing of the proJect;
but it was 1886 before the town was linked to the main
tracks. 20
The Reichstag election of 1881 brought a surprise.
Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel campaigned in various
voting districts in Hessen, notably the district Darmstadt

I
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Gro~-Gerau.

Buchner, running again as a Progressive Li

beral. needed and received the votes of the SPD to win
the run-ot"f election he was forced into. 21

Pfungstadt t s

workers had given Liebknecht over twenty votes.
In 1884 a local affiliate of the National Liberal
Party was established in Pfungstadt.

Wilhelm Ulrich, the

owner of the brewery, was the initiator of the move,
which was undertaken in anticipation of the 1884 Reich
stag election, because Buchner was in poor health. and
had declared that he would not stand for election. 22 He
died in 1892.

Ulrich was able to carry Pfungstadt, but

the SPD became a political factor by winning one hundred
thirty-four votes.

The increase in the number of SPD

voters is attributable to the intense work of a small
. group of men whose energetic activity culminated in the
founding of an illegal SPD group under the cover of the
singing club Liederkranz on New Yearts Eve 1889/90. 23
Fritz Raab, the brother of the leader of the SPD in Pfung
stadt, Georg Raab, was elected chairman of the club which
served as a means of distributing party information. hold
ing meetings, and occasionally even singing.

When the

ant-i-socialist laws were not renewed in 1891, the SPD was
free to come out into the open with their membership in
tact.

In 1892 a local unit of the SPD was officially or

. ganized, Georg Raab quickly assuming the chairmanship.
The initial efforts of the SPD to win the votes of

11

the workers met with limited success$ because of the lin
gering influence of Buchner's liberalism on the rela
t~onship

between the workers and the Handwerker.

In 1890

the party polled only 257 votes, increased its support to
282 in 1893, and made a big jump to 530 votes in 1898.

In·

1898 the SPD had nominated two candidates for the town
council, but without a positive result. 24 In 1899 the
gPD held its first May Day celebration which featured a
speech by Georg Raab.

These were trying years for the

gPD because each of their meetings was closely observed
by the police, and they were not permitted to display any
red flags.
In the last year.s of the nineteenth century and the
first decade of the twentieth century a decline in the
number of hometown industries set in. 25 Buchner's Ultra
marine factory closed, and the business of the tannery
declined.

The workers of Pfungstadt began to travel as

tar away as Frankfurt and Mannheim looking for work.
Pfungstadt was developing lnto a town where workers lived
(Arbeiterwohngemeinde), while holding jobs in the sur';"
rounding area.

Despite this development, a wave of town

sponsored construction got under way.

The street system

was extended to the north of the town, to accommodate the
inCl'eased population; a water system was installed in
1899; an electricity network was begun in 1901; by 1904 a
sewer complex began to creep under the streets; while in

I

I
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1907 Pfungstadt became one of the few towns of its size
to have an indoor swimming pool.26

The progressive nature

of the citizens of the town reenforced the image tl..e ad
joining towns had of Pfungstadt.
The SPD fit itself into the picture of the town, as
the Ortsverein grew from one hundred menlbers in 1904 to
over 220 in 1907.

When the gPD began to publish a party

newspaper, the Hessischer Volksfreund, in the nearby town
. of Darmstadt in 1905, four hundred and fifty subscrip
tions were immediately enlisted.

The Union, through its

education committee, fostered the growth of a library,
while the sportive inclinations of the workers were taken
care of by the gymnastics club, founded in 1900. 27 The
SPD had built a solid apparatus, which was at the disposal
of the party in the elections.
The untiring efforts of the SPD were finally capped
with success when three SPD candidates, Georg Raab,
Phillip Gilbert, and Paul Weigel won seats on the town
council 1n 1904.

•

But the power of the middle class was

tar from dead, as the 1907 town council election was to
demonstrate.

That election saw the building of a "BUrger

Block" (Biirgerliche Vereinigung) which waged an election
campaign on the issue of the emerging wOI-kers' cooperative,
claiming that the creation of the co-or': would effectively

•One-third

of the town council wa3 elected every
three years before the outbreak of the First World War.

I I, III
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destroy the small businessmen of the town.

With th:J.s theme

the burgerliche defeated the socialist candidates across
tte board .. 28
It was not until 1913 that the byproduct of the in
dustrialization of the second half of the nineteenth cen
tury, the SPO, was able to regain the momentum which they
had lost in 1907.

In 1913 all five of the SPO candidates

succeeded in winning election to the council,29 which was
then composed of six SPO--one had been elected in 1910-
and nine middle class members.
The outbreak of the First World War effectively
cut the political activity of the organized parties to
near zero.

Two hundred and thirty-eight members of the

community paid with their lives for the
carried on. 30

s~ruggle

Germany

The impact of war weariness and the 1918/19 Itrevol
ution" manifested themselves in the results of the 1919
electlons.

The outcome of the first town council elec

tion after the war, on June 15, 1919, enabled the SPO to
place eight members on the council. 3l With the coopera
tion of the USPD (Independent Social Democratic Party of
Germany) who received enough votes to place two members
on the counCil, the workers controlle.d ten votes to only
eight tor the burgerliche members of the council.

This

was a pattern which was to predominate until the fate
....

ful change of 1933.

A pattern which was siwilar to the

14
SPD dominated governments that ruled Hesse-Darmstadt in
cooperation with the DDP and Zentrum during the 1920's.
Ptungstadt's middle class parties continued their

p~e

war roles with the same lineup of personalities and posItions ..
The hometown business life of Pfungstadt further
declined after the First World War..

Three match factories

closed and the tobacco business receded.

The tannery had

already slid from its predominate position after the turn

ot the century.

All of the brick factories save one had

closed after the war.

The introduction of the production

of enamel ware,cellophane, and gummed tape took up some
of the slack, but more and. more workers were seeking em
ployment in the surrounding towns. 32 There were no large
Industrial undertakings in Pfungstadt and in terms of
hometown industry the 1920's could not be compared to
, the second half of the nineteenth century without coming

oft a distant second.
The problems facing the town were not simple.

Work

had to be found, food supplies acquired, and housing con
structed.

A step was taken to try and ease the housing

shortage with the construction of the Siedlung !!!!Miihlberg
which consisted of wooden houses constructed by emergency
workers, but the housing problem remained accute. 33 The
Inflation, \:lhich swept Germany after the war, complicated
the efforts of the council.

In spite of the adverse

II · I
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economic

difficulties, the voters continued to stick with

their old parties.
p:rogressi~re

The years 11128-33 were to test the

traditions in Pfungstajt and unhappily to find

their strength deficient.

IIII I . I

It

III

lill,ll

In [

16
CHAPTER 1 - FOOTNOTES

1 prot • Dr. Michel, Prot. Dr. Wagner, Schu1rat H.
Queh1, Bearbeiter, Heimatk~rten vo~ Hessen inDer Lebens
raum ~ I"1enschen, (Braunschweig, 1958), pp. 1-;tr-5.
2Frledrlch Knopp, Ole Geschlchte Pfungstadts bis ins
Ptun~stadt Vergangenheit un<! Gegenwart,
(Trautheim, 1965), p. 2 •

19. Jahrhundert in

3Ib1d , p. 29.

4.____, Ptunesstadt, (Ptungstadt, no date), p. 10.

5Knopp , Die Geschichte ••• , pp. 37-38.

6Ibid

p. 32.

7Ibid

pp. 46-47.

-'
-'

8~, p. 59 •
. 9Ibid , p. 47 •
. 10Kar1 Hechler, Zwei Jahrhunderte Pfungstadter Wirt
schatt in 75 Jahre Ortsverein Pfungstadt, (
• 1967),
p. 89.

11~, p. 89 and Knopp, Die Geschichte ••• , p. 61.

12Die Revolution 1848 in Ptungstadt in the Ptung
stadter Anzeiger, May 5, 1928. (This newspaper will hence
forth be cIted ff"PA. n)
13Hechler, Zwei Jahrhunderte ••• , p. 93.
14 Kar1 Hech1er~ 75 Jahre SPD Ortsverein in 75 Jahre
gPD Ortsverein Ptungstadt, (
, 1967), p. 37. -
15Hechler, Zwel Jahrhunderte ••• , pp. 89-91.
16IIechler, 75 Jahre ••. t p. 37.

I

I: III

.[. ..11 111i I

17
11Ibid , p. 3B.

IB 1bid, p. 39 and Knopp, Die Gesch1chte ••• , p. 53.
19Ib1d , p. 39.
20Hech1er, Zwe1 Jahrhunderte ••• , p. 93.
21Hech1er, 75 Jahre ••• , p. 41.
22 Ibid , p. 41.
23Ib1d , p. 43.

24Ib1d

-'

pp. 43-45.

25Hechler, Zwe1 Jahrhunderte ••• , p. 93.

26 Ib1d , p. 93.
21Hechler, 75 Jahre ••• , p. 47.
2B 1b1c!, p. 45.

29 Ib1d , p. 45.
30Kar1 Hechler, Pfungstadt vom Beginn des 20. Jahr
hunderte bis Heute 1n Pfungstadt Vergangenhelt undGegen
~, (Trauthelm, 1965), p. 65.
31pA: June 16, 1919.
32ReChler, Zwel Jahrhunderte ••• , pp. 93-95.
33Hechler, 75 Jahre ••• , p. 49.

iT III

I

I
I

I
I

CHAPTER II

I
PFUNGSTADT'S STRUCTURE

I

Gazing to the west from the ruins of castle Franken
stein, which is nestled in the foot-hills of the Odenwald,
one can view the town of Pfungstadt.

Set on the level land

which stretches between the Odenwald and the Rhine River,
the tQwn stands naked in the middle of farm fields.

Be

yond the fields, to the east and the north, stretch the
town's forests. l Thrusting through the middle of the scene,
from the northeast toward the southwest, is the Modau
(stream) which cuts directly through the middle of the old
section of Pfungstadt.
Descending from the hill on which the castle is 31t
. uated into the town, one encounters few homes left from
the Middle Ages.

One would judge the town as an unpre

tentious child of several periods, but most notably the
nineteenth century.
stadt:=~s.~rasse

In the nineteenth century the

~

usurped the role of being the main divid

ing line from the Modau.

Running roughly parallel to the

14odau, tht. Eberstaaters.trasse acts as more than just a con
venient division between the old, southern part of the
tOl'm a.nd 'the new, northern part; It also ser-ves as the
main business thoroughfare, with shops of various kinds

.1
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lining its sides along its path through the town.

Its

inherited role also stems in part from its function as
a section of the highway system.
The people of Pfungstadt like to claim that they
are open and friendly because of their Frankish origin. 2
One would have to be a keen observer indeed in order to
be able to pick out and define particular sections of the
town within which those people lived, although there
might be suggestions of them.
In the old core of the town around the Rathaus the
majority of the farmers are located.

They inhabit struc

tures which combine a barn and living quarters in one
building, which is surrounded by a high wooden fence and
gate designed to keep animals in and unwanted visitors
out.
Businessmen-' and self-employed craftsmen generally
live on an upper floor above their businesses and are con
centrated along and to the south of Eberstadterstrasse,
to the east of the farmers.

Hardly a family in the entire

village could claim membership in the upper class.
The working class settled north of the Eberstadter
strasse along the streets which were laid out in the nine
·teenth century when industrialization swept through the
town.

There exist very few tenements in this areas be

cause of the pride which was attached to having one's own
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roof over one's head.

The houses of the workers face

directly onto the streets with a garden of some sort to
the rear.

Their houses wel'e kept in better repair than

those of the farmers and many of the businessmen who had
inherited their homes from their fathers--homes which
were normally built before 1850.

It was not uncommon for

two or even three generations of the same family to dwell
in the same building on different floors.
A worker might be found to live next door to a far
mer or a craftsman as another worker.

No one corner of

the town could claim any esthetic advantage over any
other.

There were no refugees from the heat of the summer

or cold of the winter to be found in Pfungstadt.
Compared to the years around 1850, the population of
Ptungstadt had grown at a steady, unspectacular pace since
the turn of the century.

It stood at 7,651 by 1928-

3,754 males (49.1%) and 3,897 females (50.9%); 4,800 above
the age of twenty-one (62.5%), and slightly less than
2,850 people under twenty-one years of age (37.5%).3

The

population expanded because of the 126 births which were
recorded in 1928, although this figure fell during the
period preceding 193 1l to only 95. 4
A, great deal cf pride was taken in the longevity of

families within the town, but, in fact, only six families
could claim the distinction of having ancestors who lived
in Pfungstadt before the middle of the sixteenth century.S

'I
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Many families could claim extensive numbers of relatives
1n Pfungstadt, although most families were united 1n name
only.

Relatives were disp1rsed ir. so many different occu

pations that family relationships meant little more than a
tip of the hat or the sending of a card of condolence at
the time of someonets death.
The inhabitants of"Pfungstadt were proud of the ef
forts they had made to provide themselves with housing.
On May 16, 1927, there were 1,966 households in Pfung
6
stadt.
1,819 of these households occupied quarters
which were not shared with any other family, the remaind
er being forced to share their quarters with two or more
families.
stadt:

There were 1,214 inhabited structures in Pfung

584 single-family homes, and 561 buildings with

two apartments, 55 with three apartments, 11 with four
apartments, one with five apartments and one with six
apartments.

There were other "special" buildings (in

cluding emergency housing) with ten apartments. 7 Thus
there were 264.7 apartments per 1,000 inhabitants of
which 21.1 per 1,000 had been built since 1918.

Although

15 new buildings with 31 apartments were erected in 1928,8
there were still 158 people looking for their own apart
ment or improved housing. 9
Pfungstadt can look back on a long religious his
tory.

The Protestant church was first constructed around

1300 and was enlarged in 1752.

After the Reformation the

[ I

I
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Protestant number swelled to the 100% mark.

In 1928 the

7.651 inhabitants of Pfungstadt remained overwhelmingly
Protestant:

there were 7,101

Prot~stants

(92.8%),

~2l

Catholics (4.2%), 76 Jewish (1.0%), 153 others (2.0%).10
Though the town was in name overwhelmingly Protestant,
the presence of the minister l-iuller in the 1880' shad
turned many individuals away from the church.

Only 5.1%

in 1928 and 5.2% in 1929 attended church regularly--one
of the poorest church attendance records in Hessen. ll
As one older farmer said:

III only attend church at con

firmations and burials, otherwise I am not interested.
No, I do not despise the church; we simply do not. go out
of tradit!on.,,12
The movement of Catholics into the town was very
slow.

It was not until 1912 that a Catholic church was

erected.

However, this church was not staffed by a re

sident priest as the Catholic community. was still very
small. 13 A priest from the neighboring town came on
Sundays to say :1ass.
The
years of

Jewi5~

families of Pfungstadt could all claim

member~hip

in the town community.

ed a small synagogue.

They attend

A well respected Jewish boarding

school was also operated from 1854 until 1906.

Generally

the Jews were small businessmen, accepted into Pfungstadt's
middle class SOCiety, suffering the same economical fate

I I
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as the rest of this class of people.

These circumstances

probably account for the fact that the NSDAP did not hold
any

meetings between 1928

~.nd

Marcl1, 1933, in which the

Jewish 'luestion was the center of d:lscussion.

The general

opinion of the entire population was that the Jews of
Pf'ungstadt were well integrated into the society.14
Pfungstadtts prosperity depended upon small indus
try.

The 1934 population, according to its industrial

production, can be divided as follows:

57.9% of the in

habitants belonged to the working class, 17.9% were self
employed artisans (Handwerker), 13.9% depended upon com
merce and trade, 9.3% were involved in farming, and around
1.0% in other professions. 15
As was the case already before the First World War,
not all of the

workt~rs

in local enterprises.

residing in Pfungstadtwere employed
Almost 38% of the workers were em

ployed in the surrounding towns, some as far away as
heim and Frankfurt. 16
The

Handwerk~

~~nn

had inherited a strong inclination

tor self-employment from the late nineteenth century.
There were about two hundred different ......
Handwerker
estab
..,
lishments in Pfungstadt in 1928. 17 Tradition dictated the
employment of their children at as. early an age as pos
sible, and of training their sons almost invariably in
the.1r own profession.

In essence this was designed to

insure the continuation of the firm and to supply cheap

I.

labor.

In economically prosperous times the Handwerker

engaged employees, but, as the depression worsened, they
relied almost exclusively

l1

pon famtly members.

In 1928, twenty-one factories, which employed 856
workers and artisans were operating in Pfungstadt. 18 The
number of factories had declined in the 1920's.

Three

match factories had closed and the cigar industry was
hurt.

However, the firms that remained were stable enough

to survive the depression.
Around one hundred twenty miscellaneous concerns
supplied various other necessities. 19 These shops and
businesses were extremely dependent upon the town's
workers and in constant competition with the nearby de
partment stores of Darmstadt.

ot the working

clas.,~

When. the purchasing power

was cut , it rippled back through

every shop.
The oldest group of self-employed people were the
farmers.

They had a fierce tradition of independence and

self reliance that did not bend with the changes of the
times.

There were 139 farms in Pfungstadt in 1928.

How

ever, they did not resemble the sprawling farms of east
Prussia at all.

In the whole of Pfungstadt there was ionly

one farm with more than 125 acres, one farm with more than
50 acres, 68 with 25 to 50 acres, 28 with 12 to 25 acries.
Incredibly enough, there existed also 41 farms with 2,1/2
to 12 acres under cU1tivation. 20 Land rented from the

/'
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town supplemented these private holdings.

The right of

succession is to be blamed for the extremely small farms
as well as for the fact that land holdings were scattered allover the area.
The most important crops were potatoes, grains, and
asparagus.

The horse was the basic means of tilling the

soil, while cattle furnished a prime means of making pro
fit through the sale of milk and meat.
with pigs were also raised for sale. 21

Poultry, along

Farmers were not the only people raising crops.
There were over 1,185 plots being cultivated by everyone
from Handwerker to workers to members of the police torce. 22
With the help of income tax statistics, the entire
matter can be put into clearer perspective.

The 139 tarms

had a total income ot RM 160,000, an average income of RM
1,151 per farm; businesses (including selt-employed Hand
werker, factory owners, and commercial establishments
totaling 339) had a total income of RM 829,000, an average
of RM 2,446 per business; six "free professions" had an
income of RM 35,000; the bulk of the town's people, the
workers, ea't'oed
employee. 23

fu'1

1,992,000, an average of RM 1,334 per

Savings represented a sense of security tor many
members of Pfungstadt's community.

The only institute

that accepted deposits in the general manner ot a bank was
the Volksbank.

The bank had deposits of RM 387,275 in

27
1928. 24

Besides this institution, there existed other

means for saving smaller amounts of money.

The SPD had

organized informal Christmas savings clubs and similar
organizations.

The farmers also had a sort of banking

arrangement, the Raiffeisenkasse, which served their
purpose very well.
The social life of the town centered·around the more
than 55 clUbs. 25

By and large, these clubs followed the

political outlook and the social standing in their ar
rangement.

A host of clubs for the workers and their fam

ilies had a.distinctly SPD outlook, while the middle class
clubs tended to fall into occupational groups with less
emphasis on distinguishing political outlooks.

The KPD

was the only radical group to successfully establish its
own orbit of

club~.

The only NSDAP clubs founded before

1933 were the Hitler Jugend and the NS-Frauenschaft.
One of the oldest structures in Pfungstadt is the
town hall which was built in

161~.

Within the walls of

the town hall and the nearby Stadthau~ the affairs of the
town were carried on. 26 As there tlere no "Land" or
"Reich" offices in Pfungstadt, the number of administrat
ors was very small.

Besides the l.:sual day to day busi

ness, the town provided its citizens with sewers, water,
and electriCity.
Pfungstadt had a tradition of good administration

I
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and of long years of service by its officials.

Mr. Schwinn

had been elected mayor in 1919 after having served the
a number of years as a clerk to everybody's satisfac
tion. 27 His knowledge of the functioning of the town ad

t~wn

ministration was excellent and he was the unanimous choice
tor mayor.

Officially he was.not affiliated with any

party but he often sided with the socialists.
The members of the council were directly elected by
the inhabitants. of the town every four years.

The council

subdivided its authority into committees •. The committees
were:

Building committee, Electricity committee, Swimming

pool committee, Land committee, Finance committee, Ceme
tery cODl.'Uittee, Forest committee, Welfare committee, and
School committee. 28 This system enabled the elected mem
bers of the town council and the two voting administrat
ors, Mayor Schwinn and Vice-Mayor Weigel (SPD), to super
vise matters easily.
to the

co~mittees

Members of the council were elected

proportionate to their strength in the

council.
From 1919 until 1928 this system of government func
tioned fairly smoothly.

The council was the focal point of

local action, and, as such, the members of the council re
ceived great respect from the members of the

corr~unity.

Al

though they were not paid well, they served the interests
of the groups which had elected them as well as the general

I '
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welfare of the town in an orderly fashion.
The principle income of the town of Pfungstadt came
from the following sources: Rent from town housing (RM
31,000); rented land (RM 12,800); income from the forest
(RM 43,746); return of Reich taxes (RM 68,300); and
finally various apportiorie~tcity taxes (RM 153,144).29
In normal economic times these. sources of income were
secure •. However, if a significant proportion of the taxpaying public, the working class, was removed from the
tax roles, then a larger percentage of the burden would
fallon the shoulders of the remaining tax payers--the
businessmen.

This is exactly what occurred during the

period of unemployment.
During the entire period of the depression the town
debt was lower than it had been on the eve of World War I.
In 1914 the town had had a debt of RM 827,578.95 because
of the building of a new school, swimming pool and the con
struction of the sewer, water and electricity

syst~ms-

all necessary items in the minds of the populace. 30

In

1928 the town had a debt of only RM 613,889.21 (which in
creased to RM 774,042.09 in 1931).31

During the earlier

period the debt had produced some noticeable results,
whereas this did not seem to be the case during the de
pression.
appendix~

(See graph on public debt in Pfungstadt iri
p. 466.)
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Unemployment was not a new phenomenon in Pfungstadt.
People

h~.d

experienced its effects before.

In 1928 around

fifty people (see graph of unemployment in appendix) were
supported by the town on its welfare rolls, a figure that
required the outlay of only m~ 25,583.65 per year.32
The town also administered a school system, the
first four grades being the Volksschule, and then the
Realschule.

Pfungstadt did not possess its own Gymnasium

(high school)--the children had to go to Darmstadt to re
ceive a higher education if so desired. 33 The first grade
school was built in the year 1883.

Before 1851 children

had either been educated by a minister or not at all.
Pfungstadt was a progressive town when it came to moving
with the age, and in 1901 a new school was built, pro
viding space for the increasing student pOPulation. 34 (See
graph of school population in appendix p. 467.)
The complexity of the issues and the size of the
stakes demanded that people organize themselves into po
litical groups.

By far the best organized group was the

Soclal Democratic Party of Germany--the SPD.

Through long

years of struggle the party had become the most formidable
political group.

The SPD was primarily concerned with the

interests of the workers.

Most workers belonged to union

groups, and the Gewerkschaftkartell was the organization
drawing together representatives of the various groups:

31
construction workers, printers, railway workers, metal
workers, painters, food and drink workers, tobacco work
ers, carpenters, and factory workors into a group that
had considerable influence on the SPD and the political
life of Pfungstadt. 35
The SPD was more than just a political alliance.
It was almost a way of life, for there was the Freie
'l'urnverein (a gymnastics group), the workers football
club, the Volkschor (choir), the weight lifting club,
the Arbeiterwohlfahrt, the savings club, the co-op, and
a variety of other institutions.
The leadership of the SPD rested in the hands of
capable men.

The titular.head of the movement was Georg

Raab who had become the minister for work and conunerce in
the Hessen government in 1918, serving in that position
until 1928. 36

He was the patron saint of the SPD in

Pfungstadt, an example of a simple worker who, through
the dint of unceasing effort, had raised himself and the
party to a position of power and importance.

The leaders

of the party were invariably members of the union, al
though not all union members were card-carrying members
of the party.
solid team.

The leaders of all the SPD groups were a
The SPD had welded a unit together of which

they could be proud:

a group that saw itself as the heir

to the progressive tradition that Buchner had set in
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motion in the 1850's.
The SPO was not the only party that claimed to repl"esentthe interests of the workers, however.

The Com

munist Party of Germany (KPO) grew out of the split in
the SPO ranks in the late stages of the First World War.
In Pfungstadt "left" wing of the labor movement had as
sumed the first title of the USPO. but it quickly turned
to the more orthodox stream of the KPO in 1922.37

The

KPO was a small, sixty-member, but very well organized
party that was blessed by the leadership of a first
class mind, Heinrich Huxhorn.

Huxhorn was no stranger

to the labor movement, having been involved with the SPO
before the First World War.

The answers to the working

man's problems did not lie with the SPO, according to
him, because it appeared to him that the SPO was becofning
bUrgerlich, losing its Marxist character.
The credit for the success of the KPD within Pfung
stadt must be given to Huxhorn.

He was an excellent

speaker who respected the opinions of others in a debate,
but he was also an ice-cold man when it came to political
strategy and the carrying out of prOpaganda. 38 His life
was the KPD which he served very unselfishly.

He recog

nized a goal--he chose the KPD as the best party. to a
chieve that goal.
The German Democratic Party carried on the ideas
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ot Buchner in Pfungstadt.
sw~ll

Basically it was a composite of

Handwerker and business men who believed in the

value of a free economy ar.i the freedom of man.

This party

had suffered much during the twenties in Ptungstadt be
cause its leadership was old.

One can actually see the

death of the DDP in Pfungstadt with the retirement of
Christoph Hanbuch, the last representative of the party

ii!

in the town council in 1928. 39
The successor of the National Liberals, the German
People's Party (DVP), was composed of professionals and
business men of the town.

I,ll
Iii

~iI
!

The objectives of the party

were to insure the power of Germany and the continued
economic growth of the country. The leader in Pfungstadt
was a teacher, Julius Hofmann. 40 The party engaged in
non-political involvement.
ffungstadt had a number of farmers who did not
choose to join any of the national parties.

They associ

ated themselves with the Landbund, the farmers' party.
The Lancbund was basically a group that was designed,to
keep the interests of the farmers before the eyes of gov
ernmental authorities, and to apply what pressure it could
to bring about favored Changes. 4l It did not so much lead
as it simply existed; it rarely held political meetings
and never attempted to win members of other classes to
join its organization.

III'"

Its leader was Herr Jager.
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Besides the large national parties, there existed
two distinctly local parties.
ker-

~

The first was the Handwer

Gewerbevereinigung, which saw itself not at all

as a political party, but rather as an economic interest
group that wanted the best for everyone.

.

It was neither

"

a coherent party nor a coherent group of men.

It placed

men up only for local election, and remained neutral dur
ing national elections.

It was led by Herr Hassenzahl.

Another local group was the group Steinmetz-Martin.
They represented local businessmen and manufacturers who
banded together during the town council election, partly
out of their own sense of importance and partly because
they were very interested in the economic stability of the
town. 42
The final group under consideration
Socialist German Workers Party, the NSDAP.

wa~

the National

The original

member of the NSDAP in Pfungstadt was a man named Hans
Otto, who was a shoe maker by trade, but disliked his
work intensely.

4~
J

He was joined in 1926 by a group of dis-

gruntled Handwerker, and displaced workers, who set up a
"wild U NSDAP Ortsgruppe. 44

The NSDAP had practically no

impact on the town until 1928.

Until 1930 the group was

unable to win more than 250 votes out of the over

3,5~0

.

4
cast. 5 The original members were very radical, attempt
ing, before 1929, to win the workers away from the SPD

35
and the KPD, seeing the1r mission as that of freeing the
workers fX'om the ravages of the Jewish international big
bUSiness. 46 The NSDAP was avery small group of fanatics
who were disorganized and lacked in real talent necessary
.to l'linthe hundred:> Of votes it would take to get them
into power.

They were further handicapped because the

town was so overwhelmingly orientated towards the SPD.
The respected members of the middle class were loath to
antagonize the workers by publically proclaiming their
membership in this group.

The group was led

by Wilhelm

Graff, a small manufacturer, who would not adjust himself
to the times in which he lived.
Both the DNVP (German National People's Party) and
the Zentrum (Catho11cCenter Party), maj.or political in
fluences in other towns, were insignificant factors in
Pfungstadt.
Most often news was relayed to the members of the
town by the town's only newspaper, the Pfungstadter,
Anzelger, which had begun publication in 1874.

The paper

had a standing policy of political neutrality, which
served to stifle potential local competitors. 47 It did
not take a stand on elections.

A great deal of local

news was contributed by various parties and clubs which
tiled articles which were then edited to the standards
that the paper felt were acceptable. 48 The paper itself
empl.oyed only one part-time reporter.

Virtually every

36
household in Pfungstadt subscribed to the An:zeiger.
The SPD published a newspaper in Darmstadt called
tLe Hessi.Joher yolksfreund, which was distributed almost
exclusively among the members of the working class. It
relied upon the secretary of the SPD group to communicate
news about events in Pfungstadt which were then published
in a special column for local news.

The paper was a par-

tisan SPD paper which faithfully reported the news as the
SPD saw it.
Life is made up of more than just statistics; it is
in large part a reaction to events by the fixed prejudices
which we have labeled as our ideals.

The history of

Pfungstadt provides one example of the growth of prejudices
which destroyed the basic ideals of human existence.
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CHAPTER III
THE REIGN OF NORMALCY - 1928
The tensions, cracks and polarized political atmos
phere of the 'first three years of the 1930's had their
antecedents in the prejudices people nurtured in their
hearts during the 1920's.

The explosive demonstration of

those prejudices had to wait for the fear, which the de
pression spawned, to ripen fully in order to dominate the
town of Pfungstadt.

1928 was a year in which the normal

tensions and cracks which had existed most noticably since
the turn of the century, grew in intensity, without find
ing a coherent outlet.
January is a cold, drab month, filled with either
rain or snow for most of its thirty-one days.l

For most

men and women it was a'time to come together within the
confines of their clubs to evaluate the activities of the
past year.

Tradition dictated that as many groups as

possible stage a dance or other event in order to dispel
the monotonous winter months.

The SPD members of the

community did not have to wait for spI'ing to increase the
temperature, for on January 10, the NSDAP held one of its
rare meetings in Pfungstadt.

On blood red signs which

appeared in several places throughout the town, the NSDAP
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provocatively challenged the workers to "force the bosses

f

to attend the meeting.,,2

f

Despite the effort to implicate

that the leadership of the SPD and KPD was unresponsive

I!I

to their needs, the working class of the town did not

Ii
I

respond to the NSDAP.

They demonstrated, in this in

stance, a trend which was to continue until the fateful
year 01' 1933, when the NSDAP seized power and forced the
workers to join its own organizations.
Although the NSDAP saw its primary purpose would
be to breach the strong position 01' the workers, they
did not forget the middle class.

On January 25, a small

article appeared in the Pfungstadter Anzeiger, under the
title "Middle class, protect yourself!"

The article out

lined the necessity tor a new political group which
would put a stop to economic suffering, substitute action
for the slogans of the large parties, and vigorously
fight to protect the interests of the biirgerlich (middle
class).3

With the words "the middle class becomes con

sciousU (der Mittelstand findet sich) the NSDAP proclaim
ed its establishment in Pfungstadt.

This was quite an

accomplishment for the local group, since it had held its
first pu.blic meeting on April 7, 1924, under the direc
tion of the future Gauleiter, Jokob Springer,4 and did
not number more than ten individuals as members in 1928. 5
Between 1924 and 1928 the

SOAP had held meetings

I '
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or evening discussions very infrequently, and had had no
real impact upon the political atmosphere in PfUngstadt. 6
With the exception of the OrtsgruEEenleiter, Wilhel::n
Graff, the initial standard bearers of the party did not
present an inspiring picture to the general populace.
They were men who were dissatisfied with their occupations

I

and achievements and who were more eager to discuss an

II

issue with their fists and elbows than with their intel
lects.

Most citizens ridiculed and shied away from them
because of their drinking and radical expressions. 7
The SPD membership could take the recriminatory re
marks of the NSDAP in stride, because they possessed a
large reservoir of self-confidence.

Fritz Raab, the chair

man of the SPD party, proudly pointed out at the yearly
,general meeting in early February, that, although some
younger workers had failed to join the party, the member
ship had continued to grow at a stable pace.
the Nazis by saying that
won't find an aUdience,"

If

Dismissing

Nothing is so stupid that it
Georg Raab warned the assembled

thr6t:lg that 1928 promised to be a year in which the party
would have to watch out for the poisoning of the politic
al atmosphere by the middle class. 8 Any realistic chance
of the NSDAP driving a wedge between the leadership and
the foot soldiers of the party was dispelled when the mem
bership

reelected their leaders to another year in off1¢e.

On the opposite side of the fence was the local KPD
. group which busied itself with monthly meetings and com
m~Ulist

class,

study discussions aimed exclusively at the working
The KPD never ventured into the general market

place of middle class public opinion to try to win con
verts. 9 Armed with the notion that they had inherited the
mantel of the pre-war "r.evolut10nary" SPD, which they ad
monished would never had submitted to the demands that
were accepted by the post-war biirgerl1£!!.!:. leaders of the
SPD, they campaigned for the establishment of a soviet
style government.

The KPD lost no time capitalizing on

the popularity of the film "Black Sunday" (about the Jan
uary 9, 1905, revolution in Russia against the Tsar),lO
Which was shown on February 16, while scheduling a meet
ing for February 28, to which the workers were invited to
come and hear a Comrade Overhagen tell about his experi.....
ences in the USSR.

Since the KPD considered the Soviet

Union its natural ally, they tried to counteract any re
ports of their friends' suffering and misery.

Overhagen,

it was' proudly remarked, gave a full-blooded presentation
of the joys of life in the USSR, without cl.uttering up
his speech with the usual "cry statistics".ll
The immediate effect

0~

such pro: ':ctions was not

overwhelmlng" but the KPD had set another bud on the
. growth of its stem which was to bloom out into wide
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paths of influence when. given certain hot house assistance.
Ord1n~ry

citizens did not rear them or their vaunted re-

. vc:!.ution in 1928, 12 although DlB.ny people allotted them no

h~gher than third class citizenship.13
On March 4 the town celebrated the annual UDay tor
the Remembrance of the Fallen Soldiers."

The proceedings

. were supervised by the only local veterans' society, the
Kr1eger- Und

~lilitarverein.

This organization, founded

atter the Franco-German War of 1870/71, numbered the few
living ,veterans of that war and some recruits from the

men who had served in the First World War among its ranks
in 1928.

Because of the diverse political allegiance of

its members, :It remained politically neutral until after

~~rchJ 1933. 14 The lack of any organization for veterans
of World \iar I and any militarily orientated group other
than the Krieger- und Militarvere1n,15 symbolized the
level of effectiveness of the siren calls of chauvanistic
speakers in Pfungstadt.

The middle class members of

society were not abnormally opposed to the values that
Germany had supposedly carried onto the eastern and
western fronts during the war.

They simply did not focus

much attention upon them, preferring to mourn their losses in the solitude of the hearts. l6
Minister Zinn prayed for the souls of the departed
at the cemetery,

wh11~

the

~nze1ger

ran a full page.

1'
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article which concluded with the thought that "one must
be true to the fatherland,,,l7 a conception which every
lovel and

gro~p

in Pfungstadt, excluding some KPD members,

could ascribe to.
The thin line between chauvanism and innocent com
radeship is very difficult to define.

A specimen of the

latter was furnished in the last days of September when
veteran~

of the World War One Landsturmballalion "Pfung

stadt" held a reunion at the Hotel Straup.
Sept~mber

On Sunday,

,I

30, the group laid a wreath at the base of the

memorial to the sholdiers of the First World War in the
cemetery.

They then gathered together for speeches and
a small song show by the Mannerquartet in the hotel. l8
Over five hundred men took part in the affair, which
featured words of greeting from Mayor Schwinn.

The veter

ans were well received by the entire populace, most like
ly because their reunion occurred without chauvanistic
I

accolades to the might of Germany and scurrilous remarks
,
about the republic.

The Volksfreund saluted the meeting

by saying that there "were no 'hurrah' patriotic speech
es."l9
Ostentatious display of old saber-rattling tech
niques and other forms of bluster might not have been
. part of the program of the Kreigerbut a close cousin.

~

Mititarverein,

The fanning of xenophobic coals,

.

'

I

!
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which smoldered in the hearts of some members of the com
munIty because of the French occupation of German terri
t"ry whicll extended into the most westerly holdings of the
town., was a component of the DVP (Deutsche VolksPartei 
German People's Party) program.

The announced topic tor

their assembly on March 18, which was to include a show of
slides., was "The 1000 year French policy of the robbery
of the Rhine.,,20

The general secretary of the DVP in

Hessen., Welkaw (Darmstadt) chaired the gathering., which
was described as a dignified protest against the French. 2l
Disentangling the consequences of the DVP shibboleth
from typical love of country, which all of the middle
class was ready to demonstrate, is made somewhat easier by
the statement of another leader of the DVP, Hen- Brauer. He
felt that the French occupation had little influence on
the political infighting in Pfungstadt. 22 Substantiat
ing his claim, but in a modified manner, was the asser
tion of an early member of the NSDAP, who said that while
he himself feared the French, there was no political po
larization in the town because of the issue. 23 Since the
SPD newspapers are void of a reference to the importance
of such a dispute, and Herr Hechler, the leader of the SPD
after.

1~31,

could not remember any struggles of the point,

the writer concludes that the issue was not an overly im
portant one.·

III·

,t

Life in 1928 was not one long crisis.

' 11111'

There were a

number of diversions for the populace including entertain
ment at three movie theaters, the winter concert of the
Musikverein, featuring a twenty-man orchestra, and even a
circus which passed through the town over the Easter holi
days.24

Political and economic instability had not become

part ot the daily tare ot the people.

There was still time

to consider life in general over a liter of beer in the
company of' friends without the constant injection of som
ber notes of discord in the conversation.
The normal development of daily events was not dis
turbed by the SPD election planning corn.1'flittee meeting on
April 19 signaling that a new political campaign was in
the offing, without setting in motion the nhupla" that
surrounded the weeks before the vote.

As wa.s the

SPD

custom, public meetings were scheduled only in the last
weeks preceedlng the election.

The all-encompassing net

work of worker sponsored clubs, groups, and circles of
friends sufficed to pass along any necessary information
before open gatherings were held.
May was traditionally begun by the Union's celebra
tion of May Day.

Theoretically the workers gathered to

gether to reaffirm their unity, strength and desire for
socialism.

May 1, 1928, was not dissimilar from other

May Days.

A parade wound its way through the streets of

I

I'
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Pfungstadt ending with a speech praising the future of
socialism in Germany.2 5 The festivities were under the
direction ot the Union, not the SPD itself, althougn for
all practical purposes they were the same.

The subtle

distinction between the sponsorship of the day by the
union or by the SPD allowed the KPD to instruct its mem
bers to march with their respective colleagues.
impor~ant

This was

for it served to give the workers the feeling

that despite their political differences there remained a

, I

bond of unity weaving them together.
The KPD had three representatives within the gov
erning board of the united union, who exerted a percep
tible, but limited, influence over the entire union. 26
The membership of both groups anticipated that the cords
that bound the two groups together in the union could
only be broken by force,27 which unfortunately proved to
be fine in theory but poor in practice wpen the strains
of the depression revealed the full extent of the differ
ences which lay 1n the path of workable understandings.
In 1928 it was normal for the workers to present a united
front on at least one day of the year.
The first SPD public meeting was held on May 9 in
oraer to take advantage of the momentum the tolay Day activ- .
itles had generated.

The topic for discussion, liThe mean

ing of the Reichstag election for the younger generation",

1

,

I

was designed to meet. the effort of the party. to acquire a
larger number of younger members with its election cam
paign.28

Coupled to the venture cf SPD was the att-'!mpt

of the SAJ (Sozialistische Arbeiter Jugend - Socialist
Worker Youth) in April to recruit more children to its
program.

Children who wanted to taste the beauty of

nature by hiking and camping in the area surrounding
Pfungstadt were invited to join, but the main thrust was
aimed at the sons and daughters of workers. 29 The SAJ
was

t~e

only youth group of any importance at the time.

There were groups for boys and girls sponsored by the
protestant church, but their membership was miniscule.
The children of the middle class were w1thout any clubs of
their own" while their parents even frowned upon their
membership in the SAJ for social and politit'al reasons. 30
The middle class divided its loyalty between a
. variety of nationally powerful parties" with marginal re
presentation going to smaller splinter parties.

A small

political group was not at quite the disadvantage in es
tablishing an aura of success as might at first be imagin
ed, since there was no meeting hall or restaurant with a
large capacity in Pfungstadt.

•

A case in point is the

selection of the restaurant nZum Goldnen Lamm l1 by the
'The leadership of the SPD reasoned that they would
need to rent the three largest halls~tc
barely accommodate
their entire membership at one t1me. j

I

I
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~srechtspartei

(People's Rights Party).

They knew full

well that they could report a standing room only crowd for
the speech of Professor Axt about "Peop1e t s rights in rela
tion to the right of capita1. rr32 The evening consisted of
the professor cleverly playing on the fears of the 1922/23
inflation victims to drive his points horne.
Another group which had to be counted among the
splinter parties in 1928 was the NSDAP.
bers had been inactive since January.

The local mem
On May 11 the

Anzeiger carried the notice that the NSDAP would hold an
election meeting on May 12 to which the entire population
ot the town, but specifically excluding the Jews, was in
vited. 33
Whereas the KPD and SPD members had stayed away from
the NSDAP meeting in April, the workers, especially the
KPD, decided to attend the meeting to confront the NSDAP.
The topic for discussion was to be "The deception and be
trayal of the working class by the SPDtI.

A large crowd

was on hand when the meetir'" opened, but did not listen
to the words of the speaker long before shouting and
cat-calls began to fill the restaurant, altnough no fights
broke out.

As at most assemblies, a period of discussion

was finally allotted toward the end.

Heinrich Huxhorn

(leader of the KPD) was in the middle of an emotional re
buttal, when a beer glass came sailing across the room

,I
I

I
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toward him.

It was enough to spark a pushing and shoving
,

match which did not develop into a tu11-f1edged con
frontation because the local police stepped in and closed
the meeting. 34

...

"'.

To insure the tranquil departure of the NSDAP mem

bers from the towns of Darmstadt and Worms, who were in
Ptungstadt to bolster the small number of local NSDAP
members, the police directed the NSDAP to take a back
street to the train station, fearing that otherwise vi
cious riots might evolve had the group taken the main
street (Eberstadterstrasse) through the town. Unfortun
ately I howev'er, the atmosphere was already too highly
charged.

As the NSDAP people moved off toward the station

they were shadowed by a contingent of KPD members.

The two

clusters traded insults as they advanced up the Kirchstras
se until they neared the school where they began a lively
exchange of blows.
~

The NSDAP retreated in the Schu1gass

which they could easily blockade because of its nar
,

rowness.

One of the men in the ranks of the "NSDAP re

1

I

I

ceived a blow on his head which caused him to fall side
ways into the NSDAP man, Melk.

He became alarmed at the

situation with the result that he thrust his knife into
a man who moved toward him yelling, flHeil Hit1er. 1I35 The
man turned out to be Heinrich

Kott~~n,

a printer and a

Hitler Youth member who was given first aid in Pfung
stadt, transferred to Darmstadt, and there he died the

" 1 ;1
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\'
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next day.
Melk, two other NSDAP members, and a number of KPD
people, among them Huxhorn, who was charged with inciting
a riot, were arrested.

Police searched the scene of the
altercation and found a knife and a gun. 36
The incident, which took place on a Saturday, was
not reported in the Anzeiger and the Volksfreund until
Monday since no Sunday editions were published.

The SPD

thus found time to amend the topic of their May 14 meet
ing to include a discussion of the Kottmann adventure. 37
Georg Raab opened with a warning to the crowd that they
. should not expect anything different from the NSDAP since

I

they were a reactionary group, not interested in the pro
motion of the rights of the working class.

Then he call

ed on the people ot' Pfungstadt to support the SPD in the

I

I

cOming election so that the "foes of freedom" would be re
buffed.

His remarks were followed by a discussion.

Dr.

Strecker (Berlin), who had been scheduled to present his
thoughts on "The Reichstag election and Social Democracy,"
amended the thrust of comments to point out that election
took on double importance:

socialism had to win and Naz

ism had to be defeated at the polls.

Following a screen

ing of the film, "Dein Schicksal",.and songs by tbe
yolkschor the meeting was adjOUrned. 38
Besides an angry exchange of vindictive letters

I

i

I

il

m

53
between the KPD and the NSDAP
were quiet.

~n

the Anzeiger the streets

The quiet hid the commotion that churned,

nevertheless, through the populace.

People argued

~he

merits of each side's guilt in arguments in their homes
and in restaurants with several key results.

The NSDAP

retrained trom using Kottmann's death for propaganda pur
poses because of the uncertainty surrounding the event,
but they did win the financial support of some members of
the community;39
about.

support that was not openly bandied

The hidden sustenance which the party received was

to become one of the main reasons for the rise and event
ual triumph of the NSDAP in Pfungstadt.

Membership in the

party was not openly declared because it was feared, and
rightly, that the working community would refuse to pur
chase goods or services from anyone who acknowledged party
affiliation. 40
A spate of party advertisements appeared in the

Anzeiger in the last days before the election from all of
the parties.

The KPD excitement did not die down but in

stead found an outlet in a public meeting on May 18.

Hux

horn took the opportun1ty to blast the tact1cs of the
NSDAP, and call upon the working class to unite behind the
. t menace. 41 The NSDAP's presence
... e f a'Bel-,S
KPD t o de f ea~ +h
.L

in Pfungstadt had the not-too-unpredictable effect of spur
ring the KPD on to a much more radical position.

'i'
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On

I

the morning of the election, May 20, music groups

representlng the KPD and the SPD paraded through the
streets of the town endeavoring tc drum up support.

Not

Withstanding the music, the vast majority of the voters
(70S) went to the polls between two and five in the after
noon after they had finished their noon meals. 42
When the results of the election were made known
the following day, almost every party had something to
smile about.

The chief victor was the SPD which picked

up almost 300 votes to raise its total t02,l19 votes
(51.07%).

The NSDAP, entering its first election in

Ptungstadt since 1924, made a respectable showing with
260 votes (6.26%).

The number of votes going to the mid

dle class parties remained

ab~ve

1,400, so that one can

,conclude that the bulk of the Nazi vote came from people
who had failed to previously go to the polls.

The per

centage of citizens using their right to vote swelled
trom 77% to 88% in the election. 43 The KPD picked up
sixty-four votes, not suffering any from the taint which
surrounded Kottmann's murder.
A breakdown of the 1,075 people \'1ho did '!!2i vote,
but were eligible to vote, requires some examination.
Division of the people by age yields the following in
formation:

I

I

I
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AGE

ELIGIBLE
NON-VOTERS

20 - 25

240

22.3

26 - 30

161

15.0

31 - 35
36 - 40

115

10.7

76

7.0

41 - 45
46 - 50

66

6.1

55

5.1

51- 55

85

8.0

56 - 60

59

5.5

218

20.3

1,075

100.0

60 and over

PERCENTAGE

Men numbered 380 (35.3%) and women 695 (6q.7%) of the
group. 44

Supplementing this data is a comparison of the

1928 return by the sex of the voters.

Intel'estingly

enough, each of the old, established, non-radical parties,
including the SPD, DNVP, Zentrum, DVP, DDP, and the Land
~,

obtained a majority of their support from women.

Both the KPD and the NSDAP, the parties most closely as
sociated with radicalism in the minds of tbe populace in

1928, received a majority of their votes from men.

In

the case of the KPD, 63.59% of its votes were cast by men,
and in the case of the NSDAP, 56.15%.45 . (See appendices
for a complete breakdown, p. 460.)

One

c~~

logically con

clude that more (young) women turned up at the polls than
men, but that they most likely voted for the stable

par~ies

I
I'

I

I
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which represented the order they deemed essential.

It

would seem plausible to assert that the men who entered
the election polls in 192e probably voted overwhelmingly

tor the NSDAP.
The soothing strains of the music of the Musikver

-ein introduced the month of June
Ptungstadt.

to the inhabitants of

The notes from the orchestra could not mi

tigate the rumble that came from the KPD when the Land
tag announced on June 5 that they had agreed to pay the
former GroPherzog thirteen million Reichmarks over a
twenty year period. 46

What potentially should have bene

fited the image of the parties of the middle, rebounded
in their faces.

F.irst the far right (DNVP, Deuts'ch

National VolksE,artei - German National People's Party)
indicted the SPD fc.lr hypocracy because they had not
been amenable to a payment to Grof)herzog in 1919, then
came the predictable onslaught from the KPD.
The KPD scheduled a public meeting for the evening
of June 29, at which time they demanded to know how the
gPD could have supported legislation which meant that
needed social service programs could not be financed tor
the year.
To the working class of Pfungstadt this was a vol,'
at11e issue.

It gave the KPD the

their assertion that the SPD

possibi~'

leade:,,~hip

,la:;

'-'Y to cultivate
far from the

II

: I

i'
'

57
workers~

and was almost middle class.

As a matter of

tact, the KPD propaganda which surrounded this question
was credited with setting the KPD on their way to rrack
ing the rock-hard unity of the SPD membershiP.47
The KPD was not the only dissatisfied group in town.
An article appeared in the Anzeiger late in June which
sought to outline the problems of the Handwerker (crafts
men).

The article contained the usual reference to the

essential character of the Handwerker to the basis of the
state, and went on to develop the novel idea that, "it
is necessary for the government to protect outmoded forms
of production, namely Handwerker,lI be'Cause, "no one sys
tem of production should prevail in Germany.n 48 One re
presenta~ive

of this politically and economically sig

nificant. group sounded a call which was to .':"everberate
through the political system for the next five years.
The proverbial butcher and baker still functioned ef
fectively in the twenties, but the candle stick maker
was simply producing a commodity whose day had passed.
Actually, the candle stick maker was no longer a part of
the economy, but the shoe maker and the tailor were.

They

were unable to compete with mass-produced items, but did
not want to accept the change, much as the farmer did not
want to.

An explosive situation was growing.

Signifi

cantly enough Hans Otto, the first member of the NSDAP in

I:
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Ptungstadt and one of its most vocal adherents, was a
shoe maker.
An

ominous outpouring of militancy eminated from the

town's farmers who bitterly gazed at the disintegration of
their customary role in society.

The Landbund, a farmers' .

economic interest group which posed as a political party,
sponsored a rally in Darmstadt designed to place their
complaints directly before the government.

A large con

tingent of Pfungstadter farmers mingled with the crowd to
hear the double-barreled attack upon the state and nation
al governments which the Landtag member, Glaser (Nordheim),
launched. 49

He labeled as unbearable the farm program of

the government, and summoned the farmers to "go back to
the simple life, a life of thriftiness, fear of God, and
love of work."

He stopped after uttering the prophetic

words, ubefore we go bankrupt, we will fight with all the
tools at our disposal in order to protect the German farm
and, with it, the very basis of the State.,,50

An angry,

confused, politically ineffectual mass of farmers existed
before the depression ever struck down its first victim.
As one simple farmer stated,

I~our

debt was too high, and

the price for our products was too low.

Why I could not

even afford the immediate needs, such as shoes, for my
children.,,51

The confrontation with these realities did

more to cloud the line between political. theories than

I

i
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any number of abstract .speeches.

Illustrative of the deep cleavage that existed be
tween the working class anJ the middle class was the fete
encompassing the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Workers'
Bike Riding Club which was scheduled for May 26, 27 and

28.

It seems that the workers' club was an affiliate

of

the union of bike clubs uSolidarity," while the middle
class club "Union" was a member of the "German" bike clubs.
The burgerlich club was, therefore, not invited to the
anniversary as a group, although they could attend as in
. dividuals.

The "Union" blasted the SPD populated club

in a letter to the editor, proclaiming that, "clubs should
practice sports, the political parties politics.,,52

The

events surrounding the anniversary went off without inci
dent.

The central aspect of the entire problem was the

failure of both sides to grow out of their antiquated
methods of labeling themselves "German" or "Worker"
. groups.

Both sides allowed such practices to continue

because they firmly believed that they represented social
and political classes which were separated by a chasm
that could not be bridged--a fatal mistake.
The town council meeting of May 7 nad provided a
forum for an analysis of the insecurity which had begun
to creep into the tives of some citizens.

During the

meeting it was pointed out that there was an excess ca
pae1ty in the construction industry, but not funds from

I

I

I
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private sources to supply a stimulus.

The suggestion came

forward that the town increase the number of low interest
loans it annually granted to private individuals. 53

This

suggestion began the process of defining the role of the
town government in economic affairs.

On the one hand the

elected officials desired to provide the needed capital,
but on the other hand they deeply felt that they had the
obligation to balance the budget.
if

b~ndied

Debt was a word which,

about in a frivolous manner could cause a

storm of opposition among all levels of the community.
Although their fathers had gone into debt before World
War One to provide the town with water, sewers, electric
ity, and the unheard-of luxury of a swimming pool, the
idea of accumulating debt to stimulate a given section of
the general economy was foreign to them.

No thorough

definition of the problem was possible in 1928 when the
economy was still in some semblance of order, a forbid
ding omen for the troubled years that lay ahead.
In the town

co~~cil

the middle class parties were

split into five different parts, each with its own elect
orial program, while the working class parties were split
into only two divisions.

The most hotly debated issue to

face the council was the budget, which was drawn up and
discussed in July.
W1lhel~

Martin (from the local party Steinmetz-Mar

tin) often lashed out at the policies of the SPD, accusing

i
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them ot misusing the trust ot the general populace.

He

asserted that the SPD turthered the interests of its con
stituents at the expense of the good of the entire town. 54
The proposed budget was the spark which had ignited Mar
tin's outburst.

In early July the budget had been put to

gether by the tinance committee under the chairmanship of
the old DDP (Deutsche Demokratlsche Partei - German Demo
cratic Party) member Christoph Hanbuch.

The occasion for

Martin's initial remarks had been the presentation of the
budget at the council meeting on July 16.

His verbal

violence was rare and not particularly dangerous because
the hands on the levers of power were not those ot Martin,
but his older middle class colleague like Hanbuch.

Thus

it came as no surprise to anyone that the SPD and the
biirgerllch council members easily arranged compromises
for the sticky pOints which had separated them during the
first inspection of the budget.

With their differences

ironed out, the budget for 1928/29 sailed through the
council meeting on July 23 with a minimum of dissention. 55
The writer ot the article which appeared in the
Volksfreund on July 25, which reported the passing of the
budget, also took the opportunity to accuse Martin of
provocative demagoguery and lack of manners. 56 Such mild
attacks on Martin were to be repeated over the coming
years, but in a much more serious context.
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The town council meeting of August 21 set the basic
economic problems in clear relief.

The council used the

occasion to wrestle with the problem of finding work for
the unemployed and debating the methods to best solve the
housing situation. 57 Neither question was new to Pfung
s.tadt, although they were slowly becoming more pressing.
The readjustment, loss of hometown businesses, the econ
omy ot Pfungstadt throughout the twenties, did not spur on
the town council members, especially the middle class mem
bers, to find new approaches to their problems.

They

seemed to function under the motto, "when in doubt, cut
the budget," while calling upon the government to pro
vide the funds necessary for them to solve their difficul
ties.

The employment market was in a depressed state

especially in the building industry.58
The housing issue was double-edged for the SPD.
Most ot the people with inadequate housing were SPD
. voters who demanded action from their representatives in
the council.

The SPD thus had a special interest .in see

ing the construction of some sort of housing, but fi
nanced in such a manner that the biirgerlich parties could
support.

This delicate balancing act proved harder and

harder to accomplish as time wore on.
Clarifying the situation someWhat is the story ot
the construction of Herr Ruckelshausents private home in
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1928. When he announced plans to build his home he was
beseiged by contractors looking for work.

Thanks to his

sense of fair play, the project moved forward to the ad
vantage of all concerned.

He divided the work to be done

on the house among different master craftsmen.

The base

ment was constructed by one, the walls by a second, the
roof by a third, the windows and doors by a fourth, and so
on. 59

The men were eager for work; unfortunately there

were tew homes constructed during the entire ,year.
_The spirit of accomodation which was one of the
main trade marks of the SPD was flatly rejected by the
KPD.

They hammered away at inconsistent policies in the

SPD whenever they had the chance.

It was no surprise to

find the KPD sponsoring a public meeting September l--a
meeting called to discuss, liThe SPD and the construction
of the cruiser. tt60 The failure of the KPD to acknowledge
that compromise is a valid political art sowed seeds which
were to bear bitter fruit in the years to come.
The SPD did not respond to the charges of the KPD
until late September, because of the strong position they
held since the last Re1chstag election.

At a party gather

ing, the speaker, Weber (Offenbach) labeled the KPD a band
of opportunistic malcontents who should be fighting the
D~NPts

plans for the restoration of the monarchy rather

than the SPD.

He was more interested in reminding the

II l'i
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workers of the day in remembrance of the anti-socialist
laws which were coming up on October 21.

His closing re

lru:"rks dea:t with the leadership the SPD would have to
exert if legislation was to be passed which would lead
to the needed improvement of society.61
The workers enthusiastic reception of Weber tended
to steal the SPD's non-radical political course.

The

radical parties, KPD and NSDAP, did not seem to be mak
ing a dent in the SPD or for that matter the atmosphere
in the town.

The NSDAP had not held another public meet

ing since May, and, in fact, the members rarely showed
themselves in PfUngstadt. 62 The KPD pushed their in
itiative petition against the cruiser in the first weeks
of October, but could only collect eighty-three signa
tures from their constituency, whereas they had won
three hundred sixty-eight votes in the May 20 Reichstag
election. 63
The most impressive holiday to be celebrated dur
ing the month of August was Constitution Day on August
11.

Since Pfungstadt had an overwhelming number of

republican political parties, every club took part in
the festivities and the parade except for the Landbund
and the '''German'' gymnastics clUb. 64 Three bands and two
drum and bugle corps joined the parade which l/ound its
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way through the streets of the town to the small square
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in front of the town hall where the Vice-Mayor, Pa,ulWe1gel
(SPD) spoke to the crowd.

It was the biggest and best
c~lebratlon of the day that Pfungstadt had ever seen. 65
The festivities included commemoration of the constitu
t10n 1n the school.

Julius Hofmann (DVP) praised the

spirit of the fest, calling on everyone to bear in mind
the valiant efforts of the men of 1848.

When he was

finished speaking, small black-red-gold flags of the
republic were distributed to each student.
One of the reasons for the excellent attendance at
the parade and festivities was simply the fact that most
of the inhabitants had grown up in families in which
their fathers had continually extolled the value of
democracy. 66

There was little reason to doubt that

democracy would not survive many years in Pfungstadt if
clever politicians would balance the traditional liberal
outlook of the populace with real accomplishments.

The

propagation of theories was only one side of the COin,
how.ever; the practical people ot the town also wanted to
hear about results.
The Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold was not active
in 1928, because there was no organized trouble being
generated by other groups in Pfungstadt.

They also en

Joyed a virtual monopoly position as far as the number
of members was concerned. 67

Albert Walke, the titular
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head of the Reichsbanner and his second in command Ludwig
Clemenz, were respected members of the community.• 68

They

an.lounced meetings at irregular per'iods to reaffirm their
belief in the democratic system of government and to try to
win new colleagues.

On July 8, the Reichsbanner marched

from the neighboring town of Eberstadt to Pfungstadt in
such a demonstration which ended with a speech. 69
The SPD had been engaged in the preparation of the
50th anniversary observation of the anti-socialist laws.
It was a festive occasion for the men of the SPD because
it represented a trying but in the end victorious age.
The day of the celebration began with a race sponsored by
the Workers Sports Club which ended at the town hall.
came a parade through the streets led by a band.

Next

It ended

at Vogler's restaurant, the largest in Pfungstadt with its
hall, where Georg Raab delivered a major address in re
memberance of the past times.

The final event was a free

dance. 70
Both the

i~~ense

strength and some of the weaknesses

of the SPD surfaced at this event.

The SPD was the only

political group in Pfungstadt which could look back on a
struggle almost forty years old, which was a source of ex
treme pride to every working man.

Georg Raab, one of the

original SPD members in Pfungstadt, lent the local group
an aura of invincibility and stableness.

The chairman of

t
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the party in Pfungstadt was Fritz Raab, Georg's brother,
who had also been a founding member ot the group in 1889.
Together with others (Karl Rei~ - Chairman of the Associated
Union and Paul Weigel - Vice-mayor), they brought to the
tasks of the twenties the suppositions of an earlier age.
At a glance it seemed as it those suppositions were still
valid, since the SPD had scored a big victory in the May
Rei,chstag election.

The leaders of the SPD were also aware

of the deficiencies of the party; they had launched a pro
gram to recruit young members.

The SPD was on what seemed

to be the right path, their vote was growing and they com
manded the largest single group of elected members in the
town coancil.
For women not caught up in the hectic struggle for
power and influence in Pfungstadt, the
(Womens Association) met regularly.

Frauenvere~n

They were politically

neutral and organized to "bring the strength of people
together in order to fulfill worthwhile goals and provide
help to anyone, without regard to creed or political affil
iation.,,71

Though their efforts to improve the lot of the

disadvantaged were not always successful, they were a
highly respected group.

If one grew tired of trying to

cure society, one could always join the Odenwald Club.
They scheduled frequent wall::s in the woods of Pfungstadt
or the Odenwald. 72
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The principle forum for the battle of words which
analyzed the administrative affairs of Pfungstadt was the
town council.

By the end of Novemoer, the middle class

parties were issuing constant calls for more economy in
the town's expenditures.

Wilhelm Martin, a constant

speaker on behalf of the biirgerlich .. launched a campaign
in the November 26 council gathering to convince the
council that the city employees were being paid too much
money.

This charge brought on a cutting exchange which

included several council members.
cited

~~rtin

council. 73

Ludwig Clemenz finally

for trying to sabotage the function of the
Clemenzaccusation satisfied his SPD constitu

ents, but not the middle class members of the community.
They started to nurture the idea that the 111eft" irre
sponsibly allotted town funds that could actually be cut,
thus saving everyone a portion of their taxes.
The Christmas holidays could not change the notions
that had begun to germinate in the minds of many men and
women during 1928.

A profound incoherent bitterness lay

Just below the surface, comprehended by few, if any,
political leaders, but with a raw potential for mutation
of SOCiety.
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CHAPTER IV
RIPPLES OF REBELLION - 1929
Mayor Schwinn's plea for harmony, which opened the
town council meeting on January 7, could not mask the rum
blings of dissatisfaction emiting from almost every class
of people in Pfungstadt.
problem of money.

The frustration centered on the

The agenda at the

January 7 meeting

provides a glimpse of the primary difficulty facing people.
A review of

~he

efforts by the town to furnish work for

the unemployed produced a debate in the council when the
council agreed to implement a program that would increase
available job openings. l At the same time, the council
pledged its continued support to the single most important
institution for the unemployed:

the Winter Relief.

Winkler, who later headed the Winter Relief

Julius

himse~f,

point

ed out that the money and goods supplied by citizens in
1928/29 winter satisfied tne needs of the unemployed. 2
Thus the traditional answer of town jobs and small doses
of private charity seemed sufficient to overcome the
plight of the unemployed.
During the month of January various clubs and in
terest groups held their yearly general meetings.

Just

about every group reported that it had made some advances

\' II
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in 1928.

A notable exception to the optimism expressed

by many of the clubs came from the Handwerker und Gewer

.b~verein
. (Craftsman and Business Association). They de
cried the fall of the profit level in their businesses
and the high amount of taxes they were forced to pay.3
Their claims struck a sore spot in the middle class in

I :

i

I
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habitants of Pfungstadt, who thought that they had to
carry the main financial burden in the post-World War One
period.

The most grating aspect of the issue for the

majority was taxes.

It was common to believe that taxes

were paid too often and in too large a quantities.
they treasured most was their financial

secul~ity

What

and the

satisfaction eminating from their Positions. 4 The As
sociation Simply supplied one more example of the chain
which the middle class felt was being tightened around
it.

The allegation that the SPD-KPD dominated council

was not interested in doing everything in its power to
!!I

correct the situation seemed very real to them.
A spokesman for the SPD shot back an answer to the

Ii

charges of the Craftsman and Business Association immedi
ately.

He pointed out that Pfungstadt1s businessmen

lived from the wages which the workingmen earned in other
towns at considerable sacrifices to themselves.

He ques

tioned the propriety of a campaign to encourage the
people of Pfungstadt only to pruchase from the businessmen

Ill! I' il I I! i
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of Pfungstadt) since other towns could imitate the mea
sures also, a potentially disasterous situation for the
businessm~n of the town. 5
The business community in Pfungstadt showed a very
narrow conception of both the function of a market economy
and their own social significance.

The inflated value

which the middle class attached to its standing was mirror
ed in their estimate of the "workers."

A worker was not

the social equal of the businessman according to the pre
dominate view. 6 Closely paralleling the outlook of the
businessman was the view of the farmers.

The tenth anni

versary of the Landbund on February 1 was an occasion to
reconfirm the values the members and supporters of the
Landbund held to be valid.

Although the members of the

Landbund realized that they were a small group which could
not muster the resources to institute their program on the
city or state level, the thought of reaching an accommo
dation with the SPD never crossed their minds. 7
The farmers rarely reacted to any situation without
gradually retreating to the notion that they represented
the basic foundation of the state.

This current of thought

found its full expression as the farmers met to prepare
for the February election to the Bauernkammer.

As the

discussion grew more lively, the blame for the causes
grew'more absurd.

The real cause for their problems, it

:
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was declared, was that the government had failed to focus
enough attention on their Plight. 8 The only solution was
tor the state and national administrations to step

~nto

the breach with a program to insure the continued rent
ability of their farms.
manage to

m~ster

The trick the farmers could never

was to balance their demands with reason

able arguments which could secure them a degree of support.
Because the farmers could not or would not conquer this
predic~~ent,

the SPD and the KPD felt no compunction to

soften their stand against the farmers.

A "traditional"

battle line existed long before the disintegration ever
began.
The fires of resentment may have burned brightly in
the hearts of the Landbund members, but outside of the
meeting hall swirled flakes of snow.

The

wec.~ther

was par

ticularly inclement through the first months of 1929.

In

t~:m1ddle of February the temperature fell to _50 (Fahren

heit},9

but the cold weather produced its own pleasures.

The frozer. Rt:.ine River acted as a magnet, attracting hordes
of people to its icy grandeur, so that they might walk
across it.

Daily dem.ands were everywhere 5ubmerged by the

desire to take part in this once-in-a-lifet!me experience.

An unpleasant side effect of the weather was the
curtailment of almost every construction project.

This

annoying fact was duly reported by the representatives of

fll
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the construction workers, carpenters, woodworkers, and
painters at the general meeting of the Union Association
(Union Kartell)

later 1n the month.

Those workers whose

jobs were not so closely tied to the weather--brewers,
printers, and metal-workers announced they were fully
employed. lO Karl Reie, who for years had been chairman

ot the Associated Unions in Pfungstadt, declared that
the economy was as stable as could be expected under the
prevailing circumstances.

His analysis was accepted by a

large majority of the attendant representatives who voted
to vest authority in his hands for yet

another year.

A

minority of the delegates to the meeting (KPD members)
circumspectly attributed the problems of the workers to a
scheme of the middle class to maim them, and the feeling
was definitely

prest~nt

among a larger circle of workers

that the middle class could not be trusted to respect the
rights of the workers. ll This reaction displayed by
one section of the working class is an indication that
workers were no more free from the vice of demagoguery
than many businessmen.

An additional example that preconceived notions could
lead working class people into dead ends as easily as the
burgerlich is provided by a controversy which
over religion.

b~oke

out

The "Free Thinkers" reacted with overly

zealous highhandedness when they discovered that their
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children were receiving instruction from a teacher with
ties to a church.
Ar,,,eiger

~hich

A vitrolic article appeared in the

charged that the children of "Free Thinkers II

were systematically being forced to study the doctrines of
the Protestant Church, and were never left in peace. l2
But the charges that a protestant teacher's plot was a
foot were unfounded.

An amiable, if uneasy, solution was

reached once the principle cast of characters approached
each other long enough to reveal the true facts surround
ing the incident.
ill~

When the ordinary instructor was taken

a volunteer teacher for the class was required.

The

teacher, Winkler, took over the responsibility for the
students, and taught them a number of songs which could
have been construed as having a religious overtone. 13 Be
yong the songs no attempt had been made to convert the
children in any way.
The soothing strains of the periodic concerts of the
Musikverein could not hide the fact that the town council
bad to find work for the unemployed.

Since the weather

(the Rhine and Main Rivers were frozen until late in
March)14 precluded the possibility that enough Jobs would
be found for the supply of men available, the town council
decided to handle the problem with its own resources.
This meant first of all furnishing the unemployed with
work in the forest.

At the March 11 meeting of the

\1\
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council, it was agreed to employ up to one hundred men in
the woods, until the middle of April, in the belief that
the economy would have overcome its normal letdown by then.
In consideration of the abnormal

sever~ty
,
,

of the Winter,

the KPD and SPD members of' the council lintroduced a sec
ond means of supplying work to the

une~ployedf

They ad

vanced the idea that those unemployed men who were unable
to find work in the forest should be given jobs in a town
project to repair and extend the street system. 15 The
submission of an ambitious proposal which would not yield

I
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a return on the anticipated expenditure of funds was
viewed with alarm by the burgerlich
oil. 16

r

members of the coun

(The council expected a small profit on the sale

of the wood which was cut and collected 'by the unemployed
in the forest.)

It was one thing to

em~loy

the unfortun-

I

ate in the woods; it was quite another thing to approve a
. project which would not be selfsustaining.
v~lutionary

idea to

finan~such

It was a re

an undertaking by gOing

into debt, a notion which brought an even more revolting
thought to the middle class members of the council.
creased debt meant increased taxes, a consideration
small

impo~tance

about the

~agging

In

or

no

to businessmen who already were alarmed
economy_

Though a vote on the proposal was qelayed to a later
date, a hardening of positions was clearly discernible to

till
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the citizens of Pfungstadt.

Hammering out an agreement

which would accommodate the wishes of each side looked
like an impossible task.

The SPD and KPD, it must

~e

added,

depicted their recommendation as a temporary measure, not
as a long range answer to unemployment.

They were as

frightened as the middle class of accumulated debt which
could only be retired through higher taxes. 17
The June meeting of the town council involved itself
once again with the problem of the unemployed, who number
ed almost two hundred and thirty.

The SPD revived its

previous idea that Jobs could be created £or the men through
the construction of streets.

Indstead of a general com

mitment to construct "streets," the SPD suggested that the
council focus its efforts on the path which ran between
Pfungstadt and Darmstadt and was used by a n;lJI1ber of work
ers to get to their emPlOyment. 18 Again the SPD delegation
on the council did not call for a vote on their measure,
preferring to see it included in the town budget scheduled
for introduction in the July council meetings.

At the

council meetings of July 4 and July 11 a serious clash of
priorities occurred for the first time 1n years.

At the

July 4 session the budget was presented to the members for
their initial comments.

After minor observations were ex

pressed by several members, the mayor con£irmed the under
lying conception of the entire council by declaring that

I
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the budget would reflect an orderly and economic state of
affa1rs. 19

The translation of these lofty objectives in

to cold, hard figures was to prove a tougher matter than
anyone had anticipated, especially
election was planned for November.

~ince

the town council

The budget debate pro... ·

vided the stage upon which basic party philosophies were
to tind their first expression.
As the budget was introduced by the finance commit
tee, the council would be obliged to raise taxes by 23,000
marks to achieve a balance between expenditures and in
come.

When this figure was announced,

~elnderat

Martin

jumped from his chair to state that rather than raising
taxes, expenditures should be cut.

He advocated a meas

ure to cut the level of spending for the school, continu
ing education, and the council's contributions to youth
F~OUps,

sport clubs, and welfare outlays.

He also favor

ed increasing the charge for water by three Efenn1gs and
imposing a special tax on businesses which operated branch
offices or stores in Pfungstadt. 20 Martin's proposals
were shrewdly formulated.

In one fell swoop he articUlat

ed the primary economic notion of. the middle class; more
importantly, he assumed a position of leadership within the
ranks of the middle class members of the council.

Martin,

a member of the local party Steinmetz-Martin, thus cut val
uable ground from under the feet of the local affiliates of

:1
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the nationally recognized middle class parties.
Vice-Mayor, Paul Weigel,{SPD), criticized the sug
. gested increase in the water rate, claiming that many
citizens would be unfairly hurt because they were on fixed
iRcomes.

Speaking for the SPD, Friedrich Raab branded Mar

tin's measures both anti-cultural and anti-social and
stated that his faction would turn them down.

Martin

coolly took the opportunity to hammer away at yet
er point.

anot~

He accused Gemeinderat Raab of being an· out

spoken (SPD) party man who was incapable of putting the
. general welrare or the town above his narrow party inter
ests. 2l Martin claimed, on the other hand, that since he
and his colleagues were not dependent upon a national
party, they could judge the budget with unprejudiced
reasonableness and calm.
The short term degree of

I~lartin

I

ssuccess became

apparent when his proposals were dereated by a narrow
margin.

The entire budget was approved, thirteen to one,

with two abstentions, indicating that the middle olass
council members were not prepared to split the council
into two unreconcl1abJe ractions in 1929.

Martin had

scored a number of important pOints for his party, and
trom this point on he and his associates were conceded
the role or rinancial watchdogs by a large portion ot
the middle class,22 an advantage sure to aid their elec
tion chances.

II

!IIII

The epirits of the participants at the SPD yearly
general meeting were

b~oyed

up because they felt that 1928

(and early 1929) had been ~ productive year.23

Friedrich

Raab noted in his annual status report that the SPD had
led the fight for improved housing opportunities for the
poor and for the hiring of.the unemployed for work in the
town's forest.

He commended the membership for their ef

forts, but warned that new struggles lay at hand.

His

last remark to the assembled faithful was that he was re
tiring from the post of chairman of the party after having
served the gPD in that capacity since 1919.

When the re

sults of voting were announced it was determined that the
chairmanship of the party had passed to Georg Schulz.

Two

intelligent young men were also elected to the governing
Georg Liebig to the position of
secretary, and August Hechler as a member at large. 24

co~ttee

of the party:

Raab's retirement acted as a signal to the town that the
original troops of the SPD were ready to pass the mantel
of authority to a new generation.
The new chairman immediately set, as his primary
priority, a gPD victory in the town council elections
scheduled for November.

His second goal was to continue

the party's organizing work among the young workers in
the town.

Planning counter measures to the propaganda of

the NSDAP lay ·"ar down his list on the schedule.

He was

I
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certainly not alone in subscribing to the Nazis an insig
nificant potential function in Pfungstadt's political af
fairs.

The threat the NSDAP posed to the

the SPD simply did not Justify a massive

solidarlt~r

react~on;

of

that

the Nazis had set their sights on the fertile ground of
middle class discontent was simply not discerned by the
leadership and the members of the SPD or the KPD. 25
The leadership of the SPD was much more worried
about KPD inroads within the membership of its own ranks
than some small pin pricks from the NSDAP.

A year-old

incident provided the KPD with the spark it needed to re
. gain momentum.

On April 9, almost one year since the

"Kottmann incident ll had taken place" trial of the acoused
started.

The nine KPD 'and two NSDAP men on trial were

charged with disturbing the peace by the prosecuting at
torney.

He also singled out Heinrich Huxhorn (KPD) for
the additional charge of inCiting a riot. 26 The prosecut
or opened the case by stating that he believed that the
KPD crowd had most likely been responsible for the alter
cation because they had outnumbered the NSDAP.

He also

asserted that rocks and other objects had been thrown at
the Nazi contingent

by

the KPD.

A series of Nazi witness

es were. called who denied any claim that they were armed
with pistols or had provoked the KPD in any way. KPD wit
nesses declared that the NSDAP had indeed been armed"

I
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pointing out that a gun had been found at the scene of the
fight the next day by the police.

The reporter for the

Arzeiger described the statements of the wItnesses as hav
ing done a wonderful job of "leaving everything in the
dark. ,,27
The following day the trial resumed with summations
by the lawyers for the defense, both KPD and
the prosecution.

NSDAP~

and

The prosecutor demanded that Huxgorn be

sentenced to an eight-month jail term for inciting a riot,
and that the other defend·, nts receive

four~month

terms.

,

He moved that Hans Melk, the NSDAP man who had stabbed
Kottmann, be turned over to trial in a higher court. 28
A verdict was reached by the court within the week.
On April 16, the court sentenced Huxhorn and six other
defendants to three months in jail for disturbing the
peace.

The charge against Huxhorn of inciting a riot was

dropped, while two other men were cleared of all charges.
Melk's case was remanded to a higher court. 29 The re
action of the KPD defend.,nts to the outcome of the trial
was swift; they retained the SPD Lawyer Sturmfels (Darm
stadt) to appeal their convictions.

While their appeal

wound its way through the bureaucracy of the courts, they
remained free.
Almost immediately the Union Association issued a
·statement derIding the court for taking the word of the
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NSDAP witnesses over those of the workers.

They advocated

that the court should have inspected the NSDAP members
more intensely if it really wished to find the sour<,:e of tre
trouble.

For the SPD, the trial could be shrugged off with

frustrated references to the injustice surrounding the mat
ter; for the KPD it was another example of the nails being
pounded into the coffin that the capitalist system in
tended for the workers.

The KPD leadership astutely began

to circulate the impression to the workers that the KPD
defendants were being persecuted solely for their politic
altheories. 30 The principal means at the disposal of the
KPD to combat street violence was the League of Anti-Fac
ists which encompassed both the membership and the goals
of the Rotfrontkampferbund which had been banned in the
state of Hesse-Darmstadt by the interior miLister.

Although

the League of Anti-Facists was not a large group in

1929~

the estimated size was twenty men; they agitated the
nerves of both the burgerlich and the SPD regularly.3l
The questions surrounding the payment to the GroBherzog,
the building of a cruiser by the Repul;>lic, the "Kottmann
incident," and finally the frustrating lack of action on
the unemployment problem combined to draw new strength to
the KPD. With little reason to oppose the NSDAP (they were
rarely to be seen in uniform)'I the KPD took to the sur
rounding countryside to win new converts among the workers
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and to lend a degree of support to other KPD groups which
did not possess the manpower of the Pfungstadt unit. 32
Many a Suaday was spent on a bicycle peddling from town to
town where meetings, demonstrations, parades, and occa
sional fights took place.
To counteract the KPD

propagand~

the Union Associa

tion stressed that the worker had to remain united at the
May Day celebration.

Literally hundreds of workers gather

ed early on that day to march in the traditional parade
which featured two bands and a drum and bugle corps that
wound its way through the streets to the SportPlatz. 33
The KPD had again instructed its members to join the par
ade as individuals to underscore the unity of the working
class, even though the KPD leadership was uneasy with the
programs of the SPD and the Union.

At the Sportplatz the

men were joined by their families to hear a speech by
Heinemann (Darmstadt).

I

He declared that the power of the

workers depended upon their unity more than anything else.
Disunity and a splintered approach to political questions,
he said, were the quickest way for the workers in Pfung
stadt to lose their grasp on the levers of power.

He

closed by reminding the assembled crowd that, "all wheels
stop when your strong arms will it.,,34

But the crack that

had developed between the KPD and the SPD during the
Reichstag election of 1928 was beginning to spread to the

S8
Union because of its strong backing of the SPD proposals
in the town council.
pr~ssed

The KPD officials in the Union had

their colleagues to take a firmer stand on the

issue of town jobs for the unemployed.

The months before

the May Day festivities had witnessed a steady growth in
the discontent with the leadership of the Union Associa
tion by its KPD members, a discontent which bordered on
open revolt after May lst. 35
While some of the citizenry engaged themselves in
the political questions of the day with amazing zeal,
others were content to let life's disputes swirl around
them without comment.

The tenth anniversary celebration

of the Sangervereinigung (United Singing Club) ir. early
June was a time for the innocent release of accumulated
energy.

The Sangervereinigung staged a parade and fest

tor the people of Pfungstadt. 36

The initial revelry

which began on Saturday (June 9) with a torchlight par
ade set the tone for the entire weekend.

A mild, friendly

attitude allowed participants and non-participants alike
to drown their cares in a liter or two of beer.
One organization

wh~ih

earned the praise of the

entire community was the volunteer fire department, which
commemorated its fiftieth anniversary on July 20 and 21.
Following a parade on Saturday (July 20) the department
put on a demonstration of flrefighting techniques on
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Sunday.

Julius Hildebrand, the owner of the brewery,

presented a contribution of RM 2,175 to the chief after
the demonstration. 37 He nvted that the businessmen of
the town realized the importance of the department and
w1shed to express their appreciation for the hours of work
the men put in to protect the town from the danger of
fire.

His comments were greeted with a round of applause

from the assembled crowd.

While the fire department was

receiving the unanimous approval of the populace, the
young people of Pfungstadt were lambasted by an older
member of the community.

The Anzeiger printed a letter

to the editor which was designed to analyze one aspect of
the problems young people presented to the older genera
tion.

The tongue-in-cheek style did not hide the writer's

deadly earnestness.
We live in the age of children! We hear this from
many sources and the grounds for it are covered in
every magazine whose editor claims to understand
anything. Bearing this in mind I must say that
this precept is not taken into consideration e
nough [in Pfungstadt]. Let's take the Eberstadter
stra~e as an example.
Countless motorscooter rid
ers can be found there every evening, proving that
their 'gas horses' can make an enormous amount of
noise. I think that it's outrageous that the po
lice do not close the street, lead pedestrians
through the nearby side streets, and tell the in
habitants not to leave their homes between 7 and
11 P.M. I would call this practical cooperation
with the ideal of the age of children. Who can
agree with a mother who has worked hard all day
when she gets excited when her child wakes up be
cause of all the noise. One can really not expect
the maching gun like noise of the motorscooters to
be turned off merely because a child is awakened.
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In this age such notions are outdated. I hope
that these lines will help make the responsible
authorities more concerned about scooter riders,
so that nOQ~ of them have to ride through town
under eighty kilometers per hour. [I hope] that
all of our motorized contemporaries are removed
from (oyr town's] racetrack - the Eberstadter
strape.3 H
This was only the tip of an iceberg of dissatisfaction
with young people in general, who were accused of being
irresponsible, of not desiring to save money, and of
lacking a proper respect for work. 39
Paralleling the festiv1ties surrounding various an
niversaries a stock show and sale was held once a year
during August.

The show, sponsored by the Ziegenzucht

Verein Pfungstadt, assumed an important place in the farm
life of the town. 40 The Handwerker also scheduled a dis
play of their goods in conjunction with the stock show in
1929.

This idea was lauded by many people because it com

bined two of the basic occupations, upon which the town
had grown, .in one neat exhibition.

From August 22 to

August 25, a public auction, private trading, and public
attention in the proceedings dominated the atmosphere in
the town, sweeping aside the nagging fears which many
citizens complained about.

Attendance at the show was

above average, although the crafts.nen complained that
people did not take their exhibits as seriously as they
would have lL;;ed. 41
In the midst of the non-political activity, the
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NSDAP held its first public attempt to win new recruits to
their caus,e in quite some time. 42

The public attempt of

the NSDAP to stimulate interest in the local group met with
only limited success because potential members felt that
their businesses could not survive a boycott which might
set in if the working class found out.

Thus the publicly

acknowledged membership of the party remained small, while
secret membership in the party increased. 43

The accept

ance of the party as a legitimate vehicle for the expltes
sion of the discontent and frustration among the farming
community and many small businessmen had begun to grow.
While the Nazis were discovering their lack of pub
lic support, the SAJ (Young Socialist Workers) staged a
county convention in Pfungstadt. 44

The Pfungstadt SAJ,

as host group, arranged the entire affair with the support
of the SPD, who were extremely proud of their youth group.
But outside of the working class, the young people of the
SAJ who gathered in Pfungstadt made little impact on the
populace.
Another indication of the minimal impact of the
Nazis in Pfungstadt was the impressive display of strength
the republican forces

0,(

Pfungstadt staged on August 10

and 11 during the Constitution Day festivities.

The two

day affair was easily the largest the residents of Pfung
-stadt had ever seen. 45 On Saturday, August 10, hundreds

I
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of people joined a parade whieh marched for over an hour
before it reached the town hall where a local dignitary
ell.;;Qlled the virtues of democracy and the republic.

His

concluding remark that "the vast majority of Pfungstadtts
citizens arc true to the Republic and the Constitution"
summarized the situation in 1929 in Pfungstadt. 46 On the
second day of the celebration Minister Zinn, the town's
protestant minister, held a church service in honor of the
Republic, while later in the day a memorial concert was
presented.
As in previous years, the adult inhabitants were
not the only ones to take part in
stitution.

the Con

corr~emorating

On August 13 the school children were led b,:

their teachers in a Day of Honor, which included a musical
presentation, the recitation of poems and an address to
the assembled students by a teacher (StraBmann).

Conclud

ing the program at the school was the distribution of
small flags bearing the colors of the RepUblic. 47
The weather did not cooperate with the people of
Pfungstadt at all in 1929.

A cold spell had grIpped the

town in its icy claws between January and April, while a
heat wave cut the size of the crops during August and
September. 48

Along with the damage to the crops came a

putrid smell from the Modau which the

Anzeig~

blamed on

dlscharged waste eminating from a. factory in Eberstadt.
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The paper editorialized that the town council must do

Ii
I ,

something about the "stink" before the atmosphere became

II
I '
I'

completely unbearable.

Failing in an effort to get the

otfending company to clean up its mess, the paper demand
ed that the plant be shut down ent1rely.49

The firm re~

plied that it was not responsible for the pollution, but
the paper stood its ground inviting the company's offici
als to come to Pfungstadt themselves and discover that
the smell was very real.
Against ,this background of a heat wave and the un
pleasant oder from the Modau, the election campaign rumbled
to life.

The SPD, true to their chairman's promise to

campaign early and with Vigor, inaugurated the scramble for
seats on the town council on August 31.
not forgotten thebii;t'gerlict! charges tha.t

The leadership had
th~

middle class

were bearing more than their fair share of the tax 'burden
in Pfungstadt.

In an effort to point out that the workers

were suffering more from unemployment and diminishing wages
they announced that Seubert (Darmstadt) would explain to
those interested" "Who carries the Debt. tt50 Seubert's
crisp style served as a workable vehicle to cOllvey his
contention that the working class was under more pressure
trom taxes and unemployment, while the imagination of the
middle class had produced their unfounded claims.

His

pOint fell on eager listeners" who bolstered the argument
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w1th l1vely shouts of approval.

The party treasurer,

Klopp1nger, characterized the financial standing as out
standing.

With the l\:nowledge that the party would be

able to mount a major campaign without concentrating
f1rst on raising funds, it was decided to hold another
meeting late in September and plaster the town with hand
bills Just before the election. 5l
The NSDAP was also beginning to anticipate the town
council election when, in the second week of September,
they

rented~a

~~~se.n

restaurant in which they might present Rine;

(Offenbach).

Ringhausen revealed to the small

crow'd wh1ch was lIexploiting the working class. ,,52

The

lack of response from -rheworking class was no h1ndrance
to the party faithful ~hO continued to plan other meetings
before the November elj:ction.

The spirit or the NSDAP mem

i

bers was neither shakeh nor diminished, although no one
believed that they would make a large impact upon the
electorate. 53
Several days later the Landbund held one of its
rare membersh1p meetings, this time to discuss the price
~ot

milk as well as to set tha election campaign in motion.

At the meeting the farmers were more concerned with defend
1ng the two Pfennig 1ncrease in the price of milk that
had just been instituted than discussing pOlitics. 54 A
majority of the costs, they claimed, were due to the het
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spell and also to the rise in taxes which they had experi
enced.
bl~e

After a spirited discussion they agreed that the
lay with the milk handlers.

Only after the issue

was dismissed did they turn their attention to the elec
tion, deciding informally' on a list of candidates they
would place before the voters. 55
Another interesting development was the meeting of
the Steinmetz-Martin during the last week of September.
This was to be their only meeting before the November el
ection"so they attempted to set down their program with
care.

They declared that their main thrust in the town

council would be to keep the budget within reasonable
limits. 56 They also promised to forcibly represent the
interests of the middle class in the face of the working
class majority which they accused of irresponsible finan
cial activities.
Capitalizing upon the popularity they had won in the
budget debate of July, the Steinmetz-Martin party reen
forced their concern for the general welfare of the commun
ity.

They had discovered a substantial echo to Martin's

deelaration that his non-party status allowed him greater
".

latitude in arriving at sound decisions.
in$; the campaign they declared:

Therefore, dur

"No individual should

practice politics in the town council, beca,useearlier
(before 19:, ,) the general welfare of the to\\.'1l was consid

er~d to be ~bove the policieA of each party."57

I

!. .II

In 1929 the Steinmetz-Martin slate was primarily an
economic interest group which directly fought two other
p4rties tor support--the DVP and the Craftsmen and Busi
ness Association.

The DDP (German Democratic Party) did

not put up any candidates for the election because of the
retirement of Christoph Hanbuch from active political life
(he did not run because of his age).

The field lay open

for the Steinmetz-Martin candidates to cash in some of the
chips they had won in the strong stand they had made the
previous July when the budget had been uP for considera
tion.

The bulk of the campaign activity they carried on

was by word of mouth among their friends and associates,
allowing them to save money and retain their image of
non-political involvement. 58
A coordinated effort was launched by the Associated
Union and the SPD to influence the electorate on the
tinal days of September.

First the Union met to debate

the question of unemployment insurance.

In a moving ap

peal to his fellow citizens one worker declared:

II

We do not want to be supported, we do not want (to
be given) beggars' money; we want work, most of
all, work. But if neither the Reich nor the Land
nor the town can give us jobs, then at least pro
vide us with enough support so that our families
can live.59
To begin the SPD gathering which was scheduled the
night after

t:~e

Union meet1ng, Ernst Walke, member ot the

town council and the brother of the Re1chsbanner leader,

:1
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Albert Walke, proclaimed emphatically that not one Pfennig
was spent by the town in 1928/29 that was wasted.

Where

aL the Union, the night before, had been calling foI' a
just level of support for the unemployed, Walke chastised
the KPD for planting the idea among the unemployed that
higher levels of support could be wrung out of the middle
class. 60 The courage of the SPD to try to balance the
demands of the unemployed with the ability of the middle
class and the remaining workers to pay was a dangerous
business.

It was dangerous because both the middle class

and the KPD could outbid the gPD for the allegiance of
various groups with more radical suggestions than the SPD
was willing to make.

The struggle to retain a reasonable

position in the middle of an ocean of emotional appeals
was the chief problem for the SPD throughout the years
before 1933.
The SPD firmly believed that they could stem the
tide of radical, demagogic propaganda for all intents and
purposes, which was surrounding them, by outsmarting and
outworking the other parties.

An appeal was put forward

at the meeting for every SPD member to place himself at
the service of the party during a discussion of the up
coming town council election.

To that end it was agreed

that the week of October 12-19 . auld be set aside for an
intensive campaign.

After nominating candidates for the
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election, the chairman closed the assembly with the old
slogan, "Mit uns das Volk, mit uns der siegl U61 A fur
ther

indi~ation

of the

sta~11ity

and integrity of the

SPD is provided at the time of Stresemann's death.
Hessischer

~olksfreund

The

praised him with the words, lilt

is to Stresemann's credit that he was able, in the end,
to bring the politicians of all beliefs together (under
one hat).,,62

Unfortunately, the tide was turning against

the politics of reasonableness.

A new chord had been

struck in the hearts of the unemployed and the middle
class.

Uncompromising polemics were replacing reason.
Using the sununer months as a yardstick, the months

from September to November were a highly charged political
period.

Complicating the political spectrum was the

Craftsmen and Businessmen Association's desire to place
a list of its own before the public.
two reasons:

This was done for

1) They felt that it was necessary for them

to represent their economic interests in the council
themselves,63 and 2) They did not desire a political alli
ance with another group because

01'

intense personal ani

mosity which existed between the candidates of the Associ
ati·;;;~;.

and the Steinmetz-Martin group.

Martin was a watch

maker by trade as was the chief candidate of
and Businessmen Association, Hassenzahl.

th~

Craftsmen

The rivalry

which existed between the two men did not even bend when
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it came to the defeat of the financial policies of the
SPD_KPD. 64
The DVP which had

be~n

caught with its guard down

during the budget debate in July, tried to recoup its
losses by stressing that it was ready to fight for the
Christian interests of the people and for a decent budget
while holding down taxes if they, the voters, would support
them. 65
back.

But the DVP had a great deal of ground to gain
Their leaders were divided on what might be the

best manner in which to accomplish this task, outside of
restressing their old themes.

No new blood and no dra

matic new strategy came to the aid of the party.66
The irrepressible energy of the NSDAP found an out
let on October 14 when the party staged a public meeting
featuring a miner from the Ruhr who scheduled the topic:
"Sixty years of work - ten years of fraud.,,67

The meager

forces at the disposal of the NSDAP in Pfungstadt were
regularly supplemented by reenforcements from Darmstadt.
October 14 was no different.

Only t\'lenty people were at

tracted to the restaurant, "Zur Krone ll by the advertise
ments of the NSDAP even though the admission charge was a
nominal thirty Pfennigs.
Darmstadt.

But thirty members came from

Nevertheless, the meeting was not a success.

A large contingent of KPD workers milled about in .front
of the restaurant occasionally taunting the people inside.

I I
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None would step into the gathering place to hear the re
marks of the NSDAP's speaker. 68 The caution of the KPD
was born from its

experien~es

in 1928.

The appeal of

Huxhorn and his friends was still pending before the
court and they did not want to provide the judge with any
excuse to flatly reject their lawyer's motion for dismis
sal of the convictions. 69
The Associated Union and the SPD were intelligent
enough to realize that the words of the KPD, specifically
Huxhorn's, were much

likely to sap their strength
than the wild charges of the NSDAP. 70 To meet the on
m~re

slaught of the KPD, the SPD held
on October 26.

~,other

election meeting

During the course of the assembly, the film

"Vom Willen zur Tat" was shown since it succinctly explain
ed the accomplishments of SPD town council members in
Hessen.

The entrance fee was set at a low twenty Pfennigs

tor ,the employed while the unemployed were allowed to
enter for nothing.

Besides restating the necessity for the

election of SPD members to the town council, the chairman
(Schulz) introduced two other topics for discussion.
measured words he attacked:

With

1) the appeal of the NSDAP

DNVP for signatures on their petition for a referendum on
the Young Plan which had begun on October 14.

At the meet

ing the SPD leadership followed the same format which they
had used in an article that appeared in the Anzeige!: on the

I
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same day to launch a violent attack on the Hugenbergische
referendum.

With the upmost severity the chairmarl lashed

out at Hugenberg as a man t:nt on destroying the composi
tion of Weimar Germany.

He gleefully announced that only

eleven people had signed the petition in Pfungstadt; 2)
the candidates of the NSDAP, who had submitted their lists
of potential council members under the title Natlonale
soziale deut!,che Arbeiter- und Angestelltenvertret
ung. 71 . Schulz blasted the convenient new name the NSDAP
~

had. given themselves as a cheap trick, a vain attempt to

fool some unsuspecting members of the community, a "wolf
in sheep's clothing" act which would not succeed.

It was

pOinted out that not one worker was represented on the
"new" party's list of candidates.
I

Easily the mOflt active party during the election
campaign was the SPD.

They held two more meetings before

the November 17 vote.

The first was on November 1 at the

home of Paul Weigel included a discussion of strengths and
weaknesses of specific candidates.

The second assembly

provided the opportunity for the voters to. hear Mayor
Lorenz

(Erzh~usen)

town council,

.discuss the policies of the SPD in the

Between the mjetings members were busy

handing out leaflets and pas ing placards allover town. 72
The NSDAP-DIlVP petitio

drive ended on October 29

with a total of fifty-five s~gnatures.73

The SPD claimed
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that the final figure had risen'to fifty-f.ive because the
Landbun~

had stepped in at the last minute to encourage

its membe~s to sign the petit1on. 74
the drive as a success.

The NSDAP looked on

They viewed the matter from the

perspective that they were the recipients of political
support from an economically and socially significant
group, the Landbund, which had been opposed to their
goals to that pOint. 75

Considering the fact that 4,893

voters,were eligible to sign the pet1tion, the impact of
the drive, purely in terms of numbers, was small.

But

in terms of influence won, the NSDAP drive was a qualified
success.

People who knew little or nothing about the

NSDAP were suddenly exposed to it" and, while they might
not have rushed into the arms of the NSDAP, they certainly
d1d not reject the motives of the group.

After the drive,

a certain respectability was assigned to the NSDAP by a
,growing number of middle class cit1zens. 76
To. counteract the propaganda of the Steinmetz-Martin
.

group and the Nazis, the DVP called one last meetirlg before
the election.

Somewhat confused by the skillful maneu

vers of their opponents, they fell back on a traditional
call for a morally high professional call of government
officials, a belief in the values of their fathers, and
more understanding for the problems of the middle class
by the town council. 77

But .they were troubled by the
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s1gns that pOinted to a decline in their total vote before
the election.
KPD campaign activity before the election culminated
in an election eve rally.

At the meeting the SPD was

charged with failing to do all that could be done for the
unemployed.

The largest part of the KPD election endeavor

had been aimed at dissatisfied SPD voters.

Indeed, the

KPD seemed much more interested in lambasting the SPD than
even the NSDAP. 78 Verbally the SPD took a beating from
the KPD, but physically Nazis got a share also.

There

were no large fights before the election, but small per
sonal altercations were often sparked by the consumption
of an inordinate amount of beer.

Those fights that did

occur took place in working class restaurants and in
variably involved very few individuals. 79 It is very
doubtful that votes were sucked from one party to another
on account of the fights.
On election day it rained continually.

But the rain

did not restrain eighty-six percent of the eligible voters
from marking their ballots. 80 Two important developments
became apparent when the election results were announced.
First, while the number of SPD voters actually increased
by eighty-two, the percentage of the vote they won fell
by·almost 1.5%, while the KPD gained a significant number
of new voters.

The SPD, realizing what had happened to
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them, frankly declared that of the four hundred young
people who gained the right to vote since 1925 less

tt~n

one hundred had joined the ranks of the SPD, whereas over
two hundred should normally have jOined.

They blamed

this fact on the unemployment young people faced after
they had completed their apprenticeships.

To counteract

this trend the leadership of the SPD laid plans for the
immediate introduction of a program of voter education
meetings. 82 Second, and the most significant product of
the election, was the meaningful gains scored by the
RESULTS.OF THE NOVEMBER 11, 1929, TOWN COUNCIL ELECTION
Votes

Partl
SPD

1,110

Percenta~e

(1,628) * 42.5

Members

(43.46)

8

(8)

SteinmetzMartin
KPD

154

(564)

18.64

(15.l9)

4

(3)

494

(289)

12.21

(1.18)

2

(1)

Landbund

361

(442)

8.92

(11.61)

1

(2)

DVP

269

(321)

6.65

(8.92)

1

(2)

251

(218)

6.20

(1.48)

1

(1)

206

(---)

5.09

(----)

1

(-)

(---)

(191)

(----)

(5.14)

(-)

(1)

Craftsmen &
Susiness
Association
NSDAV
(NSDAP)
(DDP)

4,045

•Reeults

election. til

(3,713)

99.76

(99.28)


18 (18)

of the November 15, 1925 town council
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NSDAP and the Steinmetz-Martin groups.

A development simi

lar to the SPD troubles was occuring to the Landbund, and
the DVP.

Both parties lost a number of their potential

supporters to the NSDAP.

The growth of Steinmetz-Martin

was most likely the result of the fact that the DDP did
not enter the election.

Martin's attacks on the spending

habits of the town council together with their non-poli
tical cloak must have had a telling influence on the vot
ers.

And Steinmetz-Martin were well established members

ot the community who did not represent the radical break
with the past that the NSDAP did,83 which probably ac
counts for the fact that the NSDAP did not equal the two
hundred and sixty vote level they had achieved in the
1928 Reichstag election.
The KPD set out immediately to capitalize on its
election success.

They annexed a cause with lightening

speed which promised to stir up the working class and
drive another wedge between the KPD and the SPD.

Hein

rich Huxhorn charged that the SPD would try to keep him

ott the town council by claiming that the election of
his wife's sister, Marie Reia, disqualified him because
relatives co Id not serve at the same time. 84 The mat
ter seemed t
portion by t

have been (deliberately) blown out of pro
leaders.

The SPD never actually call

ed tor the b

ring of Huxhorn,85 and Mayor Schwinn de

clared at th

December 2 council meeting

that the

,,
I

'

I

I
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elections were perfectly legal. 86

Therefore the incident

1s not so 1mportantfor what happened, but for the mil
itancy which the KPD manii'_sted.

The KPD had always re

belled against -the role the SPD played in Pfungstadt, but
the year 1929 marked the first time that significant com
bination of factors enabled the KPD to make significant
strides toward their goal of po:Litical power.

Huxhornts

demagogic outburst was but one more example of the most
common KPD tactic.
It came as no surprise that the town council would
devote the largest part of its December 12 meet1ng dis
cussing unemployment problems,

si~ce

late in 1929 it be

came apparent to many that the unemployment situation was
taking on important political and economic considerations~7
The assistance the town offered the unem9loyed and the
needy cost it RM 26,000 for the budget year 1928/29 (2.9%
of the total bUdget).88
1929/30 budget year

w~s

lay in the fact that

i1.e

The projected expenditure for the
a modest RM 25,000; the trouble
town would have to supply 35% of

the RM 25,000 during 1929/30, whereas it had only been
responsible i'or 25% of the expenditure during the 1928/29
budget period. 89 Considering the uproar which had sur
rounded the July budget debate, more unemployment and
falling proi'its offered little prospect for a moderation
of political demands.
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The Associated Union was cognizant of the growing
unemployment, but did not go beyond urging the council to
give the unemployed a chance at a Job by sponsoring town
projects. 90 Besides the unemployment puzzle, the union
took a stand against the

NSDAP-D~NPsponsored

referendum

vote which was scheduled to take place on December 22.
The SPD

lead~rs

had simply told its supporters to stay

away from the POlls.9l
The Landbund reduced the issues surrounding the
referendum to the simple statement that the costs of the
Young Plan were not bearable. 92 The aid they lent to the
NSDAP in the days before the election was critical for
success, since the Landbund commanded a solid block of
voters and the police had banned the only NSDAP public
meeting before the vote. 93

Replacing public discussion

were advertisements placed in the Anzeiger which urged
voters to go to the polls and stop the Young Plan which
would only mean "eighty-seven years of hunger, crisis,

,

anel misery for you, your children, and their children. 1f

94

Since the NSDAP had established a political foot
hold in Pfungstadt during 1928 and 1929 and had the sup
port of the Landbunu, the result of the vote was re
spectable.

Of the 4,893 people who were eligible to

vote, 417 opted to use their right at the polls.

The

vast majority, 404, voted for the repeal of the Young

I
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Plan while only nine hearty souis voted "no.,,95

The

most significant aspect of the election was acceptance

ot the NSI"AP as a legitimate polit::'cal movement which,
in the minds of at least 8% of the electorate, was not
just another radical party, but a vehicle of change, a
means of expressing the frustration and resentment that
was stored in their hearts against the failure of their
expectations.

The NSDAP was becoming a viable alter

native.
The last month of 1929 provides a prophetic look
at the challenging years about to face the inhabitants
of Pfungstadt.

The problems, the cast, and the prejudices

were estab11shed--the agonizing death of a society had
begun.
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lpA: January 8, 1929; HVF: January 9, 1929 and PGSP:
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2Interview with Julius Winkl~r.
3pA : January 23, 1929.
4Interviews with Julius Hofmann, Maria Schulz,
Wilhelm Kaffenberger and Luise Steinmetz. Georg Liebig
(SPD) remarked, "The middle class did have to pay more taxes
than the workers. The SPD ma~a mistake in saying that
only the poor would remain, while the NSDAP said that they
would support the continued existance of a strong middle
class. n

5HVF : February 1, 1929.
6Intervlew with Jacob Brauer.
7pA : February 1, 1929 and interviews with Ludwig
Gunkel and August Hechler.

8pA : March 5 and 8, 1929.
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llInterview with Jacob Delp.
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16Interviews with Adam Ruckelshausen, Wilhelm Kaf
feriberger and Julius Hofmann.
17Interviews with August Hechler and Georg L1ebig.
18 PA: June 4, 1929; HVF: June 5, 1929 and PGSP:
June 3, 1929, pp. 153-155.
19 pA : July 5, 1929; HVF: July 5, 1929 and PGSP:
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21 Ibid •
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The case against one of the

29HVF: April 17, 1929.
30Notes from the private file of Heinrich Huxhorn.
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39Interviews with Johann Kelsch and Ludwig Wenz.
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and Peter CroSmann.
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48Interview with Ludwig Wenz.
49 pA : September 5 and 10, 1929 and HVF: September 2,
1929.
SOpA: August 31, 1929.

I . I il ! 111:

1

I·

,I I' I: ill IIII 1IIIf 11111
I

112
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53Interviews with Jacob Hanbuch and Heinrich Sand.
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55Interview with Ludwig Gunkel.
56 pA : October 1, 1929.
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59HVF : October 2, 1929.
60 pA : September 28, 1929 and HVF: October 2, 1929.
61Ibid and interview with August Hechler.
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ber 8 and 12, 1929.
73 pA : October 30, 1929 •
. 74HVF: October 31, 1929.
75Interview with Heinrich Sand.
76Interviews with Luise
hausen.

Stei~~etz and Adam Rucke1s

77 pA : November 14. 1929.
78pA : November 15, 1929 and interview with Peter
CroBmann.
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Luise Steinmetz.
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CF..APTER V
REALIGNING SOCIETY - JANUARY, 1930 TO JULY, 1930
Unemployment and insecurity, the most obvious out
growths of an

aceelerating depression (approximately two

hundred men were receiving town welfare payments on Jan
uary 1, 1930, while only sixty people were getting them
on January 1, 1929), provided the basis for the pin-prick
attacks which were eminating from the KPD and Steinmetz
Martin.

These annoying assaults upon the bastions of

reason and stability in Pfungstadt became ingrained with
in a conflict which was polarizing the citizens and re
aligning the previous symbols of authority into new con
figurations.

At the center of the changes which were

taking place was the town council.

The complexity of the

situation and the importance of the stakes were mirrored
in two discussions which filled the chamber in which the
town council was meeting on January 6.

A debate of wel

fare rules and the implementation of work projects led
Gemeinderat lrtartin to voice strong obj ections to what he
characterized as the free spending habits of the SPD and
the KPD.

He specifically assaulted the purchase of

stones by the town, stating that there was no use to be

round for them.

A SPD speaker acidly replied that they
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would be of use if the town would appropriate the funds
necessary for the project.

Whereas the biirgerlich and

working class representatives on tile council could find
no common denominator concern1ng the allev1ation of the
problems of the unemployed, they could rally together to
oppose a persistent thorn in their side.

One of the re

sults of the 1923 inflation had been the complete elim
1nation of the town's funding of the church debt.
the government mastered the

inflation~

After

the creditors of

the church won a reappraisal of its debt.

The church, in

turn, put pressure on the town council to renegotiate
the1r support of the church.

When an amiable solution

could not be reached, the church sued the town hoping to
reclaim a large portion of the fundS..; they felt were due.
W1th one voice, the whole membership of the council em
phatically declared that they were resolved to oppose the
church's suit. l Financial difficulties were enough to
form a block between the entire spectrum of parties in
the council and only provided one more reason for the in
habitants of Pfungstadt to ignore their Protestant Church.
The SPD framed their work in the council around one
main issue after 1929:
ployed.,,2

"Work must be found for the unem

This simple formula proved difficult to apply

1n practice.

Over the months the SPD suggested that more

men should be given jobs cutting wood in the forest, that
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more houses should be built with the unemplo.yed supplying
the labor, and that the unemployed could profitably be
used constructing streets and sewers.

But the KPO';;s suc

cess at the polls in 1929 t coupled with their new-found
desire to steer a completely independent course in the
council, meant that the SPO could only muster ten votes in
the council

(eight SPO

member~

plus the mayor and the

vice-mayor) to the ten votes of the KPO and biirgerlich.
Since the middle class representatives in the council were
not interested in compromising with the SPD when the issue
involved a possible increase ot the tax burden, which they
felt was already too great t compromise solutions of any
s~rt

were difficult to achieve.

s~tuation

A classic example of the

as it had evolved in Pfungstadt by 1930 occur

,

r~d
I

when the SPO suggested that more emergency housing

s~ould be built.

The so-called Flachbauten was. under con

,

s~ruction

in the northwest section of Pfungstadt at the

ttme, but their limited facilities did not promise much
r~lief
,

p4ge

for the housing problem which existed in 1930 (see
22).

When the SPO faction offered a proposal to

the council for more housing, gemeinderat Martin counter
ed by suggesting that the families in the Muhlberg settle
ment

(~mall

wooden housing belonging to the town which

had originally been intended only a8an emergency measure
i~ediately a.:.~:;er

World War One) should yield their homes
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to families which had a large number of children.

Inter-

e.tingly enough, Heinrich Huxhorn, who always suspected
Mtrtin of some ulterior motives, rose to his feet to de
clare his support for Martinis measure.

Realizing that

this meant that the counciJ.:- would not approve the pro
posal, the SPO, for the moment, allowed the matter to
die. 3
The pendulum of SPO - KPO cooperativeness swung
back toward a more productive arrangement when discussion
in the council concerning the sale of town.land to the
SAJ (Sozialistische .f,.rbeiter Jugend) began.

This issue

divided the council along strict worker-burfSerlich lines.
The interests of the working class were so obviously in
volved that the KPD did not dare block the SPD measure.
Over the strong objection of Steinmetz and Graff (NSDAP)
the SPD proposal to sell the SAJ city-owned land for
thirty Pfennigs per square meter was passed.

The depth

of the oPPositJon of those two was so intense that they
had proposed that the land should not be sold for under
one mark fifty per square meter. 4 The SPD emerged from
the tussle with a win:

in the fray they had to concede the

KPO more ground because they had to legitim1t1.ze KPD pro
paganda which stated that the KPD would not fail the work
ing class on truly significant issues.

The KPD had to be

accepted as a partner, even if only a Junior partner, by

'I
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the SPD if it wished to advance its own programs.

The

SPD was being squeezed from both the right and the left-
t~

side with the KPD too often in the council risked the

biirgerlich charge that the

II

reds" were not responsive to

the pleas of the middle class for a ,balanced economic
response to the serious financial crisis at hand.

Too

close a working relationship with the middle class only
invited the charge from the left that only the KPD could
adequately represent the interests of the workers in the
council.

A natural inclination within the membership

ranks of the SPD to side more openly with the KPD tended
to compound the problems which faced the leaders of the
party. 5
Around the financial standing of the town revolved
the most intensive debts of the first half of 1930.

At

the council meeting of May 22 the good news that work on
the Flachbauen was proceeding smoothly had to be balanced
against an ominous report of the fifty thou.sand marks the
town council had borrowed from the state for the construc-·
tion of housing in the Fall of 1930; only twelve thousand
five hundred and fifty marks remained to be dispersed.
news shocked the councdl

The

members who had expected the

funds to stimulate Pfungstadt's lagging economy.

The an

nouncement spar'ked a bitter exchange of recriminatory re
marks between SPD-KPD members of the council and the middle
class members who took the opportunity to drive home their
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idea that such irresponsible financial operations would
surely destroy the fiber of the middle class in Pfung
stadt--the basis of a stab'.e, prosperous community in
their oPinion. 6
The underlying problem, everyone realized, was un
employment which sapped the dignity from a man just as
quickly as it plunged the town into serious fiscal dif
ficulty.

Since the SPO proposals for street construc

tlon by the unemployed remained impaled upon the problem
of adequate financing, the council could only listen once
again to the SPD's proposing that men be given jobs by
the town in some sort of construction work.

A burgerlich

member of the council dryly remarked that at a time when
the demand for welfare payments was increasing (the coun
eil had budgeted twenty-five thousand marks for unemploy
ment pay for 1929/30 while fifty-one thousand seven hund
red and twenty-six marks was actually distributed 7 ),
which meant an increased tax load for a people already
unable to pay them, such talk was irresponsible.
felt itself a hunted animal in such circumstances.

The SPO
Unable

either to demand more radical solutions or to relax their
championing of the "workers'

rights~1t

The KPO, free of

such limitations J felt itself better attuned to the mood
of the working class electorate, and moved to fill the
gap which the SPO'left.

Huxhorn bellowed that the unem

played were being cheated out of their welfare payments

!
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by a slow and unresponsive bureaucracy which took much
too much time processing applications and official docu
ments.

His broad side struck a tender area within the

ranks of the unemployed who more and more looked to the
!PD to provide a solution to the ever more pressing forces
which were grinding them down.
As early as January the ineffective nature of the
Associated Union's response to the reports of layoffs and
Unemployment had been revealed when the leaders of the
Union could only suggest that the unemployed avail them
selves of the service of the work bureau which existed
in Pfungstadt for special problems.

Additionally they

offered the council their opinion that the time had come
to raise taxes and cut the rent for city-owned apart
ments, but neither proposal had any chance uf adoption.
The measures were put forward in the hope that they would
hold the membership of the Union together, more than for
their actuaL application, which the Union realized would
be asking for trouble. 8 The Union also sponsored a num
ber of meetings for the unemployed, but they only pro
vided the KPD with a platform for the propagation of their
own notions of the causes of the unemployment.

One of the

Union's meetings was completely disrupted when a KPD
spokesman charged that the Union had made a substantial
(RM504) contribution to the 1929 town council SPD election
fund. 9 The truth that the Union had only contributed
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RM 25 did not stop the KPD from distributing their charge
on handbills throughout the working class section of
town.

Tv underline

and e..<pand their own differences

and influence within the working class, the KPD sponsored
a

~

Hilfe meeting on February 1 at which time they pro

mised the unemployed and the working class specific mea
sures for their relief.

These included the help they

would lend anyone who was attempting to wade through the
forms one had to fill out, and a charitable bureau to dis
tribute fOOd. lO
The SPD adopted a statement which had been drawn up
by its leaders which declared that the party was satis
fied with the results of the town council election, al
though more spade work was essential between elections
among the potential electorate.

A degree of resentment

crept into the voice of Gemeinderat Walke as he discus
sed the financial situation of the town when he criticis
ed the national a.uthorities for not providing more finan
cial support.

Walke emphasized that the KPD attacks on

the SPD were merely opportunistic
realistic political thought.

outbursts devoid of

The next order of business

was a unanimous declaration of approval and support for
the SAJ's plans for the construction of their own meeting
place. (Heim)..
pa~ty

The chairman (Schulz) charged that older

members bore a special responsibility to young
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people in general, but specifically to their own cadres. ll
The Sozialistische Arbeiterjugend announced at the time

0:

the celebration of their tenth anniversary that they

planned to move forward with their plans for the construc
tion of a meeting place.

They solicited funds door to

door and enlisted the technical know-how and advice of
older SPD and Union members.

Swept along by the new-found

I

enthusiasm of the workers, the Union suggested it might
be ·time to build a hall large enough for the masses of
people who could not be accommodated at any of the exist
ing restaurants in Pfungstadt. 12 The chairman of the
Union added that the plans of a Volkshaus would only have
a chance of becoming a reality if the entire working
class

would remain united and dedicated to the ideas of

the Associated Union.
Consistent with its new policy of holding more meet
ings between elections, the SPD sponsored a public gather
ing on April 12.

A Reichstag member (Dr. Quessel) spoke

to the assembled members and guests about the general
political atmosphere in Germany, (Heinrich Bruning had been
appointed Chancellor on February 28), laying particular
emphasis on the hard work the SPD would have to undertake
if they were ever to build socialism into the reality they
wished.

He

spec~lated

that Bruning's cabinet would not

be able to survive for long, imposing upon the SPD the

.
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burden o·f being prepared for any eventuality.
(Darmstadt) defended the fiscal

re~ord

Seubert

of the SPD, noting

that the proposed economic policies of Dr. Schacht would
be a disaster for the workers.

He ended his remarks by

saying that as an opposition party the SPD hoped to do
more for the interests of the people, although he claimed
that the present capitalistic crisis would not be easy
to overcome. 13 Seubert's speech provides a brief glance
behind the seemingly solid facade of the SPD.

The stress

and strain which the depression was causing within the
ranks of the SPD was becoming a focal point of some dis
gruntled members who wanted the SPD held to a strict Marx
ist approach to the problem.
The unity of the working class which had been splin
tering away for some time because of the SPD-KPD rivalry
ceased to be a war of words and became a real war for sur
-

viva1 when the KPD dropped a political bomb of the first
magnitude into the laps of·the working class.

On April

30 they announced that they would hold their own separate
I-tay Day parade.

They invited "the revolutionary workers

of Pfungstadt to come in mass" to demonstrate their deter
mination to meet the problems of Pfungstadt head on. 14
The KPD sensed that the time had come to present themselves
as a total alternative to the SPD by increasing their in
frastructure.

Signs of a "revo1t" by the KPD had been
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numerous during the previous year, when they had attack
ed the SPD repeatedly for failing to live up to their
promise to supply the unemployed with jobs.

But the break

they proposed with the Associated Union was more than just
another attack on the SPD; it caused a rent in the fabric
of unity in the working class, dividing it in two, and
destroyed the notion which was prevalent among the work
ers:

that at least in the Union the working class could

form a solid front.

More Significantly, the KPD had reach

ed a point of departure.

It split away from the tradition

al relationship with the Union and the SPD in such a way
that wounds were opened which would be hard to heal even
when the threat of Nazism hung over the town.
ers were beginning to devour themselves.

The work

The growth of

the KPD provided almost the perfect counterpoint to the
growth of the NSDAP Which was taking place among the mid
dle class.

The KPD and the NSDAP were reaping the first

pOisoned fruits of the depression.

The situation was be

coming a race to the death.
The threat
to materialize.

whic~'

the KPD posed to the Union failed

On Ma., 1 the SAJ marched at the front

of a large parade with a big red flag, followed by the
Fre~e Turngemeind~

and then, by profession, the workers.

The goal of the parade was the

SEortE~atz

where the work

ers assembled to hear Debus (Darmstadt) explain that "to
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overcome the power of world capitalism the workers_would
have to unite and retain a belief in their ideals."15

He

lauded the Union which had succeec.ed in attracting the
vast majority of the workers to the rally while the KPD
could only gather fifty people to their counter-demon
strat1on. 16 The steady drizzle which had begun early in
the morning tapered off, allowlng the picnic to proceed
while the Volkschor serenaded the workers and their fam
1lies.

The lack of support for the KPD and the fact

that no disturbances had taken place seemed to bode well
for the Union and the SPD.

The only significant event

to take place after May 1 (besides informal political dis
cussion) was a march of SPD wives to a county meeting in
the neighboring town of Darmstadt.

At the convention

they listened to a speaker explain the role of "Socialism
and Women." l7
While the most stinging political battles in Pfung
stadt were being fought verbally by the KPD and SPD, the
Nazi party was making painfully slow progress toward con
vincing the populace that they represented an effective
political alternative.

The group coordinated its efforts

with other units of the party in often bloody exchanges
with opposing forces throughout southern Hessen.

The

brutal activism of the NSDAP reached a new high point when
in Michelstadt a Nazi 'speaker declared

that "blood must
flow" before effective changes could be introduced. lS His
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stinging remarks only succeeded in inflaming the tempers
of the assembled populace to full-fledged fighting.

Be

sides the NSDAP only the DVP could muster enough energy
to stage an assembly of their own on May 28.

Their ef

fort was limited to the showing of two films, one entitled,
ul n Remembrance of Stresemann" and IfGraf Zeppel.1n'~ ,,19

The stability of the town's government rested upon
the long years of service of its many members.

By 1930

a vast majority of the council's membership had held their
Jobs a minimum of ten years.

Mayor Schwinn and Vice-Mayor

Weigel had been associated with the administration of the
town for over twenty-five years.

During that time the

record of cooperation between the parties charged with
responsibility for the town had been consistently good.
The working class representatives had avoided ineffectual
radical language for the most part, while the burgerlich
members of the council had played a constructive role,
shunting aside talk of a "red menace" to a large degree.
Signs of a dramatic depression within the business sector
radically altered the situation; at first only, indirectly,
in 1928 and 1929; then much more actively and directly in
1930.

The KPD had been the main new vehicle of dissent

in the first months of 1930.

They were joined by the

NSDAP off and on, although the impact of the NSDAP, through
the first half of 1930, was not too significant.

The
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slack or vacuum, that the NSDAP did not move quickly
enough to fill, was by a new group on May 22 when the
formation of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft
devetreter--the Burgerliche

bgrgerliche~ G~mein

Vereinigun~--was

announced.

The group was composed of all the middle class representa
tives in the town council under the de facto leadership
of Herr Steinmetz.

The chief concern of the group was the

financial integrity of the town.

They declared that they

would no longer stand by while increasing expenditures in
the town budget were leading the economy to ruin.

They

further demanded that taxes be lowered, complaining bitter
ly, "what good are town work projects for the unemployed

when the taxpayer cannot keep on paying his taxes!"

They

,then proposed that the Kreisamt be empowered to review
each town budget and disallow any expenditure they deemed
extravagant.

Finally, they forecast that "the collapse

of the middle class would be a catastrophe; that a healthy
middle class is the surest and best basis for the healthy
existance of both the state and the town. n20

The estab

lishment of a "middle class Association"seemed to be a
positive move in the direction of more balanced govern
mental involvement by the burgerlich in the political pro
1

cesses.

The historical precedents for such an undertak

ing were plentiful (one only need review similar associa
tions which were formed in 1906 and 1922), but beneath
the

::1
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healthy exterior lurked a decaying body politic.
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Fostered by the "non-political" group Steinmetz-Martin,
the group could have only a limited effect on the town of
Pfungstadt, because the important decisions as to the
tate of Pfungstadt's economy were decided at the state,
national, and even the international levels.

Within the

new group also lay the seeds for other more radical devel
opment.

All the parties of the council, including the

NSDAP, were included in the new association.

The group.

in effect, gave its stamp of approval, if not an
., endorse
ment, to the reliability and acceptability of the NSDAP.
Most of the middle class inhabitants of Pfungstadt view
ed both developments as a logical alternative to the dan
gerous growth of KPD and SPD power.2l
The formation of the group did not raise the eye
brows of the middle class.

It was not viewtld as· a wild

experiment.

But the hidden dangers of the group were

very real.

For at almost the same time Steinmetz and

Martin were parading their concern for the financial af
fairs of Pfungstadt before the voters, they established
secret contact with the NSDAP.

Realizing that the SPD

and the KPD still had to be reckoned with, they did not
reveal their association with the party to anyone outside
of a very small group--not even other members of the
NSDAP. 22 A number of people who joined the NSDAP before
1933 followed this course of action which complicated the
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efforts of the democratic forces of Pfungstadt to effect
ively combat the'spread of Nazism.
A most serious realignment of the basic for"ces of

tbe society in Pfungstadt had taken place.

Replacing the

\

semi-SOlid structure of the working class were two orbits
of competing groups--the KPD and SPD--who were locked in
a mortal combat of their own.

Opposed to the entire uni

verse of the working class were the parties of the middle
class who were themselves split into their own
political paths.

pa~ticular

The older national parties were willing

to risk the loss of their own personal identities for the
common goal of defeating the working class under the um
brella of the new Burgerliche Vereinigung.
6erliche Vereinigung

But the Bur

was itself split more fully than

anyone realized into the orbits of pro-Nazi support (even
it for the most part hidden) and more or less pro-demo
cratic adherents.

Political resentment and headstrong

prejudices had created a situation which even a political
~izard

would have found impossible to untangle.
In line with the prejudice of mQst of the middle

class residents of Pfungstadt, the

Anzei~~

printed an

article which severely criticized the tax structure. The

.

writer complained that no matter which way one looked,

--

one could only see taxes.

Exclaiming that the people of

"Pfungstadt paid city, state, and national taxes of
1:790,800 marks (1,117,400 marks to the Reich), he

' 111111111
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recounted that older people could tell of a time when ex
penses were low and there were no taxes.

This type of

t:.;.ought was echoed in another article in the Anzeiger
which purported to detail the taxes Pfungstadt would be
contributing in order for Germany to payoff the war re
parations.

The article claimed that the citizens of

Pfungstadt could expect to pay an average of 244,600
marks per year until 1987 when the final payment would be
made.

Both articles lamented that the present state of

the economy would, not allow such sums to be exported
from the town without a severe situation develoPing. 23
The thinking of the gentlemen may have been enshrouded
in a fuzzy haze of half-truths and propaganda; the re
action of a large segment of the middle class was only
too real.

Most were unable to bear their misery without

quenching their hatred (for it had become in many cases
outright hatred) on imaginary or over-played scapegoats.
Sane analysis of the real face of good and evil was fast
fading from the scene.
Those venerable old fortresses of quiet solitude and
good cheer, the clubs and associations every German town
had in plentiful supply, were also becoming the victims

ot hea.ted passions and political intrigue.

The depth of

the distemper had not spread as completely to the clubs
as it had to the political area, but the atmosphere was
fast becoming filled with the clouds of insecurity and

I!
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resentment.

The Protestant Singing Club sponsored the

play, "Without God,," early in the year in order to show
the unhappiness of a Bolshevik whose hatred of God had
driven him into misery.
claimed, had

prese~ued

Only God, the group loudly pro
the man from a terrible end and

granted him the contentment he needed to find peace with
his surroUndings. 24 The KPD scoffed at the ideas, but a
few burgerlich members of the community used the words
to reenforce their own conception of life.
The Turnverein Pfungstadt (middle class) realized
that a change was spreading over the town by acknowledging
that the group as a whole was not responsive enough to
the needs and desires of young people.

This accusation

set off a lively debate" with another show of members
claiming that this was only an imaginary wrong, that
club had kept its promises to its younger members.

t~e

The

war inside the group quietly raged on for weeks, with the
forces of moderate change slowly gaining the upper hand
to the dismay of some older members. 25 The fight for a
new definition of roles was hardly a phenomenon which was
limited to the political sictor of the town.
The

~!eger

und

Ml1itar~erein

retained its sensible

policy of political neutraljty throughout those trying
times by concentrating on discussions of death benefits
and

e~ecting

new officers.

Although they supported a

small arms shooting committee which was charged with

d
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providing each member the opportunity to become better
acquainted with the finer arts of various weapons, they
did not press any of the c':;her merr.bers of the community
to take part in their activities 26
Some people succeeded in carrying out the re
definition of the role of people upon the economic sector
successfully.

They decided to reapportion the wealth by

stealing meat from poorly protected butcher shops at night,
and by stealing potatoes from farmers both before and
after the farmers coul.d harvest their crops.

A growing

number of disputes were also being settled with the fists
of the dissatisfied electorate, much to the dismay of
large sections of the community.27
The developments of the first half of 1930 were
significant.

The KPD began to take a much more stringent

line against the SPD and the Associated Union.
ge£liche

Vereinigun~

The Bur

had been formed to fight for the

political power they felt was rightly theirs, even if
that meant accepting the NSDAP as a legitimate political
factor.

The realigning of the traditional seats of power

in Pfungstadt had only begun; the function of the new
forces was only to become clear after a longer period of
time had elapsed.

The people of every group were begin

ning to sense that something had to be done about the in
tolerable economic conditions which were fast overtaking
the livelihood of the most determined individuals.

Unrest
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had grown considerably in the short interval of six months.
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CHAPTER VI
BASIC ADJUSTMENTS - JULY, 1930 TO JANUARY, 1931
Like a large immovable rock, the town council domin
ated the political scene of Pfung$tadt.

Instead of losing

its near monopoly position concerning the political life
in town,

by July the views expressed by various members

came to mirror ever more closely the general political
trends of the populace.

The debates which occurred in the

council set.a tone for subsequent events which were to de
cide the struggle for power and influence.

The town

council of July 10 devoted the major portion of its time
to one topic:

unemployment.

By July, 1930, unemployment

and the fiscal ramifications which it produced or induced,
bad corne to play the major role in the lives of a majority
of the citizens of Pfungstadt.

In the case of the town

council, unemployment sparked fires of suspicion in the
hearts of both the working class representatives and the
burgerlich:

the former primarily because of their concern

for the use of the unemployed in some needful town sponsor
ed

undert~king,

and the latter primarily because of their

anxiety concerning the means that would be used to finance
that work.

The council had approved the use of the unem

ployed tor the cutting of wood in the town forest and more

I
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recently the employment of almost one hundred men on a
proJect designed to clean up the banks of the Modau
(stream) but the SPD never lost s!ght of their proposal
to provide Jobs through the construction of streets in
Pfungstadt.

They reasoned that a mea.ningful measure such

as that would allow the unemployed to retain a greater
amount of their self-dignity and self-confidence than the
balf-way measures the council had been sponsoring.

Fi

nancing for the project was to be provided through a
series of loans from the state.

The expenditure of forty

eight thousand marks for the construction of streets was
roundly condemned by the Burgerliche Vereinigung.
claimed that:

They

1) the funds necessary for the undertaking

would further damage the already highly taxed businessmen

ot Pfungstadt, pertaps fatally, and 2) the SPD figures for
the costs were inflated, since a private contractor could
handle the construction for one-half of the Spots estimate.
The

V~reiniguns

:~en

went directly to the inhabitants of

Pfungstadt witt:: ";heir contentions in an article in the
Anzeiger. l
The remarks of the Vereinigung elicited an emotional
ly tinged response from the Construction Workers wing of
the Union Association.

A spokesman acidly pointed out

that the businessmen of Pfungstadt implored the inhabit
ants to "Buy in Pfungstadt," but were not ready to see the
working class "Earn in Pfungstadt."

He bitterly complained

i !

139
that the

Vereinigun~

acted as if "the businessmen think

that they are the only taxpayers in Pfungstadt."

An

equal distribution of the p.conomic burden always played
a prominent role in the election propaganda of the middle
class parties, but in practice they wanted the workers
to bear a disproportionate load.

Warming to his role,

the Union spokesman satirically asked, "Oh, how would it
be if these men were in control of the government?"

He

closed with the ominous warning that "Whoever ,won't let
the workers live, doesn't deserve to be (financially)
.

supported by the workers."

2

The leadership of the SPD

hastened to point out that they were ready to agree to the

I'

I
!i

employment of a master craftsman as the primary vehicle
for the job.

However, they insisted that he be willing

to parcel out the work among the unemployed, not the
members of his family or his apprentices.
~

The Vereini

re-entered the argument long enough to retort that

the proposal was to give the contract for the work to the
master bricklayer with the least amount of work, regard
less of his family connections.

Shrewdly their agent

charged that the men behind the unemployed (SPD/KPD lead
ers) were responsible for this disagreement; a disagree
ment, he claimed, the
punish the unemployed.

Vereinigun~

did not wish to use to

He appealed to the town's inhabit

ants to make their minds up with facts, not demagogic
rhetoric which only clouded the issue. 3

I
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The SPD council members had not anticipated such a
spirited reaction when they had first submitted their
proposal.

They had

expect~d

a token opposition from the

burgerlich for political purposes, but not the stubborn
ness they encountered.

This same act had occurred a

number of times during the 1920's.

The SPD did not realize

that they were dealing with a new set of factors.

The

center of direction within the burgerlich factor had shift
ed; the old reasonableness had been displaced by the anxi
ety of the depression, and the leadership of Steinmetz and
Martin, who did not view the problems of Pfungstadt with
the same benign calm as their associates had.

The dis

placement of the leadership roles within the burgerlich
was becoming more and more real.

The winners of the feud

were the practitioners of total opposition, Steinmetz and
Martin, who together with their colleagues were able to
convince a large segment of the middle class that the SPD
was really trying to foist off new taxes upon them.

Un

doubtedly they were also beginning to maneuver themselves
into a position which would allow them to consistently
take a hard line in the upcoming budget debate.
result of the SPD setback concerned the KPD.

Another

The entire

process had been viewed by the KPD with obvious pleasure,
since it supplied them with valuable ammunitlon for hit
and run attacks on both the SPD and the burgerlich. The
leadership of the KPD formulated a series of strictly

i
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one-sided measures, arguing that the Vereinigung's cat
agorical rejection of the SPO's modest proposals had once
and for all torn the

rnask~

of seer.ing reasonableness from

the fact of the reactionary burgerlich and the ineffectual
gPO.

Huxhorn called on the workers to rally around the

KPO, the one institution that offered people a real alter
native to the

~~chinations

bungling of the

of the middle class and the

..
)
( pseudo-burgerlich

SPO. I.J

The fate of the

people of Pfungstadt was in part decided by the intransi
ance of the burgerlich to meet halfway with the SPO, for,
as events were soon to show, the real intention of several
bur6erlic~

was not to find the proper master bricklayer

for the job.

A faction of the burgerlich really intended

to scuttle the whole council program of providing jobs for
the unemployed--at nearly any price.
Between July 28 and September 2 no less than ten
town council meetings specifically dealing with the town's
budget were held.

The first measure up for debate at the

meeting on July 28 was a proposal to raise the level of
taxation.

The proposal had already been discussed in

eight finance committee meetings where agreement on the
rate of taxation had been reached after hours of dispute. 5
The rates were to be:
Profits ----- raised from RM 1.50 to 1.90 per RM 100
Business
Capital ---- raised from RM

.35 to

.40 per RM 100

i
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Unimproved
raised from RM .50 to .56 per RM 100
Land
Buildings
raised from RM 1.25 to 1.27 per RM 100
and Lots
Imposition of a special property tax of between RM
36.43 and 41.75 depending upon gross income.
Since the rolls of the taxpayers was shringing because of
unemployment, the vast majority of the taxpaying populace
would be paying significantly larger tax bills.

The bur

den of the increases fell more and more on the shoulders
of the middle class businessman.

A very explosive resent

ment began to reach a peak, because the same middle class
who were paying higher taxes felt that their representa
\

tives on the council could never adjust the situation
more to their liking as long as the SPD and the KPD con
trolled a majority of the council's seats. 6 A volatile
predicament had developed.

Some changes in the structure

of Pfungstadt had occurred and even more basic adjust
ments could be expected.
A point by pOint analysis of the entire budget did
not get under way in the council until July 31.

A host

of onlookers provided a pertinent reminder to the council
that it held the fate of man, people in its hands.
strategy

!)f

The

the KPD began to unfold almost at once. Hux

horn and nis colleagues proposed the elimination of the
small amount

o1~

munity received.

wood which certain old members of the com
They then turned their attention to the

price of electricity, proposing a sliding rate scale

j
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affluent paying more, the poor paying less.

i

Both measures

went down to defeat through the combined votes of the SPD
a~d

the burgerlich.

Returning to the politics of reason

for a moment, Huxhorn recommended the adoption of a law
which would allow the unemployed to bathe in the town baths
at no expense.
and was carried.

The measure found immediate SPD support,
When Huxhorn had ended his attempts to

alter the budget, it was the turn of Wilhelm Martin to
take the floor.

He offered a set of proposals which close

ly paralleled those he had submitted the

y~ar

(For a list of those proposals see p. 81.)

before.

In the inter

vening year the tide of middle class opinion had turned
strongly in his favor.

Thus a number of SPD council mem

bers felt the need to support Martin's bid to reduce ex
penditures in the hope of keeping the life lines of com
munication open to the middle class.

With this tacit

recognition of the validity of Martin's stand as a base,
his measures were assured of passage.

But Martin was not

content to rest with the acceptance of these minor changes.
He again insisted that the charge for water had to be

in~

creased and the profits of the water works and the elec
triCity work be applied to the general budget.

These init

iatives ran into the same determined resistance they had
met one year before, and were killed.

The intricacy of

the issues forced the council to remain in session until
midnight, when the mayor finally rapped his gavel for

: I
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adjournment. 7
At the town council meeting of August 4, another
e'ement of divisiveness was added to the already strained
relations between council members.

Strong personal at

tacks were) launched by a number of members during a two
and one-half hour budget debate.

When the personal vili
.~

fication died down enough every single revision of the
budget proposed by both the KPD and the middle class was
defeated.

The meeting was again adjourned to a later

date as the council had found itself unable to resolve the
complex difficulties it faced before midnight. 8 The
dazzling array of demagogic oratory which filled the coun
cil chamber during the protracted discussion of virtually
every budgetary item sapped the remaining good will out
of the council members.

While
•

~he

KPDand burgerlich

indulged themselves with their dangerous new toy, the SPD
could not grasp the levers of power long enough to pro
vide the leadership the council so badly needed.

The in

transient positions each side had decided to defend seri
ously undermined the confidence the average man in Pfung
stadt had in the ability of the council to come to terms
with the effects of the depression.
the only item on which the KPD and

Pathetically enough,
biir~erlich

could agree

was to strip the Constitution Day celebration of its
official financial

s~,port.·

The initial union of the ex

tremes had produced a resolution which tore a hole in the

Ii
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unity of the state. 9

A time of trial was upon the people

of Pfungstadt; and fifty percent of the elected representa
tives had failed the test.
When the council resumed deliberations on August 8
they were still mired down in a discussion concerning the
amount of money the town's

of~cials

should receive.

Mar

tin had called for a slash in this expenditure, while

r

Huxhorn proposed that funds allocated for the construction
of town housing should be diverted to the officials.
Martin went so far as to declare that Weigel (vice-mayor)
should not be allowed to vote, since the matter concerned
his own salary.

The meeting dragged on; the stalemate

seemed to indicate that the council would conduct no more
business for the night.

Adam Buttel (Handwerker und

Gewerbeverein) finally mentibrted that the discussion of
the budget would proceed much faster if the various fac
tions stuck to the facts instead of continually bringing
their personal views into the debate. IO But his appeal
fell on deaf ears.
The depth of the divergence of the views in the coun
cil was underscored again at the council meetings of Aug
ust 12 and August 14.

The KPD again and again submitted

measures of an unrealistic nature to the council.

The

heat of the debate was nowhere near the actual value of
the substitutions which generally involved sums of less
than BM 600.

As

~oon

as a KPD motion had been defeated,

ill
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eighteen to two votes, the burgerlich would resume the
fearful comedy with opposing measures of their own that
met the same fate.

Finally, an onlooker who could con

tain himself no longer got to his feet and abrasively pro
tested the character of the proceedings.

The most the

council could do was to have one of its members remind the
gentleman that:

liAs long as there are political parties,

there will be differences of opinion."

The spectator of

course left the meeting dissatisfied and was soon follow
ed by the members of the council who agreed to postpone
their deliberations once again because they had failed to
resolve their differences concerning expenditures in the
budget. ll
The council chambers again became the scene of more
misplaced selfrighteousness on August 18 and 21.

The

attention of Pfungstadt's inhabitants were glued to the
sessions of the council to an extraordinary degree.

Upon

the stage of the council the KPD and the burgerlich could
play their destructive roles to the hilt.

During the

course of the debate over town emergency unemployment pay,
the two sides competed with increasing vigor for their
respective Viewpoints.

When the KPD proposed that the

allotment for the unemployed should be raised from seven
ty-eight thousand marks toone hundred thousand marks,
the burgerlich responded with the demand that it should
be cut to forty thousand.

After the predictable defeat of

l~!
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both motions, the KPD launched a new thrust in their
campaign for the "proletariate" by demanding that the town
impose a "luxury" apartmen+ tax.

It took only a few mom

ents for the council to turn down this measure.

But the

Burgerliche VeReinigung could hardly wait to Jump back
into the race to decide which side could manufacture the
most chaos.

They requested that the council reconsider

their earlier demand for an increased water rate, with
yet another refusal by the SPD and KPD to pass their
motion.

The uninspiring maneuver continued through both

sessions of the council. 12

Neither the two hundred men

seeking work in the forest nor the average citizen knew of
an easy solution to the town's problems, but both reali2
ed that the intransigence of the factions in the council
had begun to make the difficulties seem unsolvable.

More

and more, the basic political survival of the political
life of Pfungstadt was being called into question.
At the town council meeting on August 25 the entire
matter of the 19.;J/31 budget came to a head.

The assembly

opened with a heated debate of the merits of particular
points in the context of the entire budget, with each side
setting out its particular reasons for unhappiness with the
final product.

At 9:00 P.M. a motion was tendered for a

vote on the whole budget.

When the results were announced

it was clear that the new constellation of political
forces which had been gathering strength in Pfungstadt

I
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since early in 1929 had now gained a stunning Victory over
the remaining bastions of moderation.

By pooling their

s+rength the KPD and the Burgerliche Vereinigung secured
enough votes to knot the votes of the SPD, the Mayor, and
the Vice-Mayor at ten to ten, which meant that the town
was without a budget for 1930/31.

Each side took pains

to point out that its action was based on the sincere be
lief that they were serving the highest good, that their
position alone lay within the realm of the acceptable. 13
The terrible responsibility for the continued deteriora
tion of the political life of Pfungstadt must be laid at
the feet of the counCil, the highest political organ of
the town.

In the final

analysis~hough,

the KPD and the

Burgerliche Vereinigung must bear the greatest share of
shame for the debacle because they had inflamed their
followers to assume uncompromising stances in the face of
the most complex and bitter difficulties.

The SPD·'· s re

luctance to agree to some sort of political deal created
for them greater problems than ever in a time when ex
tremism seemed to be the most respected political attri
bute~.

The
~

cal~~lated

effort of the Burgerliche Vereini

to defeat the 1930/31 town budget found a sympathetic

response among the members of the middle class in Pfung
stadt.

The general feeling among that group was that the

power of the

"~eds"

had increased too much and that the

I
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Burgerliche

had rendered the town a valuable
service by staving off financial ruin. 14 On August 28
Vereini~~~

the Anzeiger published an
ted by the

Vereinigun~.

~rticle

which had been submit

The writer took the position

that the seventy pOints in the budget should have been
submitted to the Kreisamt so that competent experts could
have ironed out the inadequacies in the budget before it
was presented to the council.

Since this course of action

had not been followed, the writer declared that a great
~Ajority

of the people supported the Vereiniguns when it

had turned down the budget.

He further claimed that the

rejection of the budget was based on the high taxes which
had been incorporated into the budget.
the Veteiniguns was well worded.
of real middle class sore points.

15

The message of

It played on a series
The fact that experts

had been excluded from a review of the budget fit in per
fectly with claims saying that the SPD and the KPD were
parties fond of exuding theories, but failed the test of
practical application.

Together with the pent up anXiety

many members of the middle class felt for their financial
and social standing in the town, the Verein'isung was
struck a grievous, if not fatal, blow to the old political
order of the middle class.
The precipitate use of small dialogues and meetings
by the KPD provided the basis for their attempt to claim
a strangle hold on the working c1ass. 16
Their

m'll
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demonstration of hard-headed stubbornness in the council
added new voices to their movement.

The KPD was in the

envious position of making a political victory out of a
practical loss, because they claimed that their measures
and motions were all aimed at improving the lot of the
workers immediately.

The SPD was accused once again of

having sold out to bO\lrgeoise interests. Both the Biirger
·li·che Vereinigung and the KPD had succeeded in claiming
that a negative action was a positive result.

Within the

framework of these new politics, prejudice and hatred
were sure to make large gains.

Whose gains they would be,

became the burning question of the day.
Both the Associated Union and the SPD were very
much concerned about the repudiation of the budget by the
council.

The Union scheduled a meeting on August 26 when

they learned of the defeat of the budget even though they
had a meeting billed for August 28.

At the meeting a

feeling pf disgust hung in the air as several speakers
followed one .another with denunciations of the KPD and
the Vereinigung.

One pointed out that this was the first

budget to have ever been rejected by a town council in
the history
,
. of Pfungstadt, while another noted with an
ironic

wa~e

of the hand that it had taken a combination

of workers (KPD) and the businessmen to do the job.

When

the meeting was thrown open to general discussion, Hux
horn moved to counteract the blows of the Union's leaders.

Ill: \\1
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He used the time which was alloted to him to say once more
that only the Communist Party of Germany would protect the
workers while others ran to make accommodations with the
\
17
When Huxhorn and others had completed their
biir~erlich.
'-

cri.ticisms of the council's action, it was announced that
a SPD member of the council would be present at the Union
meeting on August 28 to explain some of the finer pOints
of the budget and the reasons for its rejection.

A huge

crowd filled the entire hall on August 28 to listen to
Friedrich Raab and Ernst Walke give their reports of the
council's action.

The two men, in a lengthly and detail

ed analysis, charted the course the budget had followed to
its defeat on August 25, but saved their most stinging
remarks for the KPD.

They jOintly belittled the KPD for

hurting the interests of the workers and causing disunity
within the ranks of the working class.

Huxhorn tried to

turn the arguments of Raab and Walke around during the
fifteen minutes the leadership of the meeting alloted to
him.

He argued that the real protector of the working

men and women was the KPD, while the SPD was failing to
unite behind the causes they held up 50 often in public
meetings and informal gatherings. 18 A restless, half
defeated, confused group of men and women wound their way
out of the hall when the chairman of the Union finally
adjourned the assembly.

eAII of the talk which occurred on the streets and in

~.
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the homes of Pfungstadt could not pass the town's budget,
and there was little reason to expect the town council
meeting to produce a new result when it assembled on Sep
tember 18.

The meeting was marked only by a vigorous ex

change of verbal barbs between Martin and Raab as to who
was responsible for the lack of a budget.

They wrangled

tor some time over each other's shortsightedness before
the council could move on to other business.. The national
government had ordered the imposition of a beer tax which
was supposed to alleviate some of the problems which so
many towns faced.

But in

Pfungstadt~

both the KPD-SPD

and the Burgerliche Vereinigung were staunchly opposed to
this new tax.

They found the time to curtail their ani

mosities long enough to deal a telling blow to the hopes

ot the national government for such a tax in Pfungstadt. 19
Such unity of opinion was very short lived.

At the

council meeting on September 25 no progress could be made
towards the acceptance of a new budget, although the SPD
and the KPD could agree to approve a forty tounsand mark
loan for the construction of streets. 20 The mayor was
thus authorized to seek the necessary credit from a finan
cial institution.

The council meeting on October 2 should

have proceeded as all the others had since August 25, ex
cept that one small but significant development intervened
to alter the composition of the council.

Heinrich Hux

horn had begun to serve the sentence which had been meted

II
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out to him because of his involvement in the "Kottmann
incident."

The time he was ordered to spend behind bars

had been delayed for over

~

year, but, when his final

appeal was turned down, reckoning was at hand.

With Hux

horn missing, the SPD could muster ten votes to the nine
votes that still remained in the hands of the burgerlich
and the KPD.

The biirgerlich and the SPD leaders had met

privately in the meantime, but had been unable to resolve
the1r differences.

So when the council gathered together

1n the town hall to confront the issue of the budget once
again~

a majority could be found to support the passage of

the budget.

A short series of speeches preceded the

actual vote which worked out in the favor of the bUdget. 21
The tables had been turned on the KPD and the Biirgerliche
Vereinigung, since there was now no way for them to defeat
the budget.

The most they could expect for a resolution

against the budget would be a standoff defeat for their
measure.

But it was a sick political wind that blew in

Pfungstadt when the only thing standing between real chaos
and continued financial responsibility was the jail term

ot an important council member.

The democrats of Pfung

stadt could hardly expect such a development to reoccur
each time a vital issue appeared before the council.

By

approving the budget the SPD left themselves open to the
charge from both the right and the left that they were
opposing the will of a significant section of the

I I !I ill
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electorate.
The Biirger11che.

Verelnigun~

was quick to jump on the

band wagon of hatred which swelled u.p among the ranks of
the middle class.

At a public meeting on October 11 the

charge that the new taxes which were included in the bud
get were too heavy to bear was brandished about before a
large and receptive audience.

One report after another

by members of the council labeled the action of the SPD
as detrimental to the wellbeing of Pfungstadt.

More than

one speaker declared that the average taxpayer was under
tremendous pressure just to pay the existing taxes, while
an increasingly desperate economic situation did not
promise any relief.

One exclaimed that new taxes flew in

the face of the just existance of the middle class, while
more seconded the notion enunciated by others that only
a decrease in expenditures would provide a path out of
the economic shambles a large majority of Pfungstadt's
citizens found themselves in.

When the discussion died

down, the people ill attendance agreed to formulate a let
ter to the council which would set out their objections
to the new town budget. 22 Several days later the leaders
of the V!.reinigung sent another letter to the editor of
the Anze1ger to reenforce their stand against the budget
and to complain that some people simply did not understand
and appreciate the seriousness of the situation in Pfung
stadt.

They again directed an attack on the supposed

I'
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over-payment of wages to town officials, concluding with
the remark that the businessmen of Pfungstadtwere under
an extreme financial pressure.

Such assaults struck a

very receptive chord among the members of the business
community and the farmers who, rightly or not, viewed the
fiscal and political picture in Pfungstadt through the
same glasses.

The Biirgerllche Vereinigung could justly

claim that it was only echoing the call for a stop to the
"fiscal irresponsibility" that was lodged deeply in the
hearts of a wide number of people.
Among the membership of the SPD the fierce struggle
concerning the budget had torn yet another splinter from
the bark of unity which encircled the party.

The SPD

leadership reciprocated the Vereinigung's charges with
a blast at the inappropriate nature of this group's
claims when so many men were unemployed and forced to
live off the tiny amount doled out by the welfare system. 23
To many a SPD member the forty-one years of progress the
SPD had made in Pfungstadt seemed suddenly to have lost
its sparkle.

Their instinct told them to fight back,

but their disunity did not allow them to concentrate on a
single enemy.

The lack of a clear target only played into

the hand3 of the KPD, which relentlessly strove to blame
the biirgerlich for all of the troubles of the working men
in Pfungstadt.

The foul seeds of despair and undirected

fear which had sprung up in the fertile soil of so many
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anxious hearts during 1928, 1929, and the first half of
1930 bore fruit in the last half of 1930.
At the town council meeting on October 20 the whole
issue of the budget and the Vereinigung's objections was
replayed before a large crowd of disgruntled onlookers.
The significance of the refurbished proposals of the
Vereinigung took on a much more important aspect when the
mayor announced that the number of unemployed had risen to
a point where the entire allotment for the fiscal year
1930/31 had already been exceeded.

The town was' paying

out approximately two thousand six hundred marks per week
to the unemployed.

The mayor also reported that the at

tempt to find a source for a forty thousand mark loan to
the town could not be found.

These reports stimulated

the council to review its expenditures once again, with
the

Verelnigun~

achieving a number of new reductions in

expenditures in the budget although they failed to push
their proposal to raise the price of water through the
council.

The new mood which prevailed in the council

also produced an agreement to submit the whole question
of the wages of: town officials to the Kreisamt for ex
pert analysis. 24

The position of the Vereinigung was

partially vindicated.

The consequences of the depression

exerted a tremendous, all-encompassing influence on the
citizens of Pfungstadt.
P1ay~ng

a role equal to budget squabble in the
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political life of Pfungstadt was the Reichstag election
campaign of 1930.

The election, scheduled for September

15 J brought to the surface the political forces
not engaged in the budget debate.
the NSDAP.

wh~.ch

had

This means primarily

Their entire election campaign approach was

keyed to motivating those people whose complaints were
dominating the scene in Pfungstadt to come to the polls and
vote for the Hitler movement.

They concentrated their pre

election propaganda on a few private gatherings and a
heavy dose of newspaper advertisements during the three
weeks before the election. 25 The ground had been amply
prepared by the growth of the influence of Steinmetz and
Martin, who had split the once dominate ranks of the
national middle class political parties in Pfungstadt in
a way the NSDAP could not in Pfungstadt.
Heinrich Huxhorn and his associates in the KPD
were also determined to win their party a larger share of
the votes.

They approached the problem with two-pronged

campaign tactics which combined periodic attacks on the
SPD with a constructive thrust against the problems of un
employment.

It would be a drastic mistake to assume that

the KPD produced only negative answers for the people of
PfUngstadt.

They took the lead in attacking the unemploy

ment office for its inefficiency, and formed their own
unemployment commission, under the chairmanship of Georg
Herth, to fight for the rights of the unemployed, helping

IIIIIIII I!rll
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an inordinately large number to· gain their Justbenefits. 26
They attacked many of the real inequities which people had
to face, although they often propagated their program
with dogmatic diatribes.

The militant attitude of the KPD

which occaSionally led to fights tended to drive the un
sympathetic middle class even further away from the KPD,
while the SPD tended to take on the appearance of an in
effective, some said even cowardly, alternative. 27 In
one instance a riot, in which a different KPD group was
involved, occurred in the nearby town of Bensheim and led
to a wild chase through the countryside with one detach
ment of police hotly pursuing a KPD group through Pfung
stadt.

Although the local party in Pfungstadt was not

involved, busi-ness men and farmers did not take the time
to distinguish the differences between the two KPD groups~3
The major thrust of the KPD though was never aimed at·at
tracting middle class support, but to bring new members
to the party from the ranks of the SPD.
very successful.
more individuals

In this they were

'l'he KPD boasted openly that more and
.j

~ined

them in an effort to overcome the

rampant crisis which could obviously not be overcome
through the traditional avenues.

Since many workers did

assume a more militant attitude toward their problems the
SPDwas sorely pressed to provide a more dynamic approach
to their complaints.
Carlo Mierendorff responded to the invltatic

of the

I

i
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SPD's leadership to blunt the KPD's aggressive propaganda.
After dealing with the reasons behind Bruning's decision
to dissolve the Reichstag, he moved into the body of his
speech declaring that the SPD would have to wrap their old
traditions and beliefs in democracy and socialism in a new
package of election methods if the party was to win a
substantial number of votes in Hessen.

Mierendorffts

comments were well received by the large crowd in attend
ance, which thereafter listened to Ernst Walke reaffirm
the SPDts desire to see the orderly functioning of the
government while they strove for reform.

He noted that

the town council of Pfungstadt would do well if it heeded
his remarks about orderly procedure. 29 But more import
ant personages such as Mierendorff were not the only means
the SPD had to stimulate the working class in Pfungstadt.
The thirtieth anniversary of the Freie Turngemelnde Pfung
stadt (the SPD sponsored gymnastics club) provided the
base from which a host of workers could receive SPD pro
paganda.

A massive celebration which 'lasted three days

in July was filled with exhibitions, speeches, and sing
ing and was attended mostly for the luster of the SPD
and its institutions. 30 The subtle reenforcement the
SPD acquired from such undertaking was credited with main
taining the aura of con.tinuity which the KPD simply could
not offer.

The average working man still enjoyed his

attachment to the traditional that the SPD represented,
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although some felt that the dust of old age clogged the
mechanisms of the party.
The

Associ'ated Uni'on, although technically politi

cally neutral" provided the SPD with another strong arm',
with which to ward off the frequent criticism of the KPD.
Peter eriOSmann, the chairman of the Union, took the lead
among the officials of the workers in promoting the con
tinued celebration of Constitution Day in August" even
though the appropriation which the town had previously
made" had been blocked by the the KPD and the Biirgerliche
Vereinigung.

He urged the democratic believers in Pfung

stadt to turn out in masses for the parade and speeches
which were scheduled for August 11.

His expectations were

not mislaid as a large number of clubs, both SPD and mid
dle class" continued to support the events of the day.
Two barids provided a festive backdrop for the marchers
who tropped through the streets to the Sportplatz to hear
a long speech honoring the Weimar Republic.

The prinCiple

speaker, Basthuisen, called for the upmost social justice
in in the state as an alternative to diotatorship and warn
ed the people assembled that, "radical solutions

~ren't

gOing to cure unemployment ills; only practical work will
help.,,3l

Unfortunately, those individuals who most needed

to, hear the words of warning stayed away from the gathering.
,

'

Eagerness for an election battle permeated more than
just the ranks of the SPD and KPD; the middle

(:l.~ss

parties
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responded with enthusiasm to the challenge which lay before
them.

Dingeley was .the featured speaker for the DVP as

they set their election campaign moving.

He stressed the

basic theme which the party was to enunciate throughout
the weeks before the election:

the middle class who stood

on Hindenburg's and Stresemann's side for Germany's sal
vation should rally to the DVP.

The leaders of the party

stressed .the ability of the DVP to rule--its years of ex
perience and its penchant for order. 32 They dropped any
reference to the French occupation of the left bank of
the Rhine, since the French had evacuated the area.

Just

before the election the DVP held another meeting, aimed
primarily at the women of Pfungstadt although the youth
was not forgotten.

The membership of the DVP went out of

its way to stress to the women assembled that only they
stood for order in time of chaos, with their time-tested
answers not radical theories. 33 Curiously enough, the
leaders of the DVP felt much more at ease campaigning for
national office than tney had during the town council
election.

They felt that Stresemannrs close association

with the leading figures of Germany lent them more pres
tige than the subsidiary roles they had so often played
in the town council.

A note of optimism crept into the

speech of the DVP r s local leader, Hofmann" whenever he
discussed the upcoming election with his intimate friends.
Just three days before the September 15 election the DVP
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repeated the same basic message they had presented to the
electorate throughout the campaign at another meeting.

The stable, traditional

ou~look

of theDVP was reenforced

betore the eyes of the voters as they stressed that "a
sick zstate cannot be cured through radical means,"

and

proJected the image that a vote for the DVP was a vote
"tor Hil'ldcnburg and the fatherland.,,3 4 A renamed and re-
orsan1z e d Deutsche Staatspartei (hereto the Deutsche Dem
okrat1schc Partei) briefly tried to stir up some enthusiasm
tor themaelves at a gathering in the Hotel

Strau~.

But

the only message- they could bring to the voters was that
they "shouldn't vote for an interest group, (but) for a
national party.,,35

The long liberal tradition which had

manitested itself for almost one hundred years in Pfung
stadt waa dying an unhonored death 1n the side streets of
voter indifference.

Virtually unnoticed the DSP addressed

itself to secondary issues in the minds of its earlier
constituency.

The SPD again dominated the political campaign in
terms of sheer volumn of campaign material and public
meetings,

Meetings held on August 21 and 28 prepared the

SPO for a final, all-out, push to last two weeks before the
..vO-te.-

On September 4 Dr. Kraus (the mayor of Mainz)

to a J anuned assemt ly.

He~,old

~poke

the crowd that only a vote

tor the SPD could produce any action against Bruning's
emergency decrees, particularly those which dealt with
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unemployment compensation. 36

Before a second SPD voters'

meet1ng was scheduled on September 12, placards, slogans,
and a series of

far-rangi~6

political propaganda lined

many of the walls of Pfungstadt.

At the September 12

meeting May Lux (Nieder Florstadt) exclaimed to another
capacity crowd that the upcoming election would decide
the fate of Germany.

He lashed out at extremism (he was

referring to the KPD) and pleaded with the workers to
bear the responsibility for the safety of Germany.37

The

ma1n issue for the SPD throughout the election was the
1nterests of the working class and the possible effect
that the KPD would have upon the long association of the
workers with the SPD.

The middle class electorate of

Pfungstadt was left without a morsel of recognition by
the SPD which considered those votes as the virtual
property of the biirgerlich parties.

Besides an active

participation in the political process in Pfungstadt the
SPD sent a number of speakers to a number of meetings
throughout southern Hessen.

The membership of the KPD

generally traveled as a group to other assemblies, as
other local groups needed the influx of strength the
group from Pfungstadt provided to present a respectable
front to their own voters.

An order by Leuschner, the

1nterior minister of Hessen, banning the movement of KPD
and NSDAP members by truck, wagon, or b1cycle just before
the election, cr1mped the po11tical activity of Pfungstadt's

dlllll'l

It

I

I III!

164
KPD. 38

But the measure did not hinder the local NSDAP

party because it did not engage, as a group, in extensive
outside propaganda.
Mass confrontations between political opponents was
a rarity in Pfungstadt, although it was common for working
class individuals to involve themselves in political dis
cussions over a glass of beer and end up in the street
using their fists to decide the justice of the issues. 39
The

fe~

fights that broke out were part of the traditional

aspect of campaigns rather than prearranged or serious
rents in the stable political order.

The middle class

hardly took note of those events because they infrequent
ly visited restaurants where such things could take place.
The later paI't of the campaign saw an increase in the
violence associated with the distribution of

propagand~

placards, but not to the point where it made an impact
on the electorate.

Every day 'the newspaper (Anzeiger)

was filled with advertisements for every party.

The final.

message to the people of Pfungstadt in the papers stressed
the discomfort and apprehension of each party with the
existing strains which had been generated by the depression.
There were two winners in the September 14 election:
the extreme parties, the KPD and the NSDAP.

The KPD in

creased its strength from 494 votes (12.21%) in the 1929
town council election to 923 votes (21. 37%), while the
NSDAf made even a more dramatic expansion.

They climbed

Itl!1111
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from 206 (5.09%) 1n 1929 to 882 votes (19.47%) 1n the
Relchstag election.

A significant loser was the SPO

which fell from 1710 votes (42.05%) in the town council
election to 1639 (36.17%) in 1930.

But the real losers,

on the basis of the returns, were the established middle
class parties.

They suffered a sharp setback, dropping

from 1366 votes (33.76%) in 1929 to only 1087 votes
(23.99%) after the Reichstag election. 40 Simply stated,
the extremes won a substantial victory; gaining control
of 1805 votes (39.84%) in a town whose electorate was
fast losing its faith in the traditional answers to the
overwhelming problems which surrounded the depression.
The crisis of confidence which had lain just below the
'surface of the inhabitants of Pfungstadt had broken out
with a force that threatened to slash the cohesiveness
of Pfungstadt's society to shreads.

An extremely danger

ous level of polarization gripped the people of Pfung
stadt.
Whereas the NSOAP had made only a token effort to
attract voters to their party before the Reichstag elect'.;;n,
the .leadership of the local group staged more than seven
public meetings before the end of 1930.

Barely one week

after the results of the election were announced, on Sep
tember 24 the NSOAP held a "discussion evening tl (Sprech
Throughout October the pace was
kept at a steady gallop, with meetings on October 8, 15,
abend) in Wader's Cafe.
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and 21.41

On November 5 the emphasis was shifted to the

SA, but only for the one gathering, as more Sprechabenden
W\,;re held for the exclusive propagation of party propagan
da on November 12 and December 6.

The December 6 meeting

represented a peak of activity, as the NSDAP assembled at
the home of Wilhelm Kaffenberger to listen to a Nazi mem
ber of the Darmstadt town council, Zurtz, discuss town
pOlitics. 42 The stepped-up tempo of the NSDAP yeilded
tew tangible results.

Membership in the party remained at

a minimum,43 as most potential conscripts turned their
attention to the town council debates.

The lack of

ready support was due in large measure to the continued
pressure the working class threatened to the financial
order of any businessman who was rash enough to declare
publicly that he supported the NSDAP.

While members

remained few in number, the intangible breach the NSDAP
had made in the subtle barrier between respectability and
irresponsibility was of great importance.

There were no

shouts of doom or dispair emitted from the throats of the
middle class because few

~argerlich

took the time to

bother facing the implications of the growth of the Nazi
party in Pfungstadt.

'}1hefew voices that were raised

against the encroachment by the NSDAP in the traditional
baIliwick

of respectability found virtually no echo.

The

increased awareness of the middle class to the strength
of the

NSDAP did not indicate an appreciation of the
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party's program.

In the minds of the harried businessman,

the Nazi party simply represented a more radical approach
to, the increasing opposition to the depression that lay
in the increasing opposition to

th~

depression that lay in

the hearts of almost everyone.

It provided an escape valve

tor q4.7' of the middle class vote (a total of 1969 votes,
882 went to the NSDAP), while only 11.2% had elected to
place their mark beside the Nazi candidates in 1929.

A

serious appraisal of Nazi intentions may not have been
undertaken by the middle class, but clearly a large
plurality felt that the Nazi party's opposition to the de
pression was creditable.
The inroads of the Nazi party were undercut in
practice by the leadership position the Biirgerliche Verein
igung had assumed in the town council concerning finances.
Although the one Nazi member of the council was a partici
pant in the movement, he played a subservient role to that
of Steinmetz and Martin.

Try as they might, the NSDAP

could hot produce the same effective propaganda as the
Vereinigung did.

At the same time, the Vereinigung

not object to the Nazi presence in their ranks.
e'inigun5 reentered the financial

fi~ht

d1~

The V<£t'

which had not lost

any of its importance because of the election, this time
in the field of unemployment compensation.

The leaders

demanded that the lists of the unemployed should be check
ed to insure that only those with legitimate problems be

~ :11111'
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allowed to remain.

The demand was backed with the hint

..that such action would result in large savings for the
town, and could not resist reminding everyone that if the
. council had heeded their advice from the beginning of the
criSiS that the town's financial headaches would have been
44
held to a minimum.
This was a new untested area of
attack for the

V~reinigung

which denoted a new militancy

and danger for the town, for they had been reluctant to
challenge the power of the workers earlier.

The confronta

tion promised to be interesting and bloody.

The decisive

thrust of Steinmetz and Martin against the citadel of
working class hope illustrates the untenable position the
older middle class parties found.

Faced with the self

r1ghteous challenge of Steinmetz and Martin, the leader
ship of the other uiddle class parties wilted.

The

de~

struction of the credibility of their positions led:'many
people to search for a party which would not "bow to the
pressure of the reds.,,45

In the case of town politics,

this turned more and more toward Steinmetz and Martin.
But in national politios the only politi.cal party. to es
tablish its credentials as an unabashed opponent to the
existing situation was the NSDAP.

Steinmetz and Martin had

only a limited local appeal, not a national organization
wi.th which to work.

The failure of the national middle

class parties to take a constructive lead, led directly to
the defection of large numbers of sensible conservatives
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to dynamic proponents of change.

Unfortunately, the high

powered activism of the advocates of change masked their
inner degeneration.

In

tp.~

growing crisis people rushed

headlong towards salvation, forgetting to look and see if
the road they were following might end in dictatorship.
The DVP attempted to rest a degree of independence from
the middle class steam roller which Steinmetz and Martin
had constructed by calling for the wholesale prohibition
of all political marches, the repeal of the law making
August 11 (Constitution Day) a legal holiday, and a spe
cial tax rebate for individuals and companys which found
work for the unemplOyed. 46

The words of constructive re

form were drowned out in an atmosphere which was steadily
Qecoming replete with the raw emotion of hatred.

Pfung

stadt's Nazis and Steinmetz-Martin understood this feeling
only too well.

Instead of concentrating their rhetoric on

solutions, they dealt almost exclusively on problems.

The

case of the salaries town officials took home provides just
another example.

They

boom~d

a message around town that

an investigation of officials' renumeration was in order,
darkly hinting that some scandal was in the works. 47
as they had with the payment the unemployed

Just

rec~ve,

they

charged fraud before seeking to establish the facts.

The

effect1veness of the approach was awe-inspiring for they
succeeded in staking out a wide territory of influence
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among all sectors of the middle class.

The farmer and the

businessman, who had been separated by tradition into oc
c;Jpationally opposed groups, found that their resentments
allowed them to rally around a single new flag--the flag
of Steinmetz-Martin on the local level, the swastika flag
on the national level.

The feeling of unity of purpose,

and power, these new associations gave to many is a basic
factor by which the spread of Nazism came so quickly to
Ptungstadt.
While a lively struggle went on among the middle
class to find new heroes, the SPD and the KPD continued to
jostle one another for the loyalty of the workers.

The

SPD quickly recovered from the stunned silence with which
they met their election defeat.

But recovering from the

shock of defeat did not mean that they had found a more
productive way of grasping the initiative from the KPD.
The leaders of the SPD decided to stress the recruitment'
of new members during a two week period early in November.
Prospects were to be attracted to the party by handbills
which were spread over most of the town; then high rank
ing SPD individuals attempted to talk with each interest
ed party separately.

A taste of the propaganda the party

would use during the drive was released at an October 25
meeting, when one member implored the working class "not
to be swayed by demagogues. 1I48 Coupled with the ideologi
cal thrust of the SPD was the practical work of the

I

I
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Associated Union which had become more openly attached to
the SPD after the increased activity of the KPD began, and
the establishment of KPD

u~ions.

In order to combat the
-

success of the KPD among the unemployed, the Union held

a public meeting during November to discuss what practical
steps could be taken for the alleviation of depression
hardships.

The initial measure under discussion was the

formation of an unemployment commission, modeled in part
after that of the KPD's.

The assembled unemployed cast

ballots for the leadership of the commission.

To the

satisfaction of the Union, and the SPD, two hundred and
fifty votes were cast for a slate of Union members, while
only five votes went to a KPD delegation. 49
~ctivity

While Union

was concentrated on real alternatives to unem
I

ployment and the SPD was involved with winning new members, the youth group of the SPD, the SAJ, exposed a
militant interpretation of the situation to public view-
the .celebration of the November 9, 1918 revolution.

They

added an interesting twist to the commonly held beliefs
of the SPD concerning the intentions of the change from
the Wilhelmenian form of autocratic government to democ
racy when one representative of the SAJ asked, "What good
are all of our equal rights when they haven't brought us
better conditions?"

From this assumption the crowd went
on to attack the capitalistic system of economics. 50

I I Ili~I:!IiI!
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They attributed the depression to the

fa~lure

of capital

ists to think of anything outside of profits.

This they

stated should inspire the working class to fight even
harder for a socialist state.
to another field of battle.

In December the SAJ moved
At a public meeting on Decem-·

ber 19 the film "Poison Gas" was shown to the assembled,
youngsters in an effort to spark an anti-war attitude
among the population.

The next war, the speaker ex

claimed, would be a total war involving the use of poison
gas on a massive scale.

The SAJ approved a resolution

stating that their primary goal would be to awaken an
awareness of the tragedy of war among the general popu
lace. 5l But the combined effort of the SPD, the SAJ, and
the Associated Union could not take the wind out of the
KPD's sails.

The street corner oration was the most ef

fective means at the disposal of the KPD membership in
. their quest for monopolistic control of the workers.
Since the major portion of the KPD leaders were themselves
unemployed, they found both the time and the reason for
deeply involving themselves in the battle for supporters.
Supplementing the personal street appeals were infrequent
mass public meetings.

,

One such gathering took place on

November 11 when the KPD leaders scheduled a meeting at
which Kiel (Offenbach) launched a scathing assault on "the
poor budget of the SPD.I!

Almost one hundred interested

spectators and a number of oppositional leaders attended

til!

ill

'I
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the assembly to cheer or object to the KPD's pronounce
ments. 52

The aim of the KPD was to galvanize those work.

ere wavering toward the

pa~ty

to move the whole way into

the communist camp by streSSing their gains in the Reich
stag election while pinning the blame for lack of speedy
'remedies concerning the unemployed on the SPD. 53 At the
street corner the KPD could concentrate on one person at
a time, while at the public meeting they allowed, out of
tradition, the SPD leaders to speak if they so desired.
Peter troBmann, the chairman of the Associated Union and
an ardent SPD member, flavored the discussion with his
own interpretation of the causes of the workers' problems.
He told the assembled workers that the unemployed would
not profit by the utopian promises of the KPD, rather by
the hard constructi've work of the SPD.Once again a
primary problem for the SPD, and for that matter, the KPD,
surfaced in the debate.

The two opponents found a large

number of pOints of difference which detracted from their
ability to analyze and counteract the subtle, submerged
growth of the NSDAP.

The preoccupation with the complex

infighting between the KPD and the SPD coupled with the
fa'ct that neither party saw their first objective in
adopting, the values of the middle class parties, led to
a devaluation of their awareness of the Nazi danger.
middle class, on the other hand,
~ln

~ehaved

The

as if they lived

a separate community, because they conscientiously
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fostered their own prejudices which necessarily excluded
from middle class vocabularies the words that could bridge
the gap separating the

cla~ses.

The problems of the age

demanded that each side reach a compromise, unfortunately
neither COUld, or would.
The festering gap which almost eliminated communica
tion and cooperation between the middle class parties and
the working class parties reappeared in the town council
meeting of November 20.

~he

meeting opened with the usual

assortment of routine business, but soon jumped into a
sea of raging storms when Heinrich Huxhorn got to his
feet to announce that he was proposing that the council
dissolve itself.
~eep

He based his unprecedented demand on the

divisions that had been created during the prolonged

budget debate and the results of the Reichstag election
which he claimed clearly indicated that a large segment
of the electorate was no longer represented by their per
sonal preferences in the council.

His words produced

utter confusion in the council's chambers, as his measure.
caught all of the council's representatives completely by
surprise.

Mayor Schwinn came to the council's rescue by

stating that the motion would have to be scheduled at a
later date. 54 But the reprieve the mayor had given to the
council exploded quickly when the council

turned its at

tention to the employment of the unemployed.

A vicious

debate between Huxhorn and Martin ensued over

t~~

amount

I
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ot funds the town could realistically expend for the un
employed.

The arguments which were employed drove the de

bate to the limits of creclbility and
result of which no one was sure of.

enCed in a vote the
After only a four day

delay the council was reconvened long enough to hear the
mayor state that the council did not have the authority
to

~issolve

itself.

The bGrgerlich nevertheless "voted"

to discuss the KPD's motion, whereupon the SPD members
protested the state of affairs and walked out of the meet
ing. 55 The politics of irresponsibility had reached a
new height in Pfungstadt by late 1930.
The next act of the suicidal play the council was to
perform took place on November 27.

By agreeing to argue

the value of the KPD's motion to dissolve the council at
their new meeting, the council found time to briefly unite
against a national emergency decree instituting beer and
Burger taxes. 56

In one voice the council voted to reject

Bruning's new fiscal measures.

Just before the council

was scheduled to resume its deliberations (on December 1),
the Kreisamt released its long awaited report concerning
the financial standing of Pfungstadt.

The contents of the

report were bitter-sweet medicine for each of the contend
ing parties.

The authors of the report informed the

council that there was a pressing need for the town to re
organize its finances, both income and expenditures.

The

Burgerliche Verelnigung won a vindicatton of sorts, for the

i I11I
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report called for a cut in official's wages, specifically
the vice-mayor.

But the report also recommended that the

town council raise the town's taxes to offset the increas
ing welfare burden, something the Union had insisted upon
for months. 57

The mayor scheduled a discussion of the re

port for a later date.

Looming over the ensuing period of

time between council meetings was the knowledge of Hux
horn's proposal for the dissolution of the council.

Im

mediately before the December 1 meeting the SPD announced
that they would boycott the session because of their dis
may with the KPD measure.

Mayor Schwinn could count only

eight representatives (two KPD and six burgerlich) when
he

open~d

the meeting.

With the possibility of effective

discussion, let alone decision making, cut off, the mayor
Simply called for adjournment.

At the close of the session

a spokesman for the Burgerliche Vereinigung announced that
his colleagues would boycott the coming council gather
ing. 58 Thus only two representatives, both KPD, were to
be found in their seats when the December 3 meeting Itbe_
gan."

Devoid of his usual opponents, Huxhorn delivered an
impromptun lecture on town politics. 59 The final politi

cal action which took place in the council occurred on
December 22, when the allotment for the Winter Relief
(Winterhilfe) was set.

Quite naturally the Burgerliche

Vereinigung called for fiscal responsibility and a cut in
the appropriation" \-Ihile the SPD/KPD attempted to increase

I'
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it.

A not too friendly exchange of views resulted in

final agreement on a measure much closer to the SPDts
vtews than the middle class liked,

They were:

Single people, over 14, who
were supporting a family

RM 15.50

Couples

20.50

Couples with one child

22.55

Couples with two children

25.10

with three children

27.65

with four or more
children

30.20

-

Payment was to commence on December 23 and occur monthly
until April~

,

Interestingly enough, the NSDAP member of

the council, Graff, who was also

Orts&r~peuleiter,

sup

ported the SPD proposal when it came up for final approv
al.

In addition to the approval of the Winterhilfe, the

council agreed to employ a large group of the unemployed
in forest renovation work for wages below what the Associ
ated Union had suggested. 60 Complexities were piled upon
complexities as 1930 approached an end.
A seathing uneasiness had filled the ranks of the
SPD

after the Reichstag election and the vicious town

council meetings.

To balance the adverse propaganda which

the KPD and the Burgerliche Vereinigung had spread against
them, the SPD determined to busy its membership in a pro
gram of positive action.

On December 7 the Reichsbanner

called for the working class to come to a meeting at
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10:00 A.M. in order to announce the formation of a "Work
ers t Protective Organization Against F.ascism and Dictator
sll.ip. "

Attempting to regain the momentum which they had

lost to the KPD, the leadership of the SPD announced that
they had lost their patience for repellent demagogic
abuse.

"Action," one speaker said,

"action~is

will demand from the organization.,,6l

what we

The morning meeting

was just the first half of a doubleheader plunge into the
troubled waters of Pfungstadt's politics.

In the evening

of the same day Dr. Gumbel (Giessen) addressed himself to
the problem of "the struggle between capital and labor" to
a large pro-SPD crowd.

He.made a direct appeal for the

people to remain true to the party--an appeal that was re
peated by the party's local chairman, Schulz, ina short
speech. 62 The double blow struck a respondent chord as
over two hundred men joined the ranks of the new group
which encouraged the SPD to pursue their revised policy
line.

The success of the meetings and the newly establish

edprotective society easily left the SPD the largest
group both in numbers and influence in Pfungstadt.

The

renewed vigor which the SPD demonstrated sharply contrast
ed to the frustrated aimlessness the party leadership had
demonstrated less than two weeks earlier.

At that time

the membership had wrestled with the unseemly dilemma
Bruning's emergency decree to introduce beer and Burger

I"
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tax had put them in.

The leadership of the party explain

ed that they would vote against these "burdens" although
they realized that the

had tc have more income to

to~,

support the growing list of unemployed.

The SPD's stand

tor increased taxes before the Reichstag election had un
doubtedly cost them. votes.

They were determined not to

make the same mistake again.

Employing, rather, more their

instincts than their intellects, the leadership of the
SPD determined that they were at a crossroads.

One would

lead them to attempt to win more influence among the middle
class electorate, the other would signify a move to the
lett.

The road to cooperation and gains among the burger

11ch was strewn with the rocks of past conflict and pitted
with the holes of social inequality which the middle class
held up to the SPD with a regularity and intensity whiqh
effectively destroyed any possible unity.

The SPD, many

of whom were veterans of the years of considerable strug
gle for the basic rights.

They simply could not forget

the police spies before the First World War, the sacri
tices for their country during a four-year school of de
struction, and the social snubs and town council squabbles
of the twenties.

Neither side had reached the point at

which they could put out their hands to each other without
risking disasterous repercussions from the members of
their own classes.

An attempt to recapture some of the

supporters who had drifted into

~~e

KPD was socially,
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ideologically, and organizationally more practical. ' The
difficulty lay in moving to the left far enough without
falling into a KPD trap mentally.

To retain a balanced

responsibility, their trade mark for forty years, was to
be an increasingly difficult task for the SPD in the days
to come.

One of the reasons the SPD could not resolve

its difficulties was Heinrich Huxhorn.

Under his intel

ligent leadership the KPD outbid the SPD with proposals
of a more radical nature.

The leadership of ,the SPD was

not prepared to compete with the irresponsible actions of
the KPD for increased support.

Huxhorn demonstrated his

ample talents for hardhitting analysis at an unemployment
meeting on December 8.

Those that attended came prepared

to complain about the economic situation in Pfungstadt.
Huxhorn's condemnation collected the thoughts of the crowd
in an explicit condemnation of the leadership of the
Associated Union and the "masters" who were without feel
ings for the poor and downtrodden. 63 His appeal was elec
trifying.

He and his colleagues felt the pulse of the un

employed and determined a course of action that outstrip
ped the SPD in effectiveness and drive.

The unemployed

cried for change as vehemently as their middle class
counterparts.
~eeting

on December 14 the Burgerliche Vereinigung

presented a number of reports by council members concerning

:!II III!
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their actions of the past weeks.

An extremely large num

ber of people had turned out to hear Martin explaining
t:le implications of the Vereinigung' s

efforts to save

fUnds ,and force the council to acknowledge the difficu1t

,

ies of the businessmen of. Pfungstadt.

64

Martin was tread-,

ing through a maze which the Handwerker u. Gewerbeverein
had discussed two weeks earlier, with the same warnings
of disaster for Pfungstadt's business community.

Even be

fore then a group of craftsmen had pointed out that "work
is the best sort of self-ne1p."

They desired a reduction

in taxes, while they reaffirmed their belief in the quality
of their work, which 'they said could not be compared with
the mass-produced articles for sale in the department:
stores in Darmstadt. 65 Thus the way for Martin and his
colleagues in the Burgerliche Vereinigung was prepared.
Striking at a particularly vunerable chink in the de
fenses of the working class, one speaker declared that
"Auf das Rathaus gehort keine Politik."

This simple state

ment summerized succinctly the feelings of many business
men andordinary middle class citizens who felt that their
economic difficulties stemmed from the party's political
'<

emphasis which the SPD and the KPD placed before the gen
era1 good of the town. 66 Non-political "politics" was a
popular concept within the ranks of the middle class. But
the mood of the people assembled by the Vereinigung on
December 14

wa~

ready to carry the concept even further.

'I::II II
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When a spirited discussion of possible alternative re
sponses had ended, the assembled people decided to form a
Kommunale Wahler
tion).

Vereini~~g (Co~unity

Voters' Associa

All interested voters were invited to join the

Association which was intended to further the interests of
the middle class without assuming distinctive party out
1ines. 67 In one swoop the political picture in Pfungstadt
had been changed again.

While political blocks of the

middle class parties ha.d been formed in the past to oppose
the SPD (and the KPD), the formation of an independent
group of voters in a "local partyll was a revolutionary
development.

With Martin and Steinmetz at the head of a

coalescing group of dissatisfied middle class voters the
influence of the established middle class national parties
was undercut much m(')re ef'f'ectively than any Nazi onslaught
possibly could have.

At the same time support for the

NSDAP was moderated, since the middle class citizens felt
much more at ease with old friends and established leaders
than the semi-questionable leaders of the NSDAP (Graff was
often accused of drinking to excess).

The effects of the

depression were more than just economic, they spurred new
forces and new prejudices to come to the forefront of a
fight for survival which had created an unstable, free
flowing political atmosphere.

An atmosphere ( aught with

more danger than any democrat or
ize.

authoritarlc~('

could real
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The year 1930 ,was the real turning point in the
history of Pfungstadt.

New influences made their polit

ical debut in an overwhelMing manner.

The KPD had jumped

into a contest for power with the SPD with both feet and
had forged a large power pocket.

The SPD was put on the

defensive, the leadership moved with positive assurance
to counteract the KPD's inroads, but with limited success.
The middle classes were more and more polarized against
the workers whom they blamed in a large part for their
problems.

The burgerlich screamed the

loude~t

about un

employment and a falling economy, the high taxes and the
fiscal difficulties of the town, while the working class
drew their meager unemployment benefits.

The working

class carried the awful burden of the depression on their
shoulders, while the middle class businessmen only feared
the hole in his pocketbook but never had to suffer the
indignity of sitting at the side of the streets, aware
that there was no work to be found.

The forces for change

were gathering their strength, waiting for an opportunity
to multiply the disaster in Pfungstadt far beyong the ex
isting level.

Basic adjustments had been made in Pfung

stadt's society:

adjustments which promised to speed the

disintegration of a society afflicted with most of the
il:~ o~

the

~ge.
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PART II

THE EROSION OF REASON

1931 TO 1933
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CHAPTER VII
A NEW NORMALCY - JANUARY, 1931 TO JULY, 1931
1931 began as unreassuringly as 1930 had ended.

The

very first days of the new year brought the unwelc me news
that the Kreisamt had decided to impose the hated

eer and
Burger taxes upon the hardpressed citizens of Pfun stadt. l
The Kreisamt's action unleashed yet another round

f dis

cussion among the ranks of the town citizenry andn the
town council where one be leagued member exclaimed, "Why
can't they work as quickly to cut expenses?U 2 Expenses
there were aplenty in Pfungstadt.

The town counci~ which

met on January 12 tad to hear reports of a large g~owth in
unemployment.

It was rep()rted that over three hundred

people had completely used up their national and cpunty
welfare payments, which placed the burden directly upon the
shoulders of the town council.

Sagging shoulders

hey were

since the one hundred thouaand mark appropriation

laced

in the budget had long since been used up.

six per

cent cut in the paychecks of all of the town's off cials
on January 1 did not dent the hard wall of proble
faced the council.

which

Added to the disquieting prosp ct of

ever higher expenditures for the unemployed was Hu horn's
continued insistance that the council immediately take a

r;

l
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position on his call for dissol~ing the council. 3 The
Christmas and New Years spirit simply had not penetrated
h':'s, 'one-track mind.
Huxhorn's wishes were finally acceded to on Feb
ruary 2 when the council agreed only a council vote would
settle the issue.

A short, but intense, debate preceded

the actual vote.

Then a hushed quiet filled the chamber

as the council began the process which struck at the very
heart of the council's authority •.No spontaneous cheers
filled the chamber as the mayor announced that the KPS's
long threatening storm was no more than a light shower.
The KPD could muster only their own (two) votes for the
proposition while the SPD (eight votes) voted in a block
against the measure.
sides.

The burgerlich abstained from taking

And as if the council were not devided on enough

issues already, the burgerllch insisted that the council
again protest to the proper authorities concerning the beer
and Burger taxes.
he~rts

The salve such ointment gave to the

of the middle class was only equa1ed by the futility

of their exasperated action.

The council itself dutiful

ly united against the beer and Burger taxes by voting unan
4
imously against them, but their action had no legal force.
Besides the KPD, the NSDAP would have stood to gain
the most from the dissolution of the town council.

This

was one of the main reasons that the burgerlich could not
agree to unite with the KPD long enough to tighten the

il III1
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grip the extreme partiEs were tightening around the throat
of the democratic process in Pfungstadt.
had

nowbere near the

mem~ership

strength would have indicated.

The NSDAP itself

;;hat its electoral
The SA could still only

elaim a pitifully small number of adherents--ten or twelve
at the most. 5

But the lack of numbers did not stop the

party from staging another large public meeting.

Late in

January the party announced that the public was invited to
a Sprechabend which would feature a discussion of the top
ic "International Marxism or National Socialism.,,6

The

hopla that surrounded the event yielded few results.

The

working class was too hostile to the Nazis to attend while
the middle class members of the party often wpre their
party pins under their coat lapels.
support for the

Na~i

Overwhelming public

party did not exist in Pfungstadt, but

this only hid from public view the favorable opinion in
which more and more individuals held the group.

Outside of

the 1928 debacle the NSDAP had not staged one parade or
march through the streets of Pfungstadt.

All of that

changed when the NSDAP announced that they would hold an
other public meeting on February 8.

They formally pro

claimed that Jahnke (Etville) would speak about "Hitler
or Severing" in the restaurant "Zur Traube," with the ad
mission charge set at thirty pfennigs for the employed and
only ten pfennigs for the unemployed.

The handbills an

1

.11

'Ili

I

I I It

I

I

III

1III I I

192
flouncing the event appeared on the streetR of Pfungstadt
on February 7, with a curious reaction.
reacted

~s

The working class

if they had ne\er been deeply divided and at

each others throats.

The new

Schutzgl~Up~

of the Reichs

banner was joined early on the morning of the eighth by
the members of the KPD's "Anti-racist League," giving the
workers well over fifteen hundred men in the streets.

The

Nazi threat at first seemed to be the exact medicine need
ed to heal the deep festering wound within the ranks of the
working class.

The flags that fluttered in the breeze

and the songs that floated in the air produced an impres
sive Sight, but did not deter the Nazis from gathering at
the train station to greet their comrades from other
towns at four thirty in the afternoon.

The small contin

gent of local party faithful saw their ranks grow almost
to three hundred strong when the infusion of outside blood
was complete.

With one ear cocked for potential trouble,

the Nazis marched off to their meeting only to find a few
frightened souls ready to listen to their message.

But

outside the restaurant shouts of derision continued to flow
from the mouths of the assembled workers.

The amazing

turnabout with the contingent of the workers led
that both the Reichsbanner leader Albert

W~lke

so far

and the KPD

leader Huxhorn agreed to share a hastily erected stage and
speak to the crowd.

In short direct speeches they pro

mised the workers that they would unite, and fight the

i!l~

I
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common

ene~y--Nazism.

With over eighteen hundred hostile

individuals assembled within easy striking distance of

II

I

each other the six man police force of Pfungstadt was to
tally unable to meet any threat.

The discretion and com

mon sense of the police led them to call in reenforce
ments--the Schupo

(Schutzpoli~ei)

of the state to calm

the troubled waters of danger which existed.

Within half

an hour three truck loads of Schupo had arrived at the
scene.

Their presense the Anzeiger later wrote was res

ponsible for maintaining order when danger seemed so close
at hand.

At the close of the Nazi's meeting the Schupo

escorted them back to the train station.

Although a fight

did not break out J a few rocky missles were launched from
the working class crowd at the departing troops of the
NSDAP.

The verbal abuse was even more intense than the

barrage of rocks"

a fact that was not lost on the curious

heads which peaked out from behind partially opened win
dows. 7 The quick arrival of the Schupo, together with the
cool-headed handling of the crowd by the leaders of the
NSDAP, the SPD and the KPD succeeded in restraining any
ambition the hotheads in each camp had to break each others
heads.

For the first tlnle since 1928 the Nazi party had

succeeded in fecusing the spotlight of attention upon them
selves to the exclusion of other interests.
lowing days the NSDAP

sp~ead

In the fo1

the report of hair-tingling

threats being made against their people. S They attempted
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to stimulate the opinion that they were suffering at the
hands of the SPD and the KPD because of their outspoken
o~positio~

to

th~

existing state of affairs in Pfungstadt

and all of Germany.
Events had not faded much before the SPD held their
annual general meeting.

Following a sharp blast directed

at the NSDAP fer their provocative behavior earlier in the
day, the assembled workers heard reports from their of
ficers.

The treasurer announced that the treasury was in

poor condition because of the massive unemployment which
sapped the fiscal power of the membership.

The chairman

stepped "in front of the crowd immediately after the
treasurer had .:.:oncluded to reassure the crowd that the
membership of the party had remained stable, neither in
creasing nor decreasing over the past year.

With that

business taken care of the leadership called for elections
to the governing committee with the following results
being reported:
Chairman - Georg Sinner
Treasurer

Phillip Stock

Secretary - lnne Gilbert
In addition to these p05~Michael Hechler, Peter Cro9mann,

s.

Gr~n1ng,

August Hechler {no relation of M. Hechler)

and C. Croflmann were elected to represent the membership
on the party's governing

comm~ttee.

Only a further call

fop each member to assume more of a duty to the party de-.

!
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1ayed adjournment. 9

In 1931 the party assumed more of a

youthful image than ever before.

The originators of the

party and the old guard were slowiy relinquishing
control of the party to younger members.

~heir

The party lead

ership gained a mixed composition of young ideas and old
er maturity.
The Associated Union was also moving toward a more
forward looking image.

They had begun the process in

January by launching a political education course and pro
viding a speaker to explain accident insurance.

The re

tention of the incumbent chairman, Peter Cropmann, for
another year, indicated that KPD charges concerning an
unresponsive leadership were i.mfounded.

Another meeting

was sponsored by the Union on February 27, where a con
tinuing discussion of various insurances wer.t on. IO In
addition to the Union and the SPD, the SAJ sponsored
their own function on January 27.

The far ranging forces

of Social Democracy were all called into playas the
tension, fear, danger, and uncertainty mounted.

The SAJ

heard a speech by Drott (Offenbach) challenging them to
build a critical outlook in their search for the truth
while they remained disciplined members of a large move
mente

A fourth element was also introduced into Pfung

stadt as the Reichsbanner took on the responsibility for
actively portraying 3trength of the SPD in the streets of
Pfungstadt.

III

On February 22, a. Sunday, the Re1chsbanner
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was scheduled to celebrate its seventh anniversary.

In

order to avoid any possible trouble both the NSDAP and
the KPD had been forbidden to march in Kreis Darmstadt by
the Hessen State Police on Saturday and Sunday (February
21 and 22).

Their precautions produced a tranquj.l at

mosphere during the entire celebration, which was marked
by a parade of over one thousand men into the town at
~:OO

P.M.

They assembled at the town hall to hear the

over-all leader of the Reichsbanner in Hesse-Darmstadt,
Stock, defend the activities of the group and proclaim
their loyalty to the state and the constitution. ll
Banning KPD and NSDAP marches over the weekend did
not deter the

KommunaleWahle~

yereinigung from continuing

their plans to hold a protest meeting the same day of the
Reichsbanner march.

The first order of business were re

ports by a number of council members.

They tol.d the as

sembled throng that thanks to ·the efforts of the Burger
liche Vereinigung the taxes of Pfungstadt's citizens
were not fifty percent higher.

Over two hundred people

attended the gathering, applauding the words of hope they
had so long mlsplaced.
new KOmplu!!ele HahleJ'.

One speaker boldly described the

Vereinigu~...6.

people, without regard to

as "a party of all the

~eligion,

political affiliation

or profession," dedicated the protection of middle class
rights and interests.

The meeting which occurred without

incident adjourned after a two mark a year fee was agreed
I

I

I
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upon as dues. 12

The Kommunale Wahler Vereinig1lns. had

again stolen the thunder from the NSDAP by taking a posi
tion on town affairs which was not only popular
much desired.

bu~

very

While the NSDAP sought out a discussion of

international issu.es, the KWV p<llnched away at the issues
of the moment.
Pfungstadt's farming cowaunity had been in uproar
since January when a disagreement broke out between the
farmers and the blacksmiths over prices.
ped into the

figh~ing

The mayor step

as an arbiter and was able, with

diplomacy, to moderate the tension which existed between
the two parties. 13

The farmers of Pfungstadt exercised

more than their fiscal discontent during the first quarter
of 1931.

On February 28 the Landbund attempted to breathe

some life back into their organization by sponsoring a
speech--"The German farmers fight for freedom"--in the
"Rheinische Hof" restaurant.

Even the Junglandbund also

became involved, but showed signs of even more advanced
hostility to the existing economic difficulties. 14
damage to the LandbuCld's

The

structure was already extensive

--almost unrepalrablc J for many farmers believed that the
II

Landbund was too small and ineffectual to influence
national issues significantly.

So~e

farmer~

had shown an

early inclination to search out a more effective voice for
their grievances.

The traditional national middle class

parties had shown no great Interest in winning the anxious

,I

I
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farmer to their cause , and since the farmer held the SPD
and the KPD for traditional enemies, they really only
h...d one wa.y to turn.

The one party which offered the

farmers an alternative with which they could live were
the Nazis.

The NSDAP had won the respect and the support

of the Landbund when they had JOintly worked for the re
peal of the Young Plan, thus it was fairly easy for a
farmer to see the rising star of Nazism as their only
salvation.

The farmers did

not march into the arms of

the NSDAP en masse, although a large group were certain
ly members by the Spring of 1931. To join the ranks of the
Nazis did not involve the average farmer in a long soulsearching processj he had too much to involve himself in
on his farm to enjoy the luxury of intricate philosophi
cal agonizing.

The world of the farmer revolved around

days filled with unending labor and worrying about the
prices he would receive for his crops and animals.

For

the most part, farmers were relatively secretive about
their political undertakings. 1S
A good indication of the tone the political atmos
phere in Pfungstadt, as it existed since the beginning of
the despression. is provided by a small article which
was inserted in the
baker"

lI

Anz~~!:.

on !>1arch 6. Phillip Stark" a

warned" the people of Pfu!lgstadt not to believe

that he had ev€'r said anythJ.ng against the KPD.
phatlcally l1.eclared that

,/
'Ii

II

Ih:

He em

had neyer made any statement
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against the KPD and threatened to take anyone that accus
ed him of such remarks to court. 15 Stark's troubles
provided a token of the pCBer of

~he

working class, and

one of the reasons why secret membership in the NSDAP was
such a prudent action for the businessmen of Pfungstadt.
The conditions of normalcy had changed vastly in the
space of only three years.

An unmistakable cloud of

suspicion hung like a heavy weight over Pfungstadt.
As the ordinary citizens of Pfungstadt wrestled with
their individual frustrations and fears, the town council
dealt with the ever-increasing financial problems unemploy
ment forced upon them.

The town was committed to sup

plying the unemployed with funds which totaled four thous
and thirty-one marks per week during March.

This horrible

dilemma was coupled to the fact that the town could use
only thirty men for woodcutting in the town forest.

The

rest of the unemployed were left to forage for themselves.
Most found nothing to do but sit on Pfungstadt's side
walks and mutter unpleasant (and sometimes foul) remarks
at business people and the members of their families as
they passed by.17

Recriminatory exchanges were not a new

phenomenon in the chambers where the town council met.
Before tackling the intricate problem of the Kreisamt's
report, the council meeting of March 30 had to handle the
prOblem

of finding more jobs for the unemployed.

Only

eighty pJaces could be found after a lively discussion

!
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ended, but the problem did not end there for many unem
ployed men simply went into the woods to gather their
own wood "lhether it was legal to do so or not.

"rh~

un

authorized practice of desperate men gave the middle
class the opening they were looking for.

Since men work

ing in the to\'1n' s forest were c;onsidered official employ
ees while they were at work, the biirgerlic,n moved that
the Kreisamt's report recommending lower wages for of
fiCials be adopted without change.

In a time when every

one was suffering some form of financial difficulty,
they argued, officials should not receive excessive re
muneration.
of view.

The SPD and the KPD took a different point

They disputed the fact that the Kreisamt had

supplied the council with a

cleal~

fiscal encurnberments of the town.

solution to the complex
When the. matter went·to

a vote the burgerlich found themselves short of the nec
essary number of votes to adopt the report. 18 This set
back did not deter them from adhering even more tightly
to the Kreisamt's

suggestions.

As they left the council

chamber they vowed to stage a mass protest meeting of the
Kommunal~ ~ahl~£ Vereinigun~.

A rumor that a bicycle tax

would be imposed in addition to the beer and Burger taxes
only added fuel to the fires of suspicion which character
ized the political atmosphere.1 9
While the NSDAP and the traditional middle class

I

I ·!I!! I 11:1
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parties attempted to recruit addltjonalsupport J the
Ko~unale

Wahler

Vereini5un~

force of disinchanted middle
movement.

was solidifying a solid
clas~

citizens behind their

On April 11 an impressive contingent of mid

dle class voters gathered together to hear "Why must our

--

[town council] officials adopt the report of the Kreisamt.
and how can this corne about. II

.

Taxpayers and especially

women were invited to come and hear KWV speakers accuse
the SPD of dealing in theory, not in practice.

An involv

ed explanation of the path the Kreisamt's report had
taken was followed by a scathing denunciation of the SPD
for failing to heed the wishes of the business commun
ity.20

An exaggerated sense of doom slowly spread its

tentacles over the assembled throng.

Only the KWV pro

mise that they would energetically seek to l'everse the
situation seemed to ease the feeling • . The dynamic thrust
of Steinmetz and Martin returned to many citizens the
trust that someone cared for their problems, and made the
two the most popular agents of middle class resentment.
Co~on,

everyday actions, such as the KWV's tax in

f,ormation bureau, took on a \i'hole new significance for a
class which felt its old established social and political
practices dissolving before their eyes.

The reaction of

the KWV to the pressing fiscal quagmire was uniformly
vle\l!'ed as a constructive alternatlveco the generally
i

•

misunderstood (thus hated) SPD economic pronouncements.
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The fact that middle class citizens saw the Kommunale
Wahler

Vereinigun~

Jected

th~

opposing the status quo while they pro

image of thrift . . . ness (5parsamkeit) and order,

lent them more and more the leading position in Pfungstadt's
changing political scene.

The DVP, one of the strongest

political factors in Pfungstadt before 1929 borrowed the
call for economy in government in order to regain some
initiative among the voters.

Hofmann announced that Dr.

Niepath (a Landtag member) would use the theme, "Commun
ity tax

policie~!

ial policies.

as the basic for a discussion of financ

The crowd which responded to the DVP call

was respectable, and listened to Nlepath's long speech
concerning the necessity for income to equal expenditures
silently.

He stressed that savings would accrue only

when taxes were lowt~red. 21

Unfortunately the DVP could

not master the intricate forces which stimulated middle
class citizens to demand a fundamental reordering of fi5
cal priorities.
again.

People wanted calm and their old ways

The DVP could not find the formula which

combiheolder prejudices in a new package.

wo~ld

They reacted

to change; they did not master it.
In a period which put a premium on new impulses to
defend old institutions, the Reichsbanner
.
.. had to spend a

-

considerable amount of time: explaining their goals to a
working class seething with unfulfilled hopes and aspira
tions.

On J'.larch 18 the

I{ei('.~.~bar.!:..~

ca.lled in Behoven to

l
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demonstrate to their constituency that the purpose of the
organization was to combat extreme excesses.

Members of

the Reichsbanner were not the only crowd that was arawn to
the meeting.

Huxhorn put his magnetic speaking ability

--

-

to use by calling the Reichsbanner a fraud.

His attack

was directed less at individual Reichsbanner leaders as to
his contention that the only group that would really stand
up to the Nazis in a physical showdown was the Anti-facist
League of the KPD.·

Albert Walke charged Huxhorn with

dividing the working class, and reemphasized the nation

-

wide resources of the Reichsbanner. 22

-

To neutralize the

momentum of the KPD; the SPD asked for the mayor of Darm
stadt, Delp, to give his views concerning "Politics in
the Hessen Landtag. 1I

His words of encouragement and the

large crowd he drew balanced the rhetorical theatrics of
Huxhorn.

To single out the opposing parties more clearly

in the minds of the SPD electorate Carlo Mierendorff ap
peared at an April 16 SPD rally, addressing himself to the
theme, "The Deichsbanner, the KPD and Facism. u23

To in

sure that order would prevail, it was announced that the
Reichsbanner would act as a protective force at the meet
ing.

This measure

wa~

intended to be a timely reminder to

the KPD that they could not· cl'eate disorder at SPD gather
ings.

The warning was occasioned because of a KPD out

burst during an Associated Un1c.n meeting late in March.
eropmann had announced that Bernhardt (Offenbach) would

"I
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discuss "The truth about Russia."

As the KPD caught sight

of the speaker at the meeting they broke into a chorus of
"uoos," continuing to heckle him throughout his remarks.
When Cro~mann ordered the offenders expelled from the hall
a pushing
near riot.

~~tch

broke out and quickly dissolved into a

The polIce immediately stopped the meeting and

called for the Schupo, but not' before several black eyes
had been recorded.

By the time the Schupo

arrived at the

scene of the altercation, only a crowd was sl;ill loitering
about in front of the hall. 24

The personal abuse and name

calling that was tossed back and forth between the KPD and
the SPD only weakened the power of the workers to face the
challenge the middle class provided.
Holding the allegiance of the unemployed was a prim
ary task for the Union.

One means at the disposal of the

Union was their unemployment bureau which handled over one
thousand cases in 1930 for people who did not understand
their rights.

The rewards for the effort was a small re

sponse to the KPD unions.

Switching to the attack the

Union tried to stem the drift to the KPD with a more direct
assault on the existing financial situation.

On April 17

they sponsored a meeting to discuss liThe German working
class's fight for freedom against the reactionary capltal

,

ists and their supporters."

25

The speech was aiIlled at

holding the workers together under the banner of the Union.
Carrying on the theme of unity, the leadership of the
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Union fostered the slogan "Up with the old soltdaritylt
for the annual May Day parade. Coupling the militant new
line of the Reichshanner:, to that o.f the Union I the }'lay
Day march got under way right on schedule under the warm
ing rays of the sun.
Revolutionary Union

Desp1te the activity of the KPD's
opposition during the latter part of

April, the vast majority of the workers stayed within the
ranks of the Union on May 1.

They heard speakers stress

that only the old unity of the workers would produce con
structive results.

Huxhorn had accentuated his oppos1t10n

to the existing system of un10nism during an impassioned
speech to a respectable crowd the same day.26

The competi

tion for the hearts and minds of the working class was a
challenge for even the most experienced un10n man.
The zeal of the Union and Reichsbannep leadership
did not wane after May 1.

Early in June the Union remind

ed the membership that Bruning's emergency decrees were
particularly hard on the workers.

The assembled membership

was also indignant tha.t one of their colleagues had been
fired by the farmers' milk cooperative because he was a
busy part of the Reichsbanner. 27 The Reichsbanner itself
had taken on a greater responsibility for the area sur
rounding Pfungstadt.

On May 31 over four hundred Reichs

banner
........ colleagues marched to the nearby town of Eberstadt
despite an official state ban.

Returning to Pfungstadt,

the Rei.chsbanner
. paraded through the streets led

by a

1

I

)1\
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band to a prearranged picnic area where a family fest was
held.

The Reichsbanner was a.gain active toward the end of

JU.''le" when a membership m(' ~ting w::.s held.

It was reported

that the greatest part of the Relchsbanner was made up of
unemployed men who had used up their state and national
welfare payments.

A main topic at the meeting was Walke's

denial that a number of Reichsbanner people had defected
to the KPD's Anti-facist League because the Reichsbanner
,
28
was not ~ilitant enough.
Those charges were to be re
futed sooner than anyone would have believed.

The Nazi

group in Pfungstadt could not hope to rule the streets
since the workers could easily outman them in any con
ceivable situation.

Thus the pent up fireworks lodged

1n the hearts of many dissatisfied men exploded in the
streets of Eschollbrucken, a small farming settlement
three kilometers west of Pfungstadt.

Violence burst

forth because of two of Pfungstadt' 5 Reichsban..n er people
had been manhandled at a NSDAP meeting in Crumstadt a few
nights earlier.

The Reichsbanner had been informed that

the two men were held In the cellar of the Nazi headquar
ters for the night.

,Tempers were at the boiling point,

even as the Nazis marched into Eschou.lbrucken fer their
gathering.

Two hundred Reich:3banner and KPD members

greeted them with cat calls and other insults.

The NSDAP

people retaliated in kind, only to find the level of vi
olence raised a notch.

Individual duels broke out all

'I

!
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over the street with the Nazis coming out the worse for
their efforts. 29 The tension filled air hung over Pfung
stadt itself for some weekJ after the confrontation.in
Eschollbracken.

The back streets of Pfungstadt resounded

to the shouts and insults of protagonists for weeks, but
only an occasional SA member ventured to back his words
with his

fists~

and then quite often with a disasterous

outcome for himself.

The workers ruled the streets.

Physical violence had not reared its ugly head with
in the town council chamber, although the heated exchanges
which often took place seemed to hold out the promise that
such an event might have to be reakoned with.

At the

June 22 town council session tne sad news that the SPD
plans to spend fifty thousand marks constructing streets
would have to be drastically cut was announced by Mayor
Schwinn.

Only sixteen thousand five hundred marks would

be allotted to Pfungstadt under revised state plans for
guaranteeing such loans.

The SPD's plan to reduce danger

ous tensions by putting men to work at useful jobs was
shattered.

To add insult to injury

~lartin

immediately de

manded a complete check of the unemployment roles so that
loafers might be eltminated.
to

appropriat~

thre~

The fact that the town had

over four thousand marks per week for the

hundred individuals who had a right to support from

the town only lent additional emphasis to the cries from
all 3ides to resolve the matter of jObs. 30

At the v~ry

I'
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time when the council neeqed to unite its energies and
solve the massiv'e prcblems facing all of the town's c1ti
zens' devisive impact of the depression increased.

At

the sixty-ninth annual meeting of the Volksbanks the dir
ectors reported that for the first time in years the total
amount of deposits had decreased markedly.

A judicious

application of sound financial policy insured the bank's
stability according to the Anzeiger. 31 Yet to the business
community and the average citizen an increased feeling of
uneasiness lurked behind the smooth words.
Pfungstadt's unnerving fiscal difficulties, together
with the struggle life had become for most citizens, truly
made the first half representative of the new normalcy
which stalked the streets.

Beyond the negative spirit the

times engendered in the town, people were

b~ginning

to ask

for new answers for new forces to mold their insecure ex
istances into more advantageous channels.

That was exactly

the new normalcy--the people of Pfungstadt started to con
centrate their attention on the extreme parties, hoping to
find relief in the promises that were bandied about.
new standard bearers of the time:

The

fear, insecurity, and

outright hatred, mark a ripening of the forces which were
unleashed in 1928/29.

These soldiers of destiny had as

sumed their own dynamic, and they were leading the people
of Pfungstadt into the uncharted waters of political ad
venturism.
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CHAPTER VIII
REACTION TO THE DEPRESSION - JULY, 1931 TO JANUARY, 1932
In the minds of a growing legion of middle class
voters (also in a significant portion of the working class)
was the idea that only a wholesale reordering of the po
litical power structure in Pfungstadt could save the town
from the depression.

The old ways had to be'changed.

This

addictive serum, first injected into the economic veins of
Pfungstadt's society, steadily gained a wider following as
the last half of 1931 unfolded.

As the deadly toxin flow

ed more and more to the minds of the normally subdued and
reliable sectors of middle class influence, the siren call
of Nazism grew to a roar.

While the town council dutiful

ly played out its role of supreme arbiter of Pfungstadt's
affairs, the entangling net of Nazi power grew, lurking
behind the good names of many citizens, revealed to the
bright rays of the sun only on election day.

The powers

which attempted to oppose this creeping menace were en
snarled in their own struggles or blocked from viewing the
insidious strength of the movement.

Thus the casual ob

server of Pfungstadt during the second half of 1931 often
only saw anxiety where despair had become the order of the
day.
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The polit1cal currents of discontent were running
very strong within the town council as the budget debate
b:;.;gan.
the

On July 16, the very day the debate was to begin

Ko~unale

Wahler Vereiniguns publicly staked out its

position with regard to the budget.

The Anzeiger noted

that the KWV intended to press for:

1) a substantial cut

in the paychecks of town officials, 2) a revision in the
town's responsibility for providing apartments for the
poor, 3) the reduction in official positions in the town's
administration (including one policeman). and 4) the ap
plication of the savings thus accrued to balancing the un
employment welfare subsidy so that taxes would not be in
creased. l The position of the KWV had been reenforced by
a pronouncement of the Handwerder- und Gewerbeverein that
they were without funds to participate in the annual
Cattle Show with an exhibition of their own.

They noted

that the crafts needed the support of the council if they
were to even survive. 2 Thus as the town council opened its
deliberations the evening of July 16 they had been fore
warned that a solid unit of middle class representatives
would work for minimizing taxes and maximizing savings.
When the appointed hour arrived for the council to
initiate its discussion of the budget, every council seat
was filled and a large contingent of spectators were on
hand.

After the mayor accepted the budget proposal of

the rinance corn.'I1ittee formally, the exchange of opinion

!I
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began in earnest.

The first hurdle was set firmly in

place when the KWI representative, Martin, introduced the
KWV's measures.

He demanded that the council arrive at

the logical position and reduce the pay of the town's of
ficials.

His words were met with firm resistance from the

SPD side of the chamber.

A SPD man pointed out that the

town had already discharged its duty to its citizens since
Bruning's emergency decrees had effectively cut take-home
checks by twelve percent.

The opening rounds of the

council's annual marathon of verbal fisticuffs had gotten
off to the expected start.

With the agreement of each of

the parties which were represented in the council, the
mayor ordered that each point in the budget would be dis
cussed in turn, but that a vote would only take place
after the council h'3.d studied the entire budget.

He hoped

to save the council the overzealous meticulousness which
had plagued the seemingly unending debate a year earlier.
But his enlightened suggestion could not drive the words
of scorn which were regularly marketed for public con
sumption from the council entirely. nor could it bring
reason and understanding to minds which were filled with
fixed positions and feelings of self-fulfilling righteous
ness.

Time and again the KPD set itself squarely against

the measures of the middle class representatives.
!

!,

Huxhorn

again proposed that water and electricity prices be stag
gered in relationship to a family's income.

He also took
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extreme exception to the KWV motion to increase rent on
town-held apartments.

He submitted instead a plan to lower

the rates.
Graff :(NSDAP) asserted himself to a greater degree
than ever before.

His recommendation that the town's

contribution to the Workers' education committee (SPD) be
halved succeeded in eliciting howls of protest from among
the SPD block.

A classic example of the heights of ir

responsibility some members of the council had succeeded
in scaling is provided in regard to their proposals for
the police force.

The KWV had suggested a one man re

duction in the police force, the KPD was ready to outbid
their opponents by proposing that the entire police con
tingent in Pfungstadt be done away with.3

A stampede of

stunning propositions was seeking to push the council to
ward a situation of utter hopelessness.

Events were not

altered even one degree in the July 20 meeting.

By the

July 23 council session voting commenced on each point in
the budget.

Another predictable situation developed, as

the SPD joined forces with the middle class or the KPD to
defeat each dangerous motion as they appeared.

The wages

of the town's officials was not lowered because of KPD
SPD votes, while unemployment compensation rates were not
doubled because of SPD-middle class action.

The main

stage of public opinion had been cleared for a decision
concernin6 the entire budget.

The preparations need not

II
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have been so grand, for the council divided on the issue
of the budget just as it had one year earlier--a ten to
ten

stand~ff--defeated

the budget.

Martin, speaking for

the middle class, hastily expressed his opinion that his
block's negative vote was based on the premise that the
town's officials received too much remuneration for their
efforts.

Huxhorn, the appointed spokesman for the KPD,

declared that his party's socially Just measure had re
ceived too quick a hearing.

His party would not approve a

budget filled with anti-social notions and phoney economy.
(The SPD did not make a statement. 2 ) The yearly stalmate
of the council once again popped up, but this year with
only a faint glimmer of relief in sight for Huxhorn had
no unfinished prison business to bother him.
The only cause open to the council was to drink
deeply from the fountain of faint hopes and then plunge
back into more deliberations four days later.

The members

of the council must have swallowed deeply of the fountain's
waters for at the July 27 council session agreement of
sorts was hammered out.

Four days had been a sufficient

period to allow the haze of contradictions to be lifted
from the eyes of the SPD and the

bur~erlich--Iong

enough

for them to settle on an orderly alternative to financial
anarchy.

The SPD and the middle class representatives had

taken ,the ,almost unheard of step of conferring with each
other.

They consented to accept the outcome of a· court

I,
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challenge on the extent to which the town would pay its
workers.

Wit.h the two sides collaborating during the short

cease-fire, and the KPD pCintedly avoiding the council
chambers, the 1931/32 budget was accepted. 5

This sensible

answer to the threatening clouds of extremism produced a
budget almost identical to the previous one.

Taxes would

remain Virtually unchanged since the estimate of needed
income was within one thousand marks of estimated ex
penses.

One immediate threat to the town's basic fabric

had been turned back.

Unfortunately, no one was really

satisfied with the budget.

No one had squeezed from the

council acceptance of their objectives.

The KPD made good

use of the fact that the SPD had votes with the burgerlich
to defeat measures for the benefit of the working class
and the unemployed.
Kommunale Wahler

The middle class, particularly the

Vereinlgun~,

could claim that they had

saved the middle class from the impoS.1:tlon"

or

new and more

taxes, while at the same time they were blasting the SPD
and the KPD for joining hands to defeat even more ambiti
ous plans to cut the budget.

The SPO was left with the

middle ground exposed to random assaults from two sides.
They stood proudly in the middle, trying to balance the
wishes of the unemployed against the ability of the
class to pay.

'ddle

It was a lonely position that promised the

gPO no political reward in a political system which was
splitting itself wide open.

I i~lli II
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The most notable effect of the depression upon Pfung
stadt was.-the growing cadre of unemployed men.
unemployed

numbel~ed

By July the

approximately eight hundred, the town

,being responsible for three hundred and fifty of the eight
hundred.

During the 1930/31 budget year relief to the un

employed had cost one hundred fifty-eight thousand seven
hundred and sixty-six marks. Budgeted for 1931/32 was a
similar sum. 6 (See page _64 for a complete breakdown of
town unemployment compensation payments.)

Many men felt

a very real shame of being unemployed while middle class
citizens worried about falling into the same situation.

In

the case of the middle class businessman he could always
fire his employees and make due with the members of his
family •. This tended to hold the unemployment devil from
his door, but a very real drop in income was experienced
by the vast majority of the middle class. 7 This led both
the man directly affected by unemployment and the man who
felt that he might become unemployed to call ever louder
for a way out.

As the depression grew in ferocity the

crie& became increasingly shrill and the extreme posi
tions became more appealing·.
Against this deteriorating backdrop the Constitution
Day celebration was staged.
the KPD and the

b~r5erlich

For a second year in a row
had joined forces to stop any

town appropriation for the festivities, and for a second
year in a row the SPD assumed the responsibility for the

r
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event.

The Reichsbanner announced that it would bear the

burden of organizing the event.
c~operate~

The town administration

as best it could by ordering all official

buildings within its jurisdiction to fly the black-red
gold flag of the

republic~

while the Protestant church

minister agreed to hold a special service and ring the
church bells for a quarter of an hour at noon the day of
the parade.

A fair number of clubs had announced that

they would participate in the annual march, but the
weather on the day of the event failed to fit into the
plans of the organizers.

It rained very hard on the ap

pointed day; nevertheless a respectable crowd listened to
the local teacher, Winkler, proclaim that the Weimar Con
stitution was one of the best in the entire world.

Mayor

Schwinn seconded Winkler's thoughts in a short speech of
his own, laying particular emphasis on the town of Pfung
stadt preserving its own freedom within the rules of the
Constitution. S The KPD had taken exception to the entire
proceedings) expressing their own ideology to the public
through a series of propaganda slogans which were painted
on various streets throughout the town. 9
The combination of increased political differences
and the ever deepening depression spurred more men to vent
their anger on the bodies of political opponents.

Barely

four days after Constitution Day a fight was reported be
tween several KPD and NSDAP members in front of a tavern.
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The burgeoning militancy, both propagandisticly and
physically, made the KPD a very real party to reckon
with.

But far from the

ha~hazard

efforts of political

novices the KPD was well organized and very, very well
led.

As one high ranking member put it:
The KPD was a party with an ideological program
which clarified our aims concerning the workers
and the common people, not a party of terror and
trouble makers. Those aims gave us a certain
character. We were against poverty, against the
rich, and against those who sought to soak the
poor. We always tried to be helpful; we did not
only conduct marches, we also founded an unem
ployment office in Pfungstadt.
We tried to
represent the unemployed workers because of the
injustices perpetrated by the employment office
[in regard to unemployment compensation]. Our
propaganda program considered not only the aver
age citizen but also the whole unemployment sys
tem. Our representatives in the town council
always stuck up for the downtrodden. If necessary
we were willing to go into the streets and in
open discussion to clarify matters which had been
debated at meetings. Our main slogan always was,
'we, the poor, against the rich.' Our aims and
our actions brought us the trust of the voters.
But whenever it was necessary (and this I want to
emphasize) to counter facism with our fists, then
we fought!lO

As the depression deepened, the power of the KPD grew in
direct relationship to hopelessness among the ranks of
the unemployed.

The election returns demonstrated that

·fact.
It is veri likely that the strategic strength of
the KPD would have grown even more if the SPD had not had
a special traditional relationship within the working
class.

Through Minister Georg Raab and the Vice-mayor

!
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Weigel a traditional block of voters regularly placed
theil' mark next to the SPD name on the ballot at election
time.

Trust and tradition helped the SPD a great deal
during the dark days of the depression. ll In addition to
the old line supporters the party attempted to win new
members through a variety of meetings, handbill distribu
tion, interest groups and clubs.

One of the most active

clubs during the entire period 1928-1933 was the SAJ, the
sPOts youth group.

One and one-half years of dogged de

termination was rewarded on July 12 when the group opened
a new Heim (club house).

Located on a piece of property

the town had sold to them, built with materials which had
been taken from an abandoned building the French had left
behind at their Griesheimer camp, transported and reas
sembled in Pfungstadt by SPD, SAJ and Union members, the
building assumed an important place in SPD propaganda ef
forts as an example of positive accomplishment as opposed
to mere rhetoric.
~,

In conjunction with the opening of the

the SPO sponsored a_parade, concert and picnic.

The main activities were held on Sunday, July 12 and at
tracted a sizable contingent of Pfungstadtts citizens. 12
Even the burgerlich expressed an admiration for the im
pressive erfort that went into the project.

Hesse-Darm

stadt Minister-President Adelung (SPO) and others spoke
with pride of the hope such undertakings gave to everyone.

I
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The inaugural presentation in the SAJts Heim revolved
around the serious message of "All Quiet on the Western
Front" which the Workers' Educaticn Committee stage1.
The show consisted of eighty slides from the film.

The

event was such a success that Georg Liebig transported
the slides and equipment allover southern Hesse by bi
cycle, playing to large audiences wherever he went. 13
August brought to the attention of the politicians
in Pfungstadt the fact that a Landtag election was sched
uled for November.

The SPD jumped into a campaign pos

ture early, holding the first meeting to discuss the can
didates for the Landtag election and hear Mayor Lorenz
(Erzhausen) give his views. on political developments the
third week in August. 14 Supplementing the regular party
activities was the thirtieth anniversary of the Factory
workers section of the Associated Union.

The Factory

workers section was the oldest part of the Union and
vividly illustrates one aspect of the tradition which
sustai.ned the SPD through the challenging battles with
the KPD and to a lesser extent the middle class parties.
Another facet of the SPD's strength was the union which
regularly sponsored meetings at which the unemployed could
vent their grievences.

One such meeting found a worker

stating that "it is hard for

~eople

in the prime of life

to bear such overwhelming unemployment."15 The leadership
of the Union reminded their members once again that wild
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statements and demands would not solve the problem.

For

over two years the working class had patiently listened
to the SPD's litany that inappropriate action would only
precipitate a worsening of the situation.

By the last

half of 1931 a growing chorus of men (and their wives)
were questioning whether a more radical solution might not
be needed.
Increasingly the talk of all sections of society
mentioned the urgent need for change;

change from the

existing situation; change which knew no goal, but only
what it did not desire to continue to have.

The average

man aad developed the habit of stressing the negative
aspects of the current situation.

The negative voter,

the man who voted against the depression, became a fix
ture in the political landscape of Pfungstadt.

In the

case of the workers, the KPD provided the outlet; in the
case of the middle classes, the NSDAP stepped into the
breach with a program composed largely of oppositional,
negative statements in 1931.

The strength of the NSDAP

was certainly hard to determine in Pfungstadt, since the
greatest portion of NSDAP propaganda within the middle
class was passed from friend to friend, rather than being
dished out at public meetings.

The steady growth of the

NSDAP among the respected middle class secton depended in
itially upon the image they projected as a means of pro
test.

Full fledged support had to wait for the depression
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to ripen somewhat further.

The'NSDAP itself had changed

fundamentally since its inception in Pfungstadt.
1~24

Between

and 1928 a radical fringe had made up the bulk of the

membership.

By 1929 a few interested farmers and business

men had begun to investigate the party, often coming away
somewhat disturbed at the radical pronouncements of the
"old fighters."

By 1930 the party had attracted a sizable

protest vote in the Reichstag election.

During the second

half of 1931 the party began to move publicly to offer it
self as a real alternative to the fears which the depres
sion had spawned.

Yet throughout the depression years the

party meant'many things to many people.

The NSDAP itself

failed in some instances to grasp the most beneficial is
sues.

They persisted in attempting to win the working

class to their cause long after the working class voters
had shown that they were not interested.

On August 23 the

NSDAPset about opening its own campaign for the coming
Landtag election with a meeting featuring the "reformed"
communist Felix Neumann (Wiesbaden) as the principle
speaker.

The KPD incensed at tactics, staged a march

through the streets at noon, the day of the meeting.

The

NSDAP marched into their meeting late in the afternoon
surrounded by twenty state policemen.

At the meeting a

variety of KPD members, Union members and SPD members com
peted with the NSDAP group for control of the meeting.
Neumann gave his speech, accompanied by a chorus of insults

r
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at strategic moments.

Later in the meeting the SPD and

Union members left in unison when Peter
A~sociatej

Cr5~mann,

the

Union chairman, was not allowed to take part in

the discussion.

Huxhorn bellowed his own comments above

the din of the crowd.

With the police standing by in case

of trouble, the crowded hall remained ordcrly.17

Polit

ical debts were paid off later in the week when the men
gathered at their restaurants to discuss the complex is
sues of the day.
Undaunted by their less than friendly reception by
Pfungstadt's workers, the NSDAP moved to the farming
front, scheduling a meeting September 6.

A farmer from

Baden scheduled a speech entitled, "Bauer in Not - Yolk
ohne Brot" (Wben the farmer is in need, the people will
not eat).

The topic and the audience were more to the

liking of a receptive section of Pfungstadt's society,
but unfortunately the police stepped in and cancelled the
meeting.

The near miss they had had at the August 23

meeting of the NSDAP had been enough to convince the
police not to take any chances. IS

Paralleling the ban

ning of the NSDAP meeting in Pfungstadt was the order of
the Interior Minister, Leuschner, banning the Nazis from
wearing SA and SS uniforms.

Their children were also not

to be allowed to wear HitlerJugend uniforms. The ban went
so far that any identifying mark of Nazi association was
"to be considered a violation of the law.

Only a very few

I
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individuals were affected by Leuschner's ban in Pfungstadt.
Those that were used the Interior Minister's order to
their own advantage. The day after the ban was issued Nazis
appeared on the streets in white shirts.

The net effect

ot the entire issue was to throw more support to the NSDAP
s1.nce a large number of people did not think that the
Nazis were any more guilty or wrongdoing in Pfungstadt
than any other group.
s~ying

t~eir

The Nazis themselves protested

that they were being martyred for their beliefs not
actions. 19 The KPD, they maintained, should have

been under ban.

The SPD applauded the stand Leuschner had

taken, while the KPD immediately demanded that the NSDAP
be banned entirely.

All in all the Nazis definitely gain

ed from the publicity they received for a measure which
tailed to strike at the organizational structure of the
party.

Limited response to a potentially dangerous move

ment was not understood by a large segment of Pfungstadt's
society, and in many cases the Nazis simply ignored the
ban,.
The SPD was definitely buoyed up by Leuschner's
resolve.

The leadership of the SPD had been altered

slightly In the intervening period when the former SAJ
leader, August Hechler, took over the post of chairman
ot the SPD early in September. 20 His election completed
the

SP~s

regeneration) and left the party free to call on

the energy of its younger members while it retained the

j
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support of mature members of the movement.

The new lead

er called for an election meeting on September 26 to ac
quaint the membership more fully with the SPDts plans for
the Landtag election
to;-pl~y

banner.

ca~paign.

One instrument which came

an increasingly important role was the Reichs
The Re!chsbanner marched through the streets of

Pfungstadt on Wednesday, September 30, in full force.

At

nine o'clock in the evening the march ended at an open
meeting where Christian Stock *

spoke to the crowd con

cerning "Our fight against facism."

As the supreme head

of the Reichsbanner in Hesse-Darmstadt his words carried
a special meaning for the SPD.

They wildly cheered his

remark that "we republicans will never surrender to the
facists; we will fight.,,2l
stadt.

A new day had dawned in Pfung

Words of derision were replaced by words of warn

ing. Clearly the NSDAP had assumed a new significance for
the SPD; they had assumed an even greater significance
for the disenchanted middle class voter.

The new SPD lead

er continued his drive to thrust the SPD back into a com
manding power-political position in Pfungstadt by robbing
the extreme parties of issues.
election meeting was held.
old men of the party,

On October 12 another

Paul Weigel, one of the grand

rep~ted

on the political situation

in Pfungstadt while the election committee gave out

*Minister-President of Hessen (1946 - 1951) after WW II
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campaign assignments to tested party members and urged the
younger members of the SPD to fill their time with propa
,sanda activities. 22
Stopping the NSDAP was to prove a most diff1cult task.
On October 18 the Naz1s scheduled a pub11c d1scussion of
the goals and aims of the party plus a speech by Liebel
(Zweibriicken) about "The road to freedom." . The meeting
came on the heels of the establishment of a Nationale
Sozialistische Betriebs Organization until by Hans Otto
in Pfungstadt. 23 The NSBO was directed at the workers;
it was the Nazi answer to the SPD's and KPD's unions.

The

Nazi meeting flowed smoothly along since the Reichsbanner
was attending a meeting of their own in a nearby town.
Police were present at the Nazi meeting to insure that no
overeager KPD men would start trouble.
seemed to have everything under control.

Thus the police
Even as the Nazis

marched out of town no hint of trouble filled the air.
Then from the north appeared the Reichsbanner in a truck
and trailer returning from their gathering.

With the

Nazis from Pfungstadt and surrounding towns filling the
streets the truck had no alternative than to slow down as
it passed through the crowd.

What began as a barrage of

scurrilous abuse soon turned into an exchange of rock
throwing and fist flying.

Blood was shed on both sides
before the two groups could be separated. 24 Yet another

brick had been plastered into the wall of hate which more"

!
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and more clearly divided citizen from citizen.

Added to

the escalating physical danger which lurked in the hearts
of many disgruntled

inhab1~ants

was a report in the

Hessischer Volksfreund (SPD) that two Nazi youths had ac
costed two old ladies in Pfungstadt and had virtually

.

forced them to buy a Nazi paper.

25

, The somber tone which

filled the article was matched by the growing awareness
within the ranks of the SPD that the NSDAP was a force to
be reckoned with.
A most striking result of the sad state of economic
affairs and the consequent move to the extremes was the
instability of the traditional middle class parties to
respond with programs and aims of their own.

During the

campaign period preceeding the November Landtag election,
the DVP was the only party to schedule a public meeting.
The gathering took place only two days before the election,
an~tressed

the role that the DVP had played in cutting ex

pendltures and leading the fight for economy measures. As
sembled in the Rheinischer Hof restaurant the party im
ported Mayor Niepoth (Schlitz) for the occasion. 26 But
in the minds of many burgerlich

the DVP was considered

too small for the task at hand.

Having failed to achieve

strong electoral support before the depression began, the
party was robbed of the momentum which it would have need
ed to forge a middle class bond for action during the
depression.

:

~

The other middle class parties either met in
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the homes of their supporters. out of public' view or left
the field to splinter parties.
Radikalde~nocratische

Pfungstadt heard only the

Partei urging "the new left tc; fight, If

---

and the Christlichsozialer
call for the re
-- Volksdienst
--.....;..;..--:...
newal of christian middle class values as "the right way
out of all of the troubles of our time."

The Wirtschafts

Eartei flatly announced that it would not run any candi
dates in the election. 27 The sorry state of middle class
political undertakings left the field all the more free for
the proponents of extreme change to dominate the scene in
Pfungstadt.

Suddenly the SPD remained the only party

standing between two. radical alternatives.

Lackluster

middle class politicians left them no other choice.
The SPD had never assumed that it would have to take
on the role of defending democratic institutions alone.
To be sure, the SPD had fought hard battles with the tradi
tional middle class parties during the 1920's, yet all
the politicians had believed that basically they belonged
to one state.

Now that situation was changing.

The ex

tremes, who claimed to represent alternative state struc
tures, were in the forefront of political struggle.
Strange were the ways of politics in the 1930's.

The

Reichsbanner had to take on a role which it had never
really anticipated fighting alone--protecting the institu
tion of democratic government.

The response of the

Reichsbanner to the changing situation was firm

and

lit III
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orderly.

To stress its preparedness to oppose extremism,

the Relchsbanner set out on a march to the neighboring
town of Eherstadt.

They extended

~heir

duties to include

the protection of SPD meetings, acquitting themselves very
well in the process. 28

The SPD met on November 6 to hear

Remnele (a former minister in Karlsruhe) explain "What the
November 15 election is all about."

Even more impressive

than the steady crowds which attended the SPD!s meetings
were the masses of people who turned out on November 8 to
hear Bierbucher (Berlin) remark about "the meaning of the
. Landtag election in Hessen."

Two thousand strong, the

eager audience applauded his comments.

November 10 saw

another meeting at which a crowd of five hundred people
gathered to hear the Reichstag member Schumacher (Stutt
gart) and the Mayor of Darmstadt, Delp, urge the voters
to support the SPD in the election.

Without slacking up

on the pace another meeting was held on November 12, Just
three days before the election, Marie Juchacz (Berlin),
also a Reichstag member, reminded the women of Pfungstadt
that the SPD had won women their rights.

She exclaimed

that it was the duty of every woman to find out the facts
and make non-emotional response at the polls.

Five

hundred and fifty men and women listened with approval
to JUchacz. 29 The rest of the election campaign included
the distribution of handbills, newspaper advertisements,
and personal pleas from SPD members to the electorate.
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On November 14 the SPD published a final appeal to 'the
voters in the Anzeiger reemphasizing the fact that the
SPO presented an orderly a.,d not a radical approach to
the complex difficulties of the day.
Throughout the campaign the KPD had laid great em
phasis on the demise of the SPD, at one point claiming
that the SPD was for all practical purposes dead.

The

KPO, as was their habit, had run a smooth campaign which
stressed the local members' involvement in propaganda
gatherings •. Huxhorn was the focus of the entire effort.
His booming voice set both policy and the tone for the
campaign.

One of the continuing strategies

of the KPO

was to use the opposition's platform as the means to
their own end.

KPO members dutifully entered their names

with the chairman

o~

each SPD meeting for the discussion

periqd which traditionally followed the main speech.

At

that time the KPD speaker, most often Huxhorn, would
hammer out the KPD objections to the particular area un
der discussion.

At the same time he would set down the

KPD's alternative solution to the problem and urge the
people in attendance to follow the KPD's line of thinking.
Supplementing the robbery of the SPD's organization effort
were weekly KPD meetings and nightly discussions in res
taurants allover Pfungstadt. 30 The combination of in
formed debaters and impressive propaganda effort supplied
the KPD with a great boost.

A boost which set it on the

1:111111
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course for the election with the feelings of winning con
fidence.
Included in

Huxhorn'~

meeting on November 1.

busy schedule was the NSDAP

Over the last weeks of the elec

tion the talk among the members of the middle class had
been almost exclusively of the NSDAP.

Therefore, no one

was too surprised to see the NSDAP meeting well attended
by

~arge

legion of active supporters.

Whereas earlier

meetings had been populated almost exclusively by hostile
workers, in the last weeks of the election a growing body
of Pfungstadt inhabitants declared their preference for
the Nazi party.31

The last two weeks of the campaign were

filled with the distribution of handbills, newspaper ad
vertisements and private discussions among newly convert
ed supporters (not necessarily members of the NSDAP).
As one more device to insure order, all outdoor public
meetings, parades and marches were cancelled after Novem
ber 12 by the state police.

This did not deter Adolf

Hitler from making a campaign appearance in the Festhall
of Darmstadt on November 13.3 2 He told the crowd that
only real nationalism would lead to socialism and de
clared that Germany would have to change its national
face.

The election campaign had drawn to an end--the

decision would be made by the voters.
Five thousand and eighty-seven people were eligi
ble to vote in Pfungstadt for the Landtag.

Of that

i
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number four thousand eight hundred and forty-three cast
votes--an amazing ninety-five point two percent.

Domin

at1ng the political scene in Pfungstadt after those- four
thousand eight hundred and forty-three people had made
their decision known was the National
Deutsche

Arb~iter

Sozialistis~he

Partei with one thousand seven hundred

and fifty-eight votes.

Closely following the NSDAP, but

second at the polls for the first time in recent memory.
was the SPD with one thousand five hundred and seventy-two
votes (32.89%).

Third in the balloting was the KPD with

one thousand forty votes (21.58%).

Together the three

parties had polled over ninety-one percent of the votes
cast in the election.

The battle for Pfungstadt had be

come strictly a three-party affair.

And since the parties

which represented the most likely radical alteration of
society had garnered fifty-eight percent of the votes. the
case for democracy looked somewhat less than promising.
The traditional middle class parties reached only to small
percentage (9.25%) of the voters. 33

Clearly tradition

among the middle class had given way to fear, to a desire
for change at any price.

Middle class faith in the ex

isting system of government had disappeared under a hail
of NSDAP votes.

The NSDAP had succeeded in capturing

nearly eighty percent of the middle class vote.

The work

ing class vote (total KPD and gPD votes) actually increas
ed by eighty-nine votes, from two thousand five hundred

.
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and sixty-two to two thousand six hundred and fifty-one.
Thus one is fairly secure in assuming that the Nazis were
confined to the ranks of the middle class while the SPD
and the KPD fought a vicious duel for the trust and support
of the workers.

(See page 460 for a complete breakdown

of the election results.)

Clearly a victory of change had

come at the expense of past loyalty.

The Nazi machine re

ceived a big boost in 1931.
The KPD grew to one hundred and twenty members in
the weeks after the election, while the KPD unemployment
commission counted many new recruits also.

Huxhorn was

interested in securing wider publicity for the party
through the use of more regular distribution of KPD hand
bills.

The party acquired a typewriter, and a small hand

printing machine, which vastly increased the propaganda
potential of the party.

Huxhorn noted that

!t

we had to

find the smallest restaurant for our meetings in earlier
years; in 1931 the largest hardly was big enough. H34

The

results of the election emboldened the KPD to press their
cause even further since the SPD had received only five
hundred and thirty-t\'lO votes more than they had.

The As

sociated Union took a militant attitude toward the Nazi
gains.

One leader spoke for a sizable majority of the

workers when he called for a boycott of all business whose
owners had voted for the NSDAP.

He remarked, tilt is not

necessary for the workers to take their money to our deadly

!

I I!

1111

III :

235
enemies. 1135
The most dramatic effect the Landtag election had on
the political scene in

Pfu~gstadt

~ad

to wait until Novem

ber 28 when the Landbund officially announced that it was
politically neutral in all of Hessen. 36
ity did not indicate that the Landbund

Political neutral
would cease to ex

ist, only that it would redefine its political intentions
in light of the erosi.on of farmer support for the politic
al forays of the group.

In Pfungstadt the group had slip

ed badly from the heyday of its power when it had polled
upwards of five hundred and sixty votes (15.4%) in the 1928
Reichstag election.

By 1931 only one hundred and sixteen

voters (2.43%) were still found backing the Landbund polit
ically.

The majority of the farmers saw the Landbund as

too weak to put the ideas of the farming community into
effect, even though they retained a fond place in their
hearts for its eXistence. 37 Indeed, as the Landbund de
clared its political bankruptcy, its leaders insisted that
the main weapon at the disposal of the farmers was their
unity under the (non-political) banner of the Landbund.
Many farmers actually mourned the passing of the Landbund
from the political scene, and vowed to retain their ties
to it anyway.

It seems that the leadership of the Landbund

saw the move as a strategic block to the increasing power
of the NSDAP with1.n the farming community.

Faced with the

prospect of total annihilation, the state leaders of the

'till II
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Landbund moved to cut their political losses in order to
retain a semblance of influence in other questions.
Jager, the local leader of the Landbund, operated his
post in a normal manner as if the Landbund still retained
its political bearing, while the bulk of the farmers
shifted their political backing to the NSDAP.

The Nazis

had easily cleared another hurdle blocking their march
to power.
The bitter pill which the depression served up to
the people of Pfungstadt was not confined to one group,
one class, or one institution.

The town council was

forced to impose a ten percent fldrinkfl tax during Decem
ber, after the council members learned that

ove~

fifty

thousand marks in bills had not been paid to the town.
(This involved
apartments.)

prin(,~ipally

back rent from town-owned

Wood prices had fallen, hunting rights

could not be sold for the old figure, and more people
than ever were dependent upon the town for emergency
welfare relief. 38 A bright spot in the dark clouds of
fear which hung over Pfungstadt was not to be found.
1931 was a tumultuous year for Pfungstadt--the year the
forces of extremism grasped for the levers of power more
effectively than at any time since the depression had
begun.

People had lost their faith in the existing

government without really knowing what should take its
place.

The confusing eddies of discontent and anxiety
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which had plagued Pfungstadt politically since 1928/29 had
become a huge wave which engulfed the town under a flood
of contradictory charges and messages.

The high ground was

held, for the moment, by the SPD, while the NSDAP lapped
at their remaining stronghold.

The most significant de

volopment during the whole year was the replacement of
the traditional middle class parties by the NSDAP.

The

battle for the hearts of the middle class was decided in
1931; it remained to be seen if the entire town would
succumb to the alluring notes of the NSDAP.

i

',I

!

238
CHAPTER VIII

~

FOOTNOTES

1 pA : July 16, 1931.
2pA : July 9, 1931.
3pA : July 17, 1931; HVF: July 18, 1931; PGSP: July
16, 1931, pp. 299-300.
4pA : July 24, 1931. HVF: July 22 and 24, 1931; PGSP:
July 23, 1931, pp. 303-312.

5pA : July 28, 1931; HVF: July 29, 1931; PGSP: July
27,1931, pp. 313-316.
6Rechnung uber Einnahme und Ausgabe der Gemeinde
fur 1930, i931 and 1932, pp. 35 and 96.

P~ungstadt

7Interviews with Jacob Hanbuch, Adam Rucke1shausen,
Jacob Brauer and Wilhelm Kaffenberger.
8pA : August 12, 1931 and HVF: August 12, 1931.
9pA : August 1, 1931.
10Interview with Georg Herth.
11Interviews with August Hechler, Anne Gilbert and
Peter Cro~mann.
12 PA: July 9, 1931; HVF: July 12, 1931; interviews
with Johann Kolsch, Adam Rucke1shausen and Karl Hechler.
13Interview with Georg Liebig.
14 pA : August 19, 1931 and HVF: August 18, 1931.
15HVF : July 21, 1931.
16Interviews with Wilhelm Kaffenberger, Heinrich
Schaffner and Jacob Hanbuch.

239
17 pA : August 17, 1931 and HVF: August 24, 1931.
1a pA : September 5, 1931.
19 pA : September 11, 1931 and interviews with Julius
Winkler, Georg Herth, Heinrich Sand and Johann Ko1sch.
20rnterview with August Hechler.
21 pA : "September 24 and 30, 1931 and HVF: September 1
and October 3, 1931.
22HVF : October 14, 1931.
23 pA : October 18, 1931 and notes from the private ~'
file of Hans Otto.
1931.

24 pA : October 19, 1931 and HVF: October 19 and 26,
25HVF : October 22, 1931.
26 pA : November 7, 1931.
27 pA : October 20, 22 and November 12, 1931.
28 pA : November 2, 1931.

29 pA : November 5, 9, 12 and 14, 1931 and HVF: Novem
ber 6, 7, 9, 10, 12 and 14, 1931.
30rnterviews with Karl Emlg and Jacob De1p.
31rnterviews w1.th Julius Winkler, Maria Schulz"
Adam Rucke1shausen and Heinrich Sand.
32pA: November 12 and 14, 1931.
33 pA : November 16, 1931.
34Notes from the file of Heinrich Huxhorn and inter
views with Georg Herth and Peter Crot3mann.

240

35HVF : November 23, 1931.
36 pA : November 28) 1931.
37Interviews with Ludwig Gunkel and Ludwig Wenzl
38 pA : December 8, 1931; HVF: December 9, 1931; PGSP:
December 7) 1931, pp. 334-335.

I
Ii,
i'

II

:JI

1111 1'11111, I I ·!III III

!I

CHAPTER IX
OLD MOODS, NEW METHODS - JANUARY, 1932 TO JULY, 1932
Between the June 6, 1920 Reichstag election and the
November 11, 1931, Hessen Landtag election, nine hundred
and forty-five citizens (1920 -

4,l~2,

gained the right to vote in Pfungstadt.

1931 - 5,087) had
During that same

period the number of people voting for either the SPD or
KPD had increased by seven hundred and fifty-two (KPD 
1,030, SPD - 81; the USPD went from 359 to 0), while
the percentage of the votes all "workers" (KPD plus SPD)
parties received rose from 54.09% in 1920 to 55.46% in
1931. 1 These figures clearly indicate that the working
class identified their political interests in either the
KPD or the SPD, not the NSDAP.

At the same time the

NSDAP control of the middle class vote had risen from
zero in 1920 to an astonishing eighty percent in 1931.2
In 1928 the KPD and NSDAP had control of only 15.12% of
the electorate at the polls while in 1931 the two counted
58.36% of the vote.

The most significant factor to come

out of the voting statistics is the fact that the burden
for the preservation of republican style government had
shifted from the shoulders of the traditional middle
class parties !ll£ the SPD to the SPD alone.

The SPD, in
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effect, was new called upon to reverse a political situa
tion that had been created by the middle class, while the
Kr~ launcl~d

roundhouse blows at the weak underbelly of

the SPD--the unemployed.

During the best of times the SPD

had had nothing more than a reasonable relationship with
the burgerlich;3 a SPD jump into middle class politics
during the 1920's would have been met with suspicion,
disbelief, and most likely ultimate failure.

At the same

time a SPD move to the "right" would most certainly have
left the field to the uncompromising leaders of the KPD.
In the midst of the depression, the SPD had everything
to lose and the bleak prospect of substantial gain) if
they had attempted to shift middle class support away
from the NSDAP.

The KPD would, without doubt, have been

the recipients of a rich, new vein of working class sup
port.

The SPD would have been left with nearly nothing

but the hardest core of its supporters. Thus the SPD
cautiously experimented with a more radical stance during
the first half of 1932.

The Hessischer Volksfreund an

nounced the shift to the SPD members in an article entitl
ed, "The evening of the capitalist
of January.4

idol~'1

in first days

Close on the heels of the article was a SPD

meeting at which the political development of Germany be
tween 1918 and 1932 was discussed vigorously.

Zinnkann

(Darmstadt) first traced the changes which had occurred
for the audience, then threw the meeting open to comment. 5

I.
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Later in the month Stock (regional chairman of the Reichs
banner) put the question to the workers more bluntly in his.
speech, "Red Unity Front or Iron Fl'ont. If

He declar(;..d that

the working class had to prepare itself for a defense of
the Republic or face destruction.

He announced plans for

the formation of an "Iron Front" (composed of SPO, the As
sociated Union and SPO club members) to take the wind from
the sails of the anti-democratic forces in Hessen through
a display of the solidarity and strength of the working
class.

The first meeting of the Iron Front in Pfungstadt

was to be !t'ebruary 3. 6

..

Like a thunderbolt the SPO was deprived of its out
standing symbol of accomplishment and fortitude at mid
night on February 2--Georg Raab died.

As the Anzei&er re

ported in its February 3 edition J "Johann Georg Raab,
popular and highly respected by everyone in the surround
ing area., was a friend of the people and a real man."
The Volksfreund called him a "Son of the people," and de
voted full,:",page accounts of his death, his accomplish
ments and his funeral in separate issues. 7

Minister-

president Adelung along with a host of official and un
official representatives came to Pfungstadt on the third
to pay their respects to his widow.

Over three thousand

Reichsbanner members alone marched with the Raabs's
coffin from his home on the Eberstadterstrage to the cem
etery where just about every important political figure
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in Hessen and a sizable number from allover Germany as
sembled to hear the last words spoken before his coffin was
covered with a traditiona! 'shovel full of dirt by each of
the mourners.

Georg Raab's, totally unexpected death left

a deep impression upon the hea;.ts of many of Pfungstadt's
H· ~

I

citizens, but particularly the SPD,.

All of the SPD spon

sored and SPD associated clubs assembled on Friday evening,
February 5, to honor Raab's memory.

The widest range of

political adherents considered Raab the good man that he
was., An NSDAP member simply said, "He was a fine man."
The daughter of a middle class businessman went even
further, saying, "He was loved. IIB

In the minds of many

people Raab represented not only the 3PD, but also the
town of Pfungstadt, a qualification which stripped away
most of the

resent~ent

for his life-long work for the so

cialist movement.
The inner circle of SPD leaders was depreived of a
valuable voice of reason and good advice with the ¥ntimely
death of Raab, but it was not crippled.

If it waspos

sible, Raab became more of a symbol for the SPD after his
death than he had been when he was alive.

The Iron Front

meeting which was scheduled for February 3, the very day
Raab's death was announced, was held as planned.
slight revision in

Landta~

But a

member Maurer's (Lauterbach)

proposed speech concerning Hessen politics and the Iron
Front took place.

After his remarks were concluded, the

i

I
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leader of the Iron Front in Pfungstadt, Albert Walke (he
was also the chairman of the Reichsbanner) proclaimed that
the fight against facism ~vuld go on as Georg Raab would
have desired. 9 The KPD, while deeply conscious of Raab's
value to the workers, thought differently.

A KPD repre- ,

sentative branded the entire Iron Front a device to insure
'the reelection of Hindenburg to the presidency of the Re
public.

He called on the workers to repudiate the policies

of Hindenburg and his associates by voting for Thalmann,
the leader of the German KPD.

The SPD party was itself

rather hard put to fight the facist threat because of a
delicate financial situation within the

local party.

The

SPD's treasurer had reported in a January meeting that not
much money was left to campaign with.

He suggested that

the party stop its payments to the Land organization of the
party in order to concentrate all of the local party's
money on the upcoming presidental election. lO
Money aside, the Iron Front actively pushed forward
with their attacks on the NSDAP.

At February 24 and Feb

ruary 27 meetings the Iron Front appealed to all republi
cans to attend to the business of preserving the Republic.
The response was gratifying.

Over six hundred people at

tended each of the sessions.

The overriding theme of the

first meeting was put forward by the Landtag member Ludwig
Rink, who said, "The class of capital against the working
class, that is the situation today in Germany.

Two

I
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are particularly important for that struggle: 1) the dis
unity of the workers) and 2) that Hitler 1s using the
t~rrible

3conomic situation to influence people who have

never done a thing as long as they had more than enough to
eat."

Other speakers attacked the war record of the Nazis,

pointing out that, "In reality the people who today spread
Nazi propaganda did not even take part in the \-1ar.

Statis

tics prove that eighty percent of the SPD Reichstag rep
resentatives are vetera:ns of the war while only thirty-se
ven percent of the NSDAP Reichstag members .fought at all."ll
This strong defense of the SPD war record was strangely set
against the Iron Front's promotion of the film "All Quiet
on the Western Front n which was being shown in Pfungstadt
at the time. 12 If the SPD was trying to impress the middle
cla&s, they still had some way to go.

If on the other hand

they were endeavoring to balance KPD initiatives in the
field of anti-war sentiment they would have had to assume
a more militant attitude.

They were again caught in the

middle, between a middle class which wanted to believe the
worst about the SPD, and a KPD which said the worst about
the SPD.

Rink struck a cord which promised more response

when he ended his speech by saying, "In good times it is
easy to be a Social Democrate.

In these hard times every

man and woman from the working class must help to put the
nobles of iLdustry out of business in order to insure the
,

well-being of [t>Je] workers and [our] children."

The SPD

I II
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remained ensnarled in defending itself against middle
class assaults. The KPD boldly avoided such situations by
Simply rejecting all those things which the middle class
stood for'.
The Reich presidental election supplied the KPD with
a great deal of valuable ammunition for their campaign.
The SPD promoted the election of Hindenburg with the slogan:
"Vote for Hindenburg, the last bollwork against facism."
The KPD gleefully reminded their SPD opponents that in the
1925 Reich presidental election the SPD had campaigned with
a different motto. In 1932, the leadership of the KPD pro
claimed, the SPDts 1925 maxim: "Whoever votes for Hinden
burg is voting for the reaction and is an enemy of pro
gress," was still valid. 13 Such remarks made the SPD's
efforts harder than ever and influenced a number or people
who were wavering in their loyality to the SPD to re
examine their views.
~rty

Another KPD stand which brought the

supporters was the KPD's uncompromising pledge to

oppose facism with force.

In January forty KPD members had
held "manouvers" in the town's forest. 14 The state police
eventually arrested one man for the incident.

Such KPD ac

tions gave birth to the wildest rumors: one had the KPD
stockpiling a huge assortment of weapons somewhere in the
forest, while another had the KPD actively planning to
take over Pfungstadt by infiltrating armed men into the
town at night. 15 The sheer size and influence of the KPD

if'
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in 1932 plus the rumors and gossip of burger1ich citizens
drove a large section of the middle class to see the e1ec
tora1 struggle for Pfungstddt exclusively in Communist ver
sus Nazi terms.

Other signs staunch respectable middle

class people took as bespeaking the introduction of anar
chy were the frequent thefts of potatoes and meat from
farmers and butchers. 16 The police did what they could to
control such activities, but many unemployed fathers were
ready to risk a Jail term if it meant that their families
would be feel. It was no Nazi trick which prevoked the
burgerlich to stream into the electoral ranks of the NSDAP,
but a stubborn blindness on the part of the middle class.
The depression and the dramatic growth of the KPD drove
many middle class citizens to seek out a "new" party.

As

one middle class ci';izens said, "If the Nazis do not solve
our problems then we will vote in another party that
w111.,,17 Such utterly naive thoughts proved a hard target
for the SPD or any party to destroy.
Despite daily attacks by the Volksfreund on the
NSDAP the Nazis enhanced their overall numbers significant
ly.

From a small group of ten or twelve men in 1931 the

SA had grown to over fifty.18

Part of the growth i6 di

rectly attributable to the secret contribution of modest
sums of money from many of the most esteemed members of
the community.

A well·-known businessman, who feared the

working class reaction to an overt endorsement of

th~
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NSDAP, often bought enough uniforms to outfit several SA
men. 19 Indeed, the burger1ich had long since stopped ar
g~ing

the merits of the NSDAP.

They wanted change and

they wanted it soon, they were ready, willing and to a
large degree able to prop up any group which could effec
tive1y bring about a revision of the depressing fiscal and
political situation.

Keying on this mood, the NSDAP de

liberately set out on February 14 to promote Hitler's cause
in the presidenta1 election of March 14.

Landtag and

Reichstag member Lenz, the main speaker, recited the stand
ard list of party goals before a large crowd.

He con

tented that the NSDAP was acquiring ever more adherents
because of its real concern for all of the people.

Part

nership, he vowed, partnership between men of every station
and every religion was the goal of the NSDAP. 20 The NSDAP
promotion of community tlpartnership" received another in
direct boost when the local Ortsgruppe published an analy
sis of the tlMarxisttl basis of class struggle in the An
zeiger. Despite

the~ansfusion

of more moderate middle

class leaders into the NSDAP after 1930, a hard core of
"socia1ist tl members remained imbedded in several patty posts.
This assured that the tl o1d fighters" would strongly attack
the KPD and the SPD at every opportunity.

The analysis of

the class struggle by Lenz was just such an assu1t.

Under

the title "Party News," the Nazi writer stated that, "The
Marxists continue to spread the idea of class struggle

fiji II
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among the working class.

The disunity of the workers is

the direct result of the idea of a class struggle.

The

SPD is a dying political party because the membership is
finally seeing through the lies of the working class
'leadership,."21

The concept of uniformly labeling the

leaders of the working class as tlmarxists" and thus excus
ing the actions of the workers themselves gained a few
more adherants with idealistic outlooks to the NSDAP.
let another front was opened in the full fledged
war for power which was raging in Pfungstadt in 1932 when
the NSDAP made known the founding of a Frauenschaft (wo
mens club) on February 26. 22 The first meeting of the
Frauenschaft heard Getrud Klink discuss, "Women in the
National Socialist State."

Her words accented the impor

tance of women in the reconstruction of Germany--not po
.litically but in their homes as mothers and helpmates.

An

inauspicious number of onlookers showed up for the meet
ing.

Throughout 1932 the great majority of Pfungstadt's

women were leery of the 'group, much as the men had shyed
away from the SA, and probably for many of the same rea
sons. 23 Rounding out the list of prospective supporters
who the NSDAP tried to move into their camp were the farm
ers.

Just two days before the election the NSDAP deliver

ed a "Statement for the young farmers" at a special meet
ing. 24 The NSDAP's chances were improved even more after
the Landbund announced that it would not endorse any can
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didate. 25

The NSDAP campaign for Hitler's presidental as

pirations in 1932 was far removed from the poorly organized
aIt.d miserably run campaigns of 1928 and 1929.

1930 had

been the turning point, 1931 the maturing period, while
1932 revealed a well financed, well organized and extreme-,
ly confident party. The party had gained momentum and
pOise.

The old splinter party image was dead, a near ma

jority party had emerged.
In the SPO wrestling match with the NSOAP ridicule
was one of the main weapons in the SPO's arsenal.

On

March 11 the Volksfreund chided the Itheroes of the Third
Reich" for their blunder in accusing Peter Cro6mann of as
suIting a NSDAP leader in Eberstadt.

The charge was so

ludicrous that the police took only a few hours to clear
up the matter.

The Volksfr'eund was even happier to report

that the police had searched some NSDAP houses in Pfung
stadt with the result that they found a rifle Just two days
berore the election. 26 On the lighter side the Volks
freund laughed along with its readers when it informed them
that someone had painted "Vote Thilmann" (KPO) on the side
of the Catholic priest's car as he said mass in Pfungstadt.
Unfortunately the campaign had seen too little humor and
too much grating propaganda.

As in other elections the

hotter heads among each party sought each other out in the
streets as each party pasted posters to walls or tore down
the posters of its opponents.

The Anzeiger displayed its

I
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usual unpolitical head when it banned all party news and
letters to the editor from its March 11 and 12 editions. 27
A prudent move in a town burning with inflamatory rhetoric.
People did not get along with each other any more.
The results of the election in Pfungstadt confirmed·
the strength of the NSDAP and the KPD.

Between themselves

they polled fifty-eight percent of the vote.

The exact

returns were:
RESULTS OF THE MARCH 13, 1932 REICH PRESIDENTAL ELECTION 28
Hindenburg

1,931

41.10%

Hitler

1,722

36.65%

Thalmann

1,001

21.31%

Dusterberg (DNVP)

27

0.57%

Winter (Wirtschafts2t.)

16

0.34%

Confirming the power of the NSDAP and the KPD was one
thing, confirming the continued expansion of the NSDAP
and KPD vote was yet another.
their 1931 Landtag totals.

Neither party achieved

Although a small dent had been

wade, no promise of a political reversal could be per
ceived from the vote.

And nationally as was the case

locally, no candidate had received the manditory fifty per
cent of the vote.
place.

Another election would have to take

The date fixed for the election was April 10.

A

combination of the depletion of party funds, lack of time
and an emergency ban on all political meetings in the state
of Hesse-Da.rmstadt led to a minimum of public meetings be
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fore the second election.
The NSDAP bided its time along with the other con
t~nding

3.

groups until the ban on meetings expired on April

In an impressive display of timing and organization

the NSDAP scheduled its first public meeting of the second
presidental campaign for four o'clock in the afternoon of
Saturday, April 3, barely four hours after the meeting ban
ran out. 29 District propaganda ch1ef Trefz beat away at
the theme, "Germany's frightful struggle," suggesting that
only the Nazis could lead Germany out of the chaos which
surrounded everyone. This speach brought into a clearer
light the second bugaboo of Nazi propaganda--chaos.

The

double fear of "marxism" and chaos were to receive more
attention in the coming months.
The campaign of the Nazis was counterbalanced by the
activity of the Iron Front.

On April 6 the Reichstagtmem

ber Ritzel discussed, "Why Hessen should vote for Hinden
burg" before a large audience.

Well received because of

his humor and speaking ability, Ritzel defended the SPD
supporting Hindenburg in the election. 30 Hindenburg's
chances in Pfungstadt received another boost when a Com
mittee for Hindenburg jumped into the campaign.

The pur

pose of the conwittee was to garner middle class support
from the Nazis.

The pronouncements of the group were aim

ed at arousing a fear of change among the burgerlich. A
newspaper campaign included the provocative question,
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"Should

our people, our homes *nd our families, the basis

of our eXistance, be handed over to experimental radicalif'm?

The German ship of state is ':'legotiating a heavy sea,

don't change captains.

Don't change from the captain who

knows every reef and shoal.

Vote for Field Marshall von

Hindenburg. u31
Although the state of Hesse-Darmstadt gave Hindenburg
a majority of the votes (53.15%), Hindenburg's percentage
in Pfungstadt increased to only 44.00%.

The exact figures

were:
RESULTS OF THE APRIL 10, 1932 REICH PRESIOENTAL ELECTION 32

(1931) *

44.00%

(41.10%)

- 1,840

(1122)

39.61%

(36.65%)

161

(1001)

16.38%

(21.31%)

Hindenburg - 2,044
Hitler
Thalmann

Fifty-three fewer voters went to the polls (March·,- 4164,

93.05%; April - 4111, 91.18%), but that was not the most
important news of the election.

The startling drop in KPO

voting strength ranked number one, while the growth of
NSOAP support was a close second.

The SPO conceeded that

the KPO had staged a hard campaign, marching through the
streets of Pfungstadt the day of the vote, but suggested
in the Volksfreund that the unemotional, but tenacious
efforts of the SPO had revived its sincere image among the
working class voters. 33

*March

The SPOts analysis 1s partially

11, 1932 election returns.
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correct, but they forgot that they were not winning new
voting support, merely rewinning former adherants, and
without tne promise that they wou11 remain in the SPD fold
for long.

The NSDAP had climbed up another couple of per

centage points.

That they could gain those votes in the

face of the number one symbol of traditional order, Hinden
burg, indicated that they could expect to hold the newly
won electoral supporters in future elections.

The burger

lich were in the throes of finding new faces to solve the
depression.

Because of their search even their old loyalty

to the Field Marshall could not hold them to the Republic.
The deliberations of the town council were not over
looked by the inhabitants of Pfungstadt in the
of Reich politics.
into effect early

~shuffle

Several emergency measures had gone

January, including another cut in
officials' pay and various rent and price changes. 34 The
i~

town council members had to deal with these developments
and their own fiscal difficulties.

Besides taking cogni

zance of fifty thousand marks of payments due the town J
the council approved a longer repayment period for a 1927
state building loan at its January 4 session. 35 In March
the council cut money for the construction of a city park
over the objection of the KPD which claimed that the coun
cil was taking jobs away from the unemPIOyed. 36 April
produced the conclusion of a fight over the school.

In

creased student attendance dictated that two additional
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teachers be engaged in the schools, but the money for the
project could not be expended according to Martin.

In

addition the council had to lay aside plans for additional
town housing at the insistance of the burgerlich.

The

oppressive opposition of the middle class to all money
measures hindered the council from approving Jobs for the
unemployed replanting trees in the forest and the approval
of only eight hundred marks for twenty-nine families with
large nembers of children whose heads had been long unem
PlOyed. 37 The final council meeting in the first half of
1932 resolved to provide some spot employment for the
chronically unemployed by alloting enough funds for the
construction of a wall around the cemetary.

The biirgerlich

members of the council found support for their constant
objections in financial matters in the audit of the
1930/31 bUdget. 38 The report stated in part:
The total cost of town emergency unemployment pay
ments amounted to RM 158,766.26. The county sup
plied RM 6,798 for the Winterhilfe during 1930/31,
so that the town had to-aIlot RM 151,968.26. These
figures establish the financial alamity of Pfung
stadt in 1930, a situation which is unbearable for
the community. The Kreisamt as well as the Minis
terium were constantly informed of the catastrophic
financial plight •.. In the 1930/31 budget year sub
sidies from"the Reichshilfe and loans from the
Hessen Compensation Fund were transfered to the
town account, however not in sufficient quantity
to allow the town to meet its financial responsi
bilities.
While national political machinations attracked their
share of the headlines, the gut political fight for the
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fiscal control of Pfungstadt sturred the emotions of
Pfungstadt's inhabitants as much as ever.
The Volksbank proudly announced that it retained
sufficent funds to remain liquid on April 9, but had to
conceed that its deposits had dropped in the past year.39
As the public and private stock of financial resources
sank, the tempers of both the right and leftwing parties
grew shorter.

The KPD was quick to pump the frustrations

of the uenmployed to a fevel' pitch.

On March 26 the KPD

distributed a leaflet which accused Mayor Schwinn of de
liberately withholding funds from the unemplOyed. 40 Charg
ing that cash was available for immediate distribution to
the enemployed, but that the mayor had prohib1.ted its dis
tribution, the KPD wrote, "Immediate action is called for,
demand your rights!"

General notice of Mayor Schwinn's

vehement denunciation of the charges had an immediate im
pact on the town's citizens since Mayor Schwinn was highly
respected in every class and circle of the populace.
the damage was already done.

But

The unemployed were very

discontented with their situation, ready to grasp at the
thinest promise thrown their way.

The leaflet only added

more fuel to the already blazing resentment among the un
employed.
Wahler

On the other side of the fence was the Kommunale

Vereinigun~

administration too.

which encouraged distrust of the town's
On April 23 the Vereinigung staged a
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display of temper over the reevalutation of property values
which the town administration had undertaken over a three
week period.

Martin charged that many of the newest eval

uations of the officials were unrealistic and inflated.

.

Other areas which were under suspicion were the taxes on
~;

profits and captial.

Mar'tin also summerized the work of

the council for the large audience of interested onlookers.
One speaker after another warned the assembled throng to
become informed about the tax situation in Pfungstadt and
how

~hey

would be hurt.

Near the end of the gathering, a

Kommunale Wahler Vereinigung spokesman promised the crowd
that his group would try to improve the business pros
pects in Pfungstadt.

As the final paint of business, the

group decided to alter its name.

In the future the group

would be called the Kommunale Vereinigung Pfungstadt. 41
Under the spell cast by the depression the KPd and the
Vereinigung strove for different goals along similar paths.
Their concerns were neither mad nor insane, but

th~

exag

gerated reaction to a crazy depression which no one under
stood.
The SPD counteracted as best it could, with the most
proven methods at its disposal.
was just such a method.

The May Day celebration

Neutralizing the KPD's lunge for

ward was the primary concern of the SPD and the Associated
Union, therefore they promoted the celebration with a fer
ver. 42 Notwithstanding financial difficulties which dic

\
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tated a more conservative outlay of funds for decorations,
the event proceeded smoothly.

Together with a speech by

stampe (Frankfurt) the AssJciated Union sponsored a picnic
for a large representative crowd. 43

Attacking with great

vigor, the SAJ, as they had during the Landtag and Reich
presidential elections when they satirized opposition can
didates through marvelous little mini-plays, called for
"socialist partnership" on May 8.

Employing the theme,

"We never want to carry the weapons [of war] again," the
group drew a large number of working class youngsters (and
their parents) to the SAJ Heim.

Peter Cro6mann enunciated

his feelings toward war on a program which included folk
dances and songs. 44

Another demonstration of SPD unity

and ongoing strength was the party gathering on May 21.
Delp (Darmstadt)

sp~ke

of the political situation through

out Germany and the state of the Landtag in Hesse-Darm
stadt.

At the same time August Hechler and Peter Cro8mann

were elected to represent Pfungstadt at the oounty level
party assembly. 45

In addition to the normal business of

day to day party;matters, the leaders of the SPD had to
begin to map their strategy for the upcoming (June 19)
Landtag election.

•

The opening shots of the campaign were

fired by the Iron Front at a meeting on June 9.

•The

Calling

November 15, 1931 Landtag election had been de
. clared invalid by the Hessen State Supreme Court.

I
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upon the services of the exiled Italian socialist Victor
Mungio1i to detail" "What the working class can expect from
facism,," the party launched a streng headon attack on the
NSDAP.

Cueing on the assumption that Italian facism and

German nazism were intertwined philosophies" Mungio1i re
cited a long list of abuses and suppressive actions which
the SPD could expect if the NSDAP came to power. 46 A
larger demonstration of SPD power was planned for June 14
on the square in front of the town hall.

Titled a demon

stration for freedom and work" the gathering was proceeded
by a march through the streets by Associated Union members,
club members and Reichsbanner associates.
marched from the train station along the

The participants
Eberstadterstra~e

to the town hall where the Reichstag members Saupe and
Maria Zammert addressed them. 47 The SPD managed to take
the offensive with these two meetings by stressing the
dread of Nazism at every turn.

The newly uncovered "Box

heimer Documents" lent the statements of the SPD even more
credance in the eyes of their followers.

The KPD also re

ceived its share of the blame for the Nazis growth.

The

KPD was accused of being narrow minded in both outlook and
action.

Closing each meeting were the cha11anging words"

"If your freedom is worth something, if you love your
country" if you don't want your children to become cannon
fodder" then put an end to Hitler's movement" vote for the
SPD on June 19!"

As the final speaker in an impressive

!
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list of national figures who vi$ited Pfungstadt during the
election campaign the SPD mustered Reichstag member Carlo
M1 erendorff to the front.

Mierendorff came directly to

the point in his remarks at the last public SPD meeting
before the election, demanding that the voters "Make Hes
sen free from the swastika."

The last SPD gesture before

the election involved the young members of the party who
braved the dangers of physical confrontation to distribute
handbills the day before the e1ection. 48
The activities of the KPD were many and varied, al
though public meetings did not assume the same importance
as they did for other parties.

KPD men used the opponent's

meeting for a forum; airing communist propaganda was a fa
vorite tactic.

Another pasttime, practiced with consider

able skill, was the destruction of the oppositions' posted
handbills and confrontations with people who attempted to
spread the word of an opponent in working class restaur
ants and meeting points.

A June 9 public meeting played

a part in Huxhorn's strategy, but by and large the party
relied on individual contact between prospective voters
and convinced followers to build a strong foundation of
support for the vote. 4 9
A cloud of suspicion, as viewed with anti-Nazi eyes,
was cast over the NSDAP when the Interior minister an
nounced that a large amount of material concerning SA and
S8 intentions together with weapons were found in a state-
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wide search of Nazi homes.

Paralleling the state govern

ments discoveries was similar action in Hahn (three kilometres sO:J.th of Pfungstadt) which produced equivalent re
sults. 50 The thought that the Nazi party, despite evidence
which would seem to irrefutable substantiate the charge,
would institue a dictatorship after assuming power either
legally or by revolution did not penetrate the minds of
the middle class.

The b6rgerlich rejected the SPD/KPD

arguments in part because they firmly believed that the
SPD/KPD were just as responsible for the confrontation
atmosphere in Pfungstadt as the Nazis.

Then there were the

words of Ortsgruppenleiter Graff himself. He stated quite
unequivocally that the NSDAP would most likely have to
establish a dictatorship after it assumed power, but only
long enough to restore both fiscal and political order. 51
The parties of the Weimar Republic had failed, he

argue~,

to provide a remedy to the depression, the Nazis would sup
ply the cure, even if it meant stepping on the toes of the
SPD and the KPD "bosses. 1t

The NSDAP was not afraid of ex

ploring new means of spreading Nazi propaganda while a ban
on party meetings existed in Hessen.

On May 28 the NSDAP

presented a "concert" in the restaurant lfGoldenen Lamm."
Between musical presentation Abt (Darmstadt) presented his
ideas concerning "Theory and Reality," which included a
strong attack on the SPD for not being able to realize the
difference between the two.

In addition to his uncomp11
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mentory remarks about the SPD, he dwelt with the positive
aspects of the NSDAP.
~ld

He promised a new state with bread

work for every German. 52

stadt on

demonstration~

After the ban in Hesse-Darm

marches, meetingssand the display

of party flags was raised by

Leuschner~

the Nazis staged

one of their most ambitious efforts to find new supporters •
On June 8 Minister Knab

• (Gustavsburg)

spoke in the over

flowing "Goldenen Lam.'ll1l about "Christianity, Communism and
National Socialism."

In a stinging denouncement of com

munism and the "Moscowers
o

,

11

he implored the audience to re-

Ject lazy, immoral marxism and think "German" once again,
so that they might serve God and country.
were not u.niversally accepted.

His remarks

A disenchanted spectator,

provoked by his comments, threw a rock (or bottle) at him
during his speech.

.

In addition to Knab, a man named Kraft

inflamed the audience with disparaging remarks about repa
rations, promising that when the NSDAP got into power the,'
money would not go abroad, but would be used to put' one
million people to work.

Fired by the speeches several mem

bers of the audience endeavored to convince opponents of
the righteousness of their respective positions in a briet
scuffle after the meeting. 53 With one week left in the
campaign,the NSDAP showed no signs of letting up.

On June

*Minister

Knab had been a deacon in Pfungstadt. be
tween 1923 and 1924 before being transfered to Gustavsburg.
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14 the party held a meeting in the nearby village of Hahn,
but spared no expense because of the small number of vil
lagers.

'rhe retired Protestant minister Munchmeyer spoke

to the gathering which included a healthy sprinkling of
people from Pfungstadt.

On Thursday, June 16, the party

concluded its campaigning with a gathering aimed at at
tracting more women to the POlls.5 4
The most interesting development in the campaign in
volved a party which

d~d

not even have a single candidate

speaking for it at a single rally.

On June 18 the Kommu

nale Vereinigung Pfungstadt placed an advertisement in the
Anzeiger which stated:
MEN AND WOMEN OF PFUNGSTADT: Do your part tommor
row to end the Marxist mismanagement of the economy
which has brought us all this suffering and unbe
lievable political terror as practised by the
'champions of freedom' in Pfungstadt. DO NOT VOTE
FOR THE SOCIAL DENOCRATS OR 'lIHESCOMMUNISTS or else
things will never get better!!5
Steinmetz and Martin, the leaders of the Vereinigung knew
very well that the warning to vote against the SPD and KPD
was an endorsement of the NSDAP since the old middle class
parties had staged no campaign at all throughout the weeks
before the election.

Conditions had become so bad for

them that the Deutsche Volkspartei, Deutsche Staatspartei,
Christlich-soziale Volksdienst, Volksrechtspartei and the
Wirtschaftspartei had formed a National Unity List.
publisher of the Anzeiger, Julius

Helen~

The

and the editor

of the paper, Gottfried Helene, unwilling to see their
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paper mixed up in the increasingly bitter political strife
banned all articles and letters to the editor submitted by
political parties.

The ban began on Wednesday, June 15,

and lasted until the election campaign concluded on June
19.

Besides fearing that political invective from one or

the other parties would damage their paper's strict policy
of political neutrality, they also were terribly afraid
that one of the parties would found its own party paper
and cut into the circulation of the Anzeiger. 56 Elec
tioneering was a dangerous enterprise in 1932.
Over ninety percent of the

eligible voters made

their way to the polls on June 19.

More than at any other

time they placed themselves in the hands of the NSDAP.

Out

side of the Nazi gains no other party increased its elec
toral support.

The results were:

.RESULTS OF THE JUNE 19, 1932 HESSEN LANDTAG ELECTION
(1572) *

32.45%

(32.89%)

917

(1040)

19.99%

(21.58%)

1947

(1758)

42.46%

(36.78%)

80

(162)

1.74%

(3.39%)

154

(248)

3.35%

(5.32%)

SPD

1488

KPD
NSDAP
National
Unity List
Others

A marked drop in the number of voters going to. the polls
resulted in only 90.17% participation in the election.

Of

*Returns from the November 15, 1931 Landtag election.
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the 5,156 people eligible to vote, only 4,4649 used their
right to decide on their representatives.
b~r

In the Novem

15, 1931 election 5,087 had been eligible to vote and

4,843 had marked a ballot.

Thus two hundred and ninety

four fewer people had taken the time to vote.

The total

vote of the SPD and the KPD fell by a combined two hundred
and twenty-six (from 2,651 to 2,425).

Thus the working

class portion of the vote fell from 55.46% in 1931 to

52.88%.

The overall drop in voter participation in the

election most likely accounts for the major portion of
the SPD/KPD vote drop, although a few working class votes
must have migrated into the Nazi column.
So much animosity, so much political hatred, so much
despair, so: much despiration ••• as one butcher said,
"People did not want to get along with each other any
more. u58

The hate, the fear, the lack of hope and the

desperation drove men to see riches were there were none,
hope where there was only a trap, order where there was
only dictatorship.

The first six months of 1932 had in

tensified what had become an untenable situation, a solu
tion was only seven months away.
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CHAPTER IX - FOOTNOTES
lpA: June 7, 1920 and November 12, 1931.
2

2,200 votes were wast by middle class citizens,
1,758 (79.9%) went to the NSDAP. Even if one allows up
to two hundred votes for the NSDAP to come from people
who considered themselves workers, not middle class, the
Nazis still captured well over seventy percent (70.8%)
of the bUrgerlich. There does not seem to be grounds for
assuming that even that many working class votes went to
the NSDAP.
,

3Inter'viel"/s with Johann Kolsch,. Julius Winkler and
Maria Schulz.
4HVF : January 2~ 1932.
5HVF : .January 11, 1932.

6pA : January 20, 1932 and HVF: Janua.ry 23 and 25,
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7 pA : February 3 and 4, 1932 and WiF: February 3, 4.
and 6, 1932.
8Interviews with Wilhelm Kaffenberger and Maria
Schulz.
9pA : February 3, 1932 and HVF: February 2 and 9,
1932.
10HVF: January 11, 1932.
llpA: February 24 and 27, 1932 and HVF: February 25,
1932.
12pA : February 24, 1932.
13Notes from the private file of Heinrich Huxhorn.
In another place in his notes he mentions the fact that
the KPD had backed the Nazi attempt to have the Frussian
Landtag dissolved. After World War II he told Peter
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Cropmann that the KPD had acted more with emotion than
with sense with regard to dissolving the Pfurrian Landtag,
but that he' still fully approved of the KPD having run
Thalmann against von Hindenburg. Cropmann reported that
he could IlO'C make Huxhorn understand the devisive effect
the KPD action had had on the working class.
14 pA : January 21, 1932.
15Interviews with Heinrich Schaffner, Jacob Hanbuch,
Jacob Brauer, Ju1iu5 Hofmann, Heinrich Sand) Luisc Stein
metz and Gottfried Helene. Incidents 'suct as this spurred
the middle class to take a more militant attitude toward
the working class of Pfungstadt than would normally have
been the case.
16HVF : February 4, 1932.
17Interview with Ludwig Wenz. The KPD also boasted
that they would attain power after the NSDAP had failed
to produce the results which they had promised to the
people for so long.
l8Interview with Heinrich Schaffner.
19Interviews \lith Heinrich Schaffner, Heinrich Sand,
Wilhelm Kaffenberger and Karl Hechler. KPD and SPD people
claimed after World War II to have known that such things
had taken place, but this seems to be looking at the past
with the knowledge of the present, not reflective of the
facts in the years before 1933. If they had known they
surely would have begun a boycott of the offending firms
involved.
20 pA : February 13 and 15, 1932.
21 pA : March 5, 1932.
22pA : February 26, 1932.
23Interviews with Heinrich Sand, Maria Schultz and
Ria Hanbuch.
24 HVF : March 11 and 12, 1932.
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26HVF : March 11, 1932.
27 pA : March 10, 1932.
28 pA : March 14, 1932.
29 pA : April 2 , 1932.
30 pA : April 6, 1932 and HVF: April 7, 1932.
31pA: kpril 8, 1932.
32pA : April 11, 1932.
33 HVF : April 11, 1932.
34pA: January 4, 1932.
35 pA : January 5, 1932; HVF: January 6, 1932; PGSP:
January 4, 1932, pp. 338-340.
36 pA : March 22, 1932 and PGSP: March 21, 1932, pp.
355-359.
37 pA : April 5, 1932; HVF: April 6, 1932; PGSP: April
4, 1932, pp. 360-362.
38 pA : June 10, 1932 and PGSP: June 9, 1932, pp. 365
39 pA : April 9, 1932.
40 pA : March 26, 1932 and INF: March 29 and 30, 1932.
41 pA : April 22 and 27, 1932.
42Interviews with August Hechler, Peter Cropmann and
Georg Liebig.
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43 HVF : April 30 and lvlay 3, 1932.

q4 pA : May 7, 1932 and IIVF: i>1ay 12, 1932.
Q5 pA : May 2Q, 1932 and HVF: May 21 and 25, 1932.
Q6 pA : June 8, 1932 and llVF: June 7 and 9, 1932.
Q7 pA : June 13, 1932 and HVF: June 13, 1932.
Q8 pA : June 16, 1932 and HVF: June 1(; and 17, 1932.
-9 pA : June 9, 1932 and interviews with Jacob Delp,
Georg Herth, Karl Emig and Georg Liebig. Few confronta
tions took place between KPD and SPD members over hand
bills and leaflets, but the animosity caused by campaign
ing caused tempers on both sides to grew short.
50 pA : :APril 15, 16 and 19, 1932.
51Interviews with Julius Winkler, Heinrich Sand
and Jacob Hanbuch. In addition to fighting a losing
cause if the SPD had attempted to make inroads into the
middle class voting strength the SPD would have had to
overcome the seemingly illogical thoughts of the bUrger
- lich. The SPD and the KFD had clearly stated on more than
one occassion that the NSDAP was intent on setting up a
dictatorship. The middle class blandly cast the warnings
aside, deeming them the ravings of people who saw only
the worst in an attempt to make a political gain. Indeed
it must have seemed very remote to the ~iddle class that
the ~azis of Pfungstadt would ever be able to impose their
will over the entire town. Trying to convince a group who
did not want to believe was an impossible task in the
highly charged atmosphere.
52pA: May 30, 1932.
53 pA : June 7 and 11, 1932.
Q
5 PA : June 14 and 15, 1932 and notes from the 1'1le
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56 pA : June 14) 1932 and interview with Gottfried
Helene.

57 pA : June 20, 1932.
58Interview with Fritz Feldmann.
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CHAPTER X
SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION - JULY, 1932 TO JANUARY, 1933
Unable to come to grips with the complexities of the
depression, a near majority of Pfungstadt's citizens had
turned to the NSDAP to supply them with a solution.

The

changes wrought by the Nazis took form at the ballot box
with a strong showing for the "Hitler movement.1f

In ad

dition to winning the single largest block of votes in
Pfungstadt, the party had grown in numbers and wealth to
the point where a sl'!rious question lay in the minds of
the SPD as to whether the Nazis would use that power to
attempt an armed revolution.

The SPD had responded to

the increasingly severe pressures upon them to take some
action by forming the Iron Front, supposedly a coalition
equal to the task of defending the Weimar Republic from
Nazi threats.
to

materializ~

But over the months the Nazi threat failed
instead more and more highly respectable

middle class citizens spoke in approving, if still hush
ed, tones of the NSDAP to restore the world to its pre
depression state. l

Restoring the middle class world to
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its former balance was undoubtedly the main factor which
drove so many intelligent people to cast their lot with
the NSDAP.

There was no traditional association for the

middle class with Nazism.

Many citizens undoubtedly voted

for the NSDAP with the idea that a shift to another party
would be possible if the Nazis failed to produce their
vaunted restoration of the German economy.2

The utter

lack of political education was one of the qreat failings
of Pfungstadt's burgerlich citizens during the days of
drama before 1933.

While the KPD leadership analyzed

every development against a supposedly infallible master
plan and the SPD followed their democratic instincts, the
burgerlich blithely and blindly marched behind the swasti
ka flag of the NSDAP, unable to see that Hitler actually
'meant what he said.
Marches had become a common occurrence since the be
ginning of 1932.

The Iron Front marched to show the

strength of the SPD and to discourage any Nazi thoughts
of attempting to seize power by force.

The plan of action

in the event of another Nazi putsch. designated the members
of the Iron Front to become police reserves under the dir
ection of the Interior Minister, Leuschner. 3

With arms

supplied by the police. the SPD had very few weapons in
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its possession, the Iron Front would act as a formidable
deterent.

without the leadership, and more importantly,

tha guns held by Leuschner, the Iron Front would have a
hard time defending Pfungstadt against a putsch attempt,
if the putschists were armed.

The leaders of the Iron

Pront and Reichsbanner, Albert Walke and his second in
command Ludwig Clemenz, did not organize their members
to operate independently of the state but through the
state.

This fact strengthened the Iron Front immensely,

since Leuschner provided a strong symbol for the member
ship.

The second half of 1932 began with the Iron Front

ready to demonstrate that they were not afraid of a
fight.

In concerted action with other nearby Iron Front

units, the group from Pfungstadt marched off to Darm
stadt on

July~

stration .. 4

in order to participate in a large demon

One of the central facts of the Iron Front

member's life in those perilous days was the constant
movement from one SPD meeting to another, from town to
town, village to village.

Pfungstadt's Iron Front had

assumed the responsibility for the protection of several
SPD local parties which were situated in less than friend

ly areas.

Quite often Sundays would be spent traveling to

this or that demonstration either as a proponent or pro

i ~
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tagonist of the particular
play.

political philosophy on dis

Some hearty individual members even set out to

distant meetings after their work was done for the day,
often arriving back in Pfungstadt early the following
morning only to repeat the process over and over again.
Fifty-kilometer bicycle trips were a common occurrence. 5
Another group that was often under way was the political
cabaret

~

roten Spatzen (the red sparrows), an invent

ion of the SAJ.

The group had made its first appearance

during the November, 1931, Landtag election, but only
produced its cutting satire for Pfungstadt.

By July, 1932,

the group was traveling over many parts of southern Hes
sen in a rented truck, playing to packed SPD gatherings
wherever it went. 6

The upcoming Reichstag election (July

. 31, 1932) would not be lost because of want of effort.
Realizing that the NSDAP could not be dreamed away
the Volksfreund
and the NSDAP.

launched daily attacks against Hitler
One area which received particular atten

tion was Hitler's position in regard to the Jews.

The bit

ing satire of a July 5 article in the Volksfreund contrast
ed his attacks on the Jews with his attacks on the "Marx
ists,"

concluding that "anything is possible with Herr

Hitler."7 Anti-semitism played such a minor role in Pfung-
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stadt's history that it never became a large point in the
Nazi program before 1933.

The one notable incident involv

ing a Jewish member of Pfungstadt produced no discernable
echo concerning other Jews in the community.

The butcher,

Stern, a hard working and practical man,S had purchased
large quantities of meat which he proceeded to sell below
other butchers' prices, most often to the unemployed.

In

this manner he became the hero of the poor and the center
of controversy.

The murky line between financial jealousy

and anti-semitism is very difficult to define in this case,
because no direct assault upon stern for being a Jew was
ever launched.

The whole incident involved a

prentice whom stern had fired.

fo~er

ap

The man charged that Stern

was able to sell his meat at the low prices he did because
he had acquired low quality, and at times, the man said,
completely inferior, meat.

An investigation of the charg

es by the state health office failed to reveal any poor
meat, but the man kept up his campaign against stern,
charging at one point that he had seen Stern urinate on a
side of beef before he cut it up to sell.

The two years

over which the struggle took place yielded no final re
sult. 9

Ster.n's threat to take the man to cou!:"t silenced

him for a time, and the inaugeration of the Third Reich
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ended stern's chances to ever settle the matter, although
the Nazis did not force him to close his shop once they
had attained power.

Anti-semitism was, at best, a

~e

ripheral issue in the years before 1933.
Throughout the years between 1929 and 1933 the
average worker very infrequently studied the differences
between the KPO and the SPo.

He preferred to think of

the working class as one united body, able to do battle
with the Nazis with both fists punching together if the
time should arrive when that would be necessary.10

The

leaders of the SPO took a dim view of such thoughts al
though they acknowledged that the KPO was violently anti
Nazi in Pfungstadt.

The abiding fear that the KPO would

only intensify its already powerful block of voters at
-the expense of the SPO predominated the thought for a
very long time within the ranks of the SPO's leaders.
They reasoned that the SPD was democratic, that the KPO
was undemocratic, and that therefore they could not work
together. ll

The average member of the party was very

dubious of that preposition.

There was also

~~e

feeling

of regret that the KPO had its members out of the Associ
ated Union (the KPO was not associated with the Union,
but individual KPO members were).

Sensing the mood of

HI"

ull

278
the average worker and desiring to see some sort of oldfashioned cooperation reestablished, the leader of the
Reichsbanner/lron Front, Walke, and the leader of the
RPDts Anti-facist League, Huxhorn, agreed to form a
~oint

Committee for Proletarian Unity at a huge meeting

on July 8.

Unanimity reigned at the gathering as a set

of proposals for a joint program was unanimously approv
ed. 12

A very real threat to any NSDAP plans for Pfung

stadt was created, for one must not lose sight of the
fact that the total vote of the SPO and the KPD still re
presented a majority in Pfungstadt (2,425 votes. 52.88%,
in the June 19, 1932, Hessen Landtag election).

The

majority of the SPO/KPO male vote (approximately 1,200)
was already part of either the SPO's or KPDts "fighting"
groups:
140).

(SPD between 600 and 700: KPD between 110 and
The SA was outnumbered by an eight to one count at

the very minimum.

Huxhorn was very enthusiastic at the

prospects of a Unity Front, going so far as to claim that
"the importance of this question (the joint committee's
plans) means more to us than the (July 31) Reichstag
election. lf13

The sincerit.y of Huxhorn1s statement was un

doubtedly viewed with a great deal of suspicion by the
SPD's leadership, but the fact remained that organs of the

II
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SPD and the KPD (the partiies themselves were not a part of
the arrangement) had

rees~ablished

their first official

contact in years.
JU~y

On Friday night,

lS, the Unity Front staged its

!

first public demonstration,
with an impressive result.
,
OVer twelve hundred of Pftingstadt's own SPD/KPD members
marched through the streets of Pfungstadt to the Rathaus
square.

At the Rathaus bqth Huxhorn and Walke delivered

impassioned speeches, pro~ising to rid Pfungstadt of the
Nazi "pest".

The crowd of two thousand men and women

cheered lustily at the wotds of their leaders, while
small groups of SPD and
where discussing the
development. 14

~D

people could be found every

impl~cations

of this unexpected new

Many were I still enjoying their rediscover

ed similarities when word l from the higher authorities of
the Reichsbanner/lron Fropt arrived that no more coopera
tion with the KPD would b r tolerated. lS

The Unity F~ont

was dead.
Barely two days

af~er

the abortive attempt to unite

the workers, the Iron Frqnt was back on the streets.
July 17 the members of

t~e

On

Iron Front mar9hed to Eber

stadt and then back to Pfungstadt where they held a rally
near the train station. 16

Before any more demonstrations

!
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could be scheduled, Chancellor von Papen* dissolved the
to~

Braun (SPD) government in Prussia which resulted in a
tal ban of all parades and demonstrations in Hessen on
July 22.17

The ban did not include meetings held within

a hall or restaurant, so the Iron Front scheduled a
gathering for July 25.

Besides words of condemnation for

Papen, the main speaker, Schmitz (Koln), reminded the as
sembled crowd that the upcoming Reichstag election would
decide if the workers were to be slaves of Papen and his
mentors or free men. lS

The final Iron Front

rall~before

the Reichstag election, took place the day before the citi
zens were scheduled to go to the polls on July 30. 19
SPDrs campaign was one of the most lively in years.

The
Abuse

against the SPD had filled the air; there were more street
confrontations than ever before, while an urgent desire
to come to a decision filled the minds and hearts of most
members.

The SPD had been caught looking silly after agree

ing to join with the KPD in an all out assault on the

NSDA~

This promoted some feelings of pessimism among the ranks
of the leaders as the days before the election waned.
July 31 would be a real test for the SPD.
*Franz von Papen had been appointed Chancellor of
Germany by President von Hindenburg on June 1, 1932.
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Among the ranks of the KPD a feeling of optimism
. reigned.

The KPO more than held its own in the back

streets of Pfungstadt with

~he

occasional SA man who

challenged a KPO distributor of handbills.

In addition

the KPO had won more respect for the attempt to unite
forces with the SPD.20

A series of informal restaurant

and street corner meetings had given Huxhorn and other
KPD leaders the chance to expound their hatred of fac
ism and recommend a sweeping solution.

As a capstone

to their pre-election efforts the KPO caused the great
est street confrontation, riot would be a better word,
in the history of Pfungstadt.

The basis for the riot was

the growth of an overwhelming dissatisfaction with the
existing conditions among the unemployed.

As unemploy

ment subsidies went down, the tempers of the unemployed
went up.

The KPD had attempted to incite the unemployed

to a more militant stand when they had distributed leaf
lets accusing the mayor of withholding funds from the un
employed.

The foundation of the riot on July 29 was

again a rUlRor about the unemployment funds.

The rumor

spread that there was no money for the unemployed.

Men,

women and children showed up at the "stock-exchange" (as
the unemployment office was called) early in the

mo~ning

-, Ii
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to confront the official in charge.

He quickly telephoned

the mayor who, in turn, informed Peter Cro~mann.

croBmann

rushed to the scene to find negotiations going on between
the mayor and the leaders of the unemployed (Huxhorn and
Herth) .21

By noon the money had begun to be distributed,

but those that had collected their money remained on the
street in front of the office talking to those who had
not yet received their payment.

The fact that the large

crowd did not disperse greatly excited Pfungstadt's police
who finally decided to call in reenforcements--the Schupo.
The arrival of the police provided the spark which had
been lacking before.
satisfied citizens

Armed police facing a crowd of dis

~long

with many children presented the

leader of the police with a difficult decision, since an
unintended shot could very easily kill a child.

Pleas

for the cro\.,d to disperse were not followed, so the police
moved forward in an attempt to send the people home.

The

crowd responded with their fists and the riot was on. 22
In the confusion one of the cars which had carried the
police to

Pfungstad~

was turned over.

Huxhorn and his as

sociates did not participate in the l:iot, mindful as they
were of the results of the 1928 "Kottmann incident".23
When the Schupo finally left the scene of the altercation
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they

only had three people in their cars, none of them

leaders of the confrontation.

While the KPD's action at

the "stock enchange" produced a strong reaction in the
ranks of the middle class, the unemployed felt a strong
sense of comradship with the KPD.

The leaders of the KPD

demonstrated that they would not be faced down by any
threat; they would take action where other people only
spoke of relief.

However tortured such logic might be,

it influenced the unemployed as much as the disjointed
ideas had moved the middle class.
The principle reaction of the burgerlich came from
the Kommunale yereinigung Pfungstadt which played up the
"terror acts" of the KPD.

Besides protesting against the

fear that supposedly stalked the streets, the vereinigunq
'charged that a "black list" of patriotic (national-think
ing people) men had been drawn up.

From the list a cer

tain number were to be shot charged the Vereiniqung. They
asked the

II

respectable " members of the community to immedi

ately report any act against themselves to the police for
action. 24

The advertisement of thl:: Vereiniqung said more

than any protest of the NSDAP could have.

It clearly sug

gested that there were only two parts to the community, the
esteemed and the dist)rder1y.

The community was clearly
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split, split deeper than any normal solution would quickly
resolve.

The intolerable political tension which was con

ducive to the parties with extreme answers caused tne An
zeiqe~

to reaffirm its neutrality once again before the

election. 25
Clouds filled the sky on July 31 and it eventually
began to rain as the last voters were marking their bal
lots, but quiet prevailed on the streets.

No incidents,

no confrontations, no fights marred the serenity of Pfung
stadt. 26

Since only 4.91% of the voters had failed to

select either the NSDAP, the KPD or the SPD in the last
election, the major impact of voting trends was expect
ed to continue in that area.

Indeed it did.

On July 31

the NSDAP/KPD/SPD captured 91.61% of the votes.

Depend

'ing upon one's self-serving interpretation of the elec
tion, the Nazis:

1) gained seventy-nine votes more than

they had had on June 19, and therefore kept their momen
tum: or 2) lost nearly one percent (July 31 - 41.49%,
June 19 - 42.46%) of the total votes cast.

Nearly every

observer regarded the first interpretation as being more
valid since the loss really indicated a reintroduction of
SPD/KPD voters into the election process than a real re
versal of Nazi voting support.

Cliwhing from 2,425 total
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votes (52.88%) the SPD/KPD recorded 2,639 electoral sup
porters (54.64%) on July 31.

This vote total still did

not equal the all-time high vote count of 2,651 on Novem
ber15, 1931, but confirms the earlier assumption that on
ly a minute fraction of the working class vote was slip
ping into the Nazi column.

Both the KPD and the SPD re

ceived a shot in the political arm, the KPD achieving
their greatest electoral success to date in Pfungstadt.
The most notable returns were:
RESULTS OF THE JULY 31, 1932, REICHSTAG ELECTION27
KPD

1,069

(917)*

22.13%

(19.1<)%)

SPD

1,570

(1,488)

32.51%

(32.45%)

NSDAP

2,026

(1,947

41.95%

(42.46%)

3.39%

(4.91%)

OTHERS

164
--------~

4,830

(225)
------
(4,586)

A record number of people had also gone to the polls
(4,878) producing a near record percentage of elig
ible voters exercising their right to vote (95.04%).
While the SPD could cheer themselves with the news that
their

vot~LS

were merely sitting out the Landtagelection

and would return to the SPD, the fact that the negative
*Retu~ns

election.

from the June 19, 1932, Hessen Landtag
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vote (KPD plus NSDAP) showed no 'signs of abating.

Along

with several other records, the KPD plus NSDAP vote total
S6C

another record as 3,095 people (a generous 64.9%)

selected them to represent their frustrations in the
Reichstag.

Of particular importance in the election was

the leveling off of the NSDAP's percentage of the vote.
At the height of their power the traditional middle class
parties had amassed 42.46% of the voting public (1,715
votes out of 4,049 in the May 4, 1924, Reichstag election).
The implication was that the Nazis had reached the end
of their poll of supporters.

with the SPD seeming to have

shored up its support, the outcome of any new election
looked fairly predictable.

Elections did not seem to

of~

fer the opportunity, in the near future, to break the
political log jam.
Encouraged by the apparent stability of the SPD, a
Constitution Day celebration was planned for August 11
despite the fact that no funds were forthcoming from the
town council and it was no longer an official holiday.
Meeting in the yard of the school, since no parade pre
ceeded the festivities, a moderately large crowd listened
attentively as the school teacher, Lang, described the
constitution as having given the people freedom.

He

I II! III!
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1Narned that f.reedom must be translated into an end to
party strife and disintegration, while the unity of the
state took first priority.28

The pale shadow of the

celebrations of previous years was nothi.ng more than a
futile gesture against the rising tide of people calling
for a solution. any solution to their problems.

Few

people were interested in debating the finer points of
the constitution at a time when they had to scrape every
day just to eat.

The robbery of potatoes from the farmers

and meat from the butchers had increased right along with
the unemployment in Pfungstadt.

Few people believed that

things could go on like they were for a sustained period
of time--the depression needed to be conquexed.
In the midst of the political unrest, the annual bud
get debate reared its ugly head.
the budget was
fits.

The ugliest aspect of

poin~ forty-th~ee--town

unemployment bene

From a low of twenty-five thousand marks in.1928/29

(2.9)% of the total budget) the benefits being paid went
to three hundred twelve thousand marks in 1931/32 (33.62%
of the total budget).29

As the budget debate opened the

outlook for an improvement in the fiscal situation it was
nowhere in sight.

A broad discussion of the entire bud-

9!c'.:led to the inevitable confrontation between the bur
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gerlich and the

SPD/Y~D

over the town unemployment bene

fits for the coming budget year.

After two hours of in

tensive debate the Unemployment committee's

suggest~on

that the unemployment benefits did not mean anything un
less there was enough to maintain a decent standard of
1iv:i.ng was adopted.

This meant that no cut would be made

from the level which was in force during the budget year
1931/32.

It also meant that the appropriation for the

payments would have to exceed four hundred thousand marks
(421.000.00 - 44.78% of the entire budget).30

One bright

spot in the gloomy fiscal picture was the townls debt
which actually decreased from a post-war high of over
seven hundred seventy-four thousand marks in July. 1930,
to somewhat under seven hundred forty thousand in July.
, 1932. 31

(For a complete breakdown of the public debt

1928-1935 please see page 466.)
Discussion of the budget, which had begun on .July
5, was postponed until september 6 at which time the
council began to vote on the individual points of the
budget.

At the close of the council session it had be

come apparent that the KPD's proposals were even further
reaching than the previous year, while the SPO seemed
less eager to support the KPD even on the most nominal
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points of the budget.

The SPD had assumed that the depres

sien would come to an end soon during 1930 and 1931 and that
the middle class could pay more taxes so that the' suffer
ing of the unemployed could be minimized.

By 1932 the SPD

.

realized that all of the normal tax channels were closed
to further enlargement.

The middle class of Pfungstadt

was not as hard struck by the depression as the workers,
but at the same time the KPD view that the burgerlich
could bear the entire burden of the unemployment through
higher taxes was not true.

The SPD,I rea.lizing that the

middle class could not pay, simply adopted a fiscal posi
tion much closer to the middle. 32

But there was no long

a "middle" middle cjass to greet the SPD on their arrival.
The burgerlich had either resigned themselves to serving
out their terms until the scheduled town council elections
in 1933, becoming rightists in their own manner, or becom
ing members (or associates) of the NSDAP.

Both Stein

metz and Martin had certainly elected to follow the last
course of action by the second half of 1932. 33
guise of

~ne

Under the

Kommunale Vereinigung Pfungstadt the two men

had carried on a brilliant running battle with the SPD and
the KPD: they continued the struggle over the 1932/33 bud
get with a ferocity that outdid their previous efforts.

!
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Charging that the budget was drastically out of balance
the

Vereiniq~~

re~uesting

sent a letter to the Kreisamt

that the Kreisamt reject certain parts of the
it reached their office. 34

budge~

when

Employing a fantastic slight

of hand act, Martin denied that the

burqer~ich

council

representatives were associated with the Vereiniqung when
he was closely questioned by the SPD members of the coun
cil on September 21 at the council session.

After plowing

their way through the maze of conflicting proposals which
accompanied each point in the budget the council finally
voted on the whole budget more than two months after it
had first been introduced into the council.

Only the KPD

members of the council voted against the budget while the
SPD and the middle class joined forces to see that the
'budget was accepted. 35
When the Kreisamt submitted its analysis to the
council at the October 3 council session, Martin wa.s high
ly upset.

The Kreisamt generally approved of the council's

1932/33 budget, but pointed out that some people were pay
ing property taxes which were be 10\-.. the Kreis average.
These, the Kreisamt decreed had to be raised, but those
that were above the average had to remain at that level.
Martin strongly objected to the "interference" of the

,
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Kreisamt. 36

Because of the serious lack ·of money the coun

cil could only approve work for thirty men on a bicycle
path to Darmstadt.

Considering the fact that seven hund

red and thirty-nine men and women were on the town's wel
fare roles this was a small concession indeed.
jects were impossible to fund.

Other pro

Workers for the bicycle

path project were to be supplied by the Free Work Service
which was also to be part of another project of immensely
larger proportions.

The Anzeiger had, just a few weeks

earlier. reported plans for the construction of the Hafraba
autobahn (Hamburg-Frankfurt-Basel) through some of Pfung
stadt's forest and fields. 37

Depending upon the construc

tion firm awarded the contract to build parts of the auto
bahn near Pfungstadt. a large number of the unemployed
- could conceivably find jobs.

Until the plans could be ap

proved the council still had to deal with the hash of fis
cal realities.

At the October 17 council meeting the re

presentatives were forced to raise the Burger tax because
of the state threat to cut off funds in the event the
council did not approve it.

Also approved was a twelve

percent cut of all officials' pay.38

The disturbing fi

nancial facts of life could not be neglected by the coun
cil for a moment.
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The tensions and frustrations of the middle class
found its most potent outlet in the NSDAP.

The fiscal dif

ficulties of the town only exasperated the already highly'
charged political atmosphere.

The NSDAP kept the pressure

for change at a fever pitch with frequent meetings at
which the speakers condemned the "Marxists" and trumpeted
Hitler's solutions.

Also of interest to the NSDAP was the

Reichstaq election slated for November 6.

A September 7

meeting featured the Reichstag member, Kern, who was in
sured a respectable audience as all of the NSDAP's mem
bers had been ordered to attend the meeting. 39

The

spread of Nazism to the younger generation of Pfungstadt
was very limited.

J.'.lthough the Hitler Jugend (HJ) had

been founded in 1932 they never showed themselves in pub
lic or at the schools.

There was never any trouble with

the HJ in the schools before 1933.

The only knowledge

that the general public gained of the group before 1933
was the Anzeiger report of ten boys and three girls tak
ing part in a youth day of the NSDAP at Potsdam in Oct
ober. 40

By late 1932 the lack of a HJ or Nazi showing

in Pfungstadt was certainly not for lack of confidence.
On October 23 the party scheduled a public meeting to
give the Reichstag member, Bartholomaus, the chance to
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describe liThe fall of Marxism."

He claimed a special in

sight into the intricacies of the problems since he
claimed to be a former KPD

me~her

and Union leader.

The

meeting was well attended, in part claimed the Volks
freund because the NSDAP had scheduled the meeting at the
same time as the Iron Front was attending a rally in
Darmstadt.

This they claimed was the basis of the chal

lenge of the NSDAP to the SPD to attend the meeting.
Aside from the false challenge of the NSDAP, the SPD
claimed to have overheard one NSDAP speaker explain the
righteousness of the Nazi cause with the words:

"Jesus

Christ and Adolf Hitler are fighting with us.,,4l
actly what the NSDAP was fighting for

remain~d

Ex

vague for

the vast majority of the over two thousand people who
'voted for the NSDAP on election day.

Party membership

strength stood at 'about one hundred late in 1932. 42
These official party members were strong advocates .of the
more radical thoughts of the party, while the broader
mass of supporters were generally interested in only one
or two aspects of the party progrant.

Some were against

the department stores in Darmstadt, feeling that they un
fairly burdened t.he small Handwerker firms in Pfungstadt;
others complaiIll?d about the tax structure which they felt

. '1[1
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the SPD would not change.
the party literally.43

Very few accepted the words of

Those who did, feverently believ

ed, although even within that group there were constant
dIsagreements and bickering.

Party discipline was under

the direction of the Ortsqruppenleiter, Wilhelm Graff;
SA discipline
Homburg.

~ms

enforced by the commander of the SA,

Graff was nominally the leader of the entire

NSDAP, although his power was often undercut by others
who reported that he drank to excess. 44

Other areas of

NSDAP activity were either unorganized or only weakly
represented in Pfungstadt.
The NSDAP Ortsbetriebszelle was one such structure.
It was only partially effective in its role, and then
only

",ith

middle class "workers" who wanted to lead a

working class cleansed of "Marxist" influence.

An Octo

ber 25 meeting of the group produced only chuckles not a
response from Pfungstadt's workers. 45

The main thrust of

the NSDAP remained.with the middle class voter.

On Novem

ber 1 the NSDAP held its last voters meeting with the cain
theme, "Von Papen or Adolf Hitler" before a large audience.
Featuring a strong attack on Papen the meeting was filled
with charges that Papen was responsible for the terrible
situation of the middle class.

Claiming that only a
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reintroduction of workers into the economy, under the lead
ership of Adolf Hitler, was the answer.

Landtag member

Klostermann promised that only the NSDAP could "lead the
German people out of the probl.em of hunger, hatred and
misery."

He also characterized the struggle as one be

tween the private··property-loving and Christian National
Socialist and communism. 46

This view was mirrored in

many circles, where the discussion was whether the "com
munists" (KPD/SPD) or the NSDAP would win power in Ger
many.47

Other alternatives were either forgotten or re

garded as insignificant.
work well: the

~rgerlich

The

Naz~had

done their home

were so wrought up in their world

of upside down logic that the excited words of the Nazis
seemed reasonable.
The basic SPD commitment to democracy never waver
ed during the long period of sustained political anarchy.
Dents were made in the SPD ranks; twenty-six percent of the
SPD electorate had wandered into the KPD column between
1928 and 1932, but a solid block of voters (July 31 Reich
stag -

l,~70)

still stood behind the

Social Democrats.

And the SPD members were never scared off the streets or
cowed into cancelling any of its public meetings.

A Sep

tember 3 public meeting of the Iron Front/SPD demonstrated
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to the people of Pfungstadt once again tnat the SPO would
not bmt/ to demagogic tactics.

There was no question of the

SA/SS driving the SPO physically out of town because of the
overwhelming superiority of Iron Front/Reichsbanner/Anti
facist League (KPmnumbers.

The leaders of the SPD were

edgy, fearing that the NSDAP would attempt to take power
in Germany through physical force, but surely not in Pfung
stadt.

Plans for the defense of the city hall, water and

electricity works, the post office, the tt'ain station, and
all ilnportant roads leading to and from Pfungstadt stood
ready.

only the signal from Interior Minister Leuschner

was needed to send the vast majority of the working class
into the streets to defend the ideals they had been taught1 8
Pessimistic reports about the growth of Nazism in other
parts of Hessen were tempered by the optimistic outlook
for the workers in pfungstadt.

Factually, a significant

portion of the KPO voting strength came from SPO members
who felt that the KPD would more quickly join battle with
the

NSD..~P

than the SPo.

Thus these voters were not entire

ly lost to the SPO, if the SPD projected itself into the
role of a more militant group
a moment's notice.

whi~h

was ready to fight at

An article in the Volksfreund that

two Nazis had been arrested in Pfungstadt for carrying
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guns only gave more emphasis to the desire of many to pre
pare for all eventualities. 49

Also accentuating the al

ternatives were Young Socialist Workers who met to dis
cuss the topic, "Democracy or Dictatorship" on october
6. 50

I

If the SPD in Pfungstadt was tired of Reichstag

'I

I

I'

elections they certainly did not reveal the fact in the

'II

weeks before the November 6 election.

'iiI

determination must have come from the activities of the

1,1:
I

II

Part of the SPDts

I

central

co~~ittee

of the Hessen gPD.

On October 23 the

SPD opened its "First Week of struggle" with a giant
rally in Darmstadt.

Hessen minister-president Adelung

and Carlo Mierendorff. the SPD's leading candidate for
the Reichstag, and other speakers delivered ringing con
demnations of Nazism at the demonstration.

The largest

part of the Iron Front from Pfungstadt went to Darmstadt~l
Besides taking part in the campaign in Pfungstadt many
of the SPD spent every free evening traveling from one
SPD meeting to another.

Leading SPD officials from

Pfungstadt spent countless hours addressing rallies,
marches, and meetings allover southern Hesse-Darmstadt. 52
Election wea.riness simply did not exist in the political
vocabulary of Pfungstadt's SPD.

Attesting to the import
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ance of P fung stadt t s SPD was minister-'president Adelung' s
address in Pfungstadt on October 26.

Before a packed

house he aiscussed liThe working class needs bread and
work, while Papen's government brings us only constitu
tional changes and steals cur political rights."

The Iron

Front praised Adelung for sticking to facts and avoiding
slogans in a letter to the .b!lz~iger~..53
During the "Second Week of struggle" \·,hich began
with another rally in Darmstadt, addressed by Leuschner
on October 29, the SPD held a huge meeting with Pringsheim
(Darmstadt) as the main speaker.

Included in the festivi

ties of the night was a satirical play by the "Rote Spat

zen" and songs from the Volksc..h2!..

As the days before

election slipped away, the Volksfreund hurled vicious
attacks at Hitler, Papen and Thalmann while it stressed
l SOC1a
' l'1sm. 54
more an d more ot-t en the nee d f
or rea

At

the same time as the yplksfreund was expounding the need
for socialism, tl:e

I~D

was reminding the working class

electorate that the SPD had been instrumental in the de
feat of the KPD's
get debate.

to~~

council

pro~osala

during the bud

Such below-the-belt tactics were not foreign

to the KPD which campaigned with force '\'/hen they met op

position on the streets.

Al1~hough

dero.agogic outbursts

I
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were not unknown to the KPD, the leaders of the KPD did
not resort to the stimulation of racial prejudices.
tfuile they sometimes lost sight of the NSDAP because of
their opposition to the SPD, the leaders of the KPD
realized that they were part of the larger working class.
Coordination of eventual tactics in the event of a Nazi
coup d

I

et~

did take place between Huxhorn and Albert

Walke (Reichsbanner/lron Front).55

During the days be

fore the election the animosity between the SPD leader
ship and the KPD leadership definitely increased, but
the average,worker did not consider this reason enough
to break lifelong friendships or engage in physical dis
agreements.
The old middle class parties staged another brill
iant non-campaign.

Not one public meeting was scheduled

because of the futility in the face of the Nazis and/or
personal admiration for the effect of the NSDAP on the
"Marxists. ,,56

The only break in the non-campaign was a

meeting of the rightwing Christlich-soziale Volksdienst
but did not find much support.

Fists replace money when

the latter runs low as it did in the final days of the
campaign.

pasting political handbills up in Pfungstadt

had to be the most dangerous occupation in 1932, as

I"
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from the Reichsbanner! KPD and SA roal'ned the streets at
night destroying the opposition's slogans and engaging in
a limited number of physical confrontations. 57
Nearly ninety-six percent of the votes went to the
NSDAP, KPD, and SPD on November 6.

The Nazi vote total

increased by only twenty votes, indicating that they had
reached the outer limits of

the~r

support.

The SPD vote

total slipped by almost one hundred and thirty, while the
KPO reached its all-time high.with one thousand and fortyeight votes.

A slight drift to the KPD by SPD voters,

coupled wi.th the lack of Nazi growth, left the town con
fronted with the same situation as before the election-

.talemate. The search for a political solution in Pfunq
stadt would have to go on.
RESULTS OF TP...E

NOVEMBER 6, 1932 REICHSTAG ELECTION

!<PD

1148

(1069) *

23.67%

(22.13%)

SPD

1446

(1570)

29.81%

(32.51%)

NSDAP

2049

(2026)

42.24%

(41.46":)

208

(165)

4.31%

(3.39%)

Others

The election did not remove the ·t1liemployed from the

'"Resulte

July 31, 1932.

of the Rei ch~,t-.ag election which was held on
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streets nor produce any economic recovery.

The KPD which

had spon,sored a nu."iIber of unemployment meetings in the
mO'lths before the election, took their improvement at the
polls as a sign that they were headed in the right direct
ion.

Although they were at loggerheads with the SPD over

many issues, the cooperation

bet~!een

the two groups was

solid in the town council when it came to unemployment
questions.

Without the prospect of a decrease in the un

employment in sight both groups pressed the town council
to allocate more funds or goods to the unemployed in or
der to cut down the theft of goods from several stores in
Pfungstadt~

Wood cutting by unauthorized people reached

a peak in the bitter months of late 1932.

The mPD en

couraged the unemployed to press their demands in the town
council in a number of meetings in November and December,
while the SPD held meetings on November 9 and December
i I

9. 59

In addition the SPD did not slow its political

activity even after
November 6 election.

~~eir

disappointing showing in the

'rhe SPD and the: I::on Front met on

November 19 to hear the chairman of the SPD Landtag mero
bers, Zinnkann, declare that the SPD had not lost its
proletarian interest as the KPD had charged.

On Novem

ber 26 the Iron Front gathered t.o hear the songs of the

I

.!i

I
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Volkschor and watch the "Roten Spatzen" distribute a
generous portion of political Datire to the audience.
The final SPD meeting of the year dealt with the ever
p,resent problem money had created for the town council and
the unemployed. 60

Words of encouragement were not to be

found in the SPD assembly.
Stunned by the obvious leveling off of their el
ectoral support the NSDAP failed to stage even one public
meeting for the rest of 1932.

The optimistic promises

of eminent governmental power which the NSDAP membership
had heard since the Spring of 1932 had turned out to be
only false predictions.
a small portion of

~e

Unable to gain power "legally"
NSDAP desired to take more direct

means to achieve their ends. 6l

~his was confined to an

insignificant portion of the NSDAP but provided an in
teresting glimpse of the unrest that haunted the NSDAP.
To take their minds off electoral politics for a time
the NSDAP assembled a notable number of members to take
part in a 110vember 20 day of "Remembrance for the De
ceased So!diers."

The Protestant ndnister, Zinn, held a

special church service at the war memorial in the town's
cemetery for a large group of SA members and
Militarverein followers. 62

Kriege~

und

The NSDAP attempted to add

! !
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more marks of respectability to its image through its
Frauenschaft .....hich set out to collect money, clothes,
and food for the poor.

On December 17 the NSDAP then

held a Christmas celebration where selected members of
the community were presented with the goods contributed
over the past month. 63
By the time 1932 drew to a close it was clear that

the people of Pfungstadt, no matter what their political
inclination might have been, were no closer to generat
ing a political solution for themselves than they had
been when 1932 began.

The little man who sat on the side

of the street through the day because he could find no
work,: and" the businessman who could not see', brighter
outlook on the horizon, were drained of the energy to
direct the political process.

Nearly everyone wanted a

solutionr no one knew where to find one in Pfungstadt.
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PART III

THE NAZI TRIUMPH

1933 TO 1935
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CHAPTER Xi

THe FINAL AGONIZING ACT - JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1933
Confined in a prison of hatred and uncertainty, the
people of Pfungstadt began the fateful year 1933.
though the Anzeiger wrote that, "We cannot

Al

give up, we

must hope for better times," few people really believed
that a solution to their problems lay near at hand. l
Hessen

gover~~ent

The

pointed out that the low point of the

depression was over and that a slo\/ improvement in the
economy could be expected, but there had been similar
predictions in previous years. 2
was going to come.

People did not know what

The once familiar signposts of life

had been altered or destroyed.

Faith had been damaged.

In such a situation people understandably lost their way,
although in a few cases their blindness was more selfinduced than anything else.

Without the stable beacons

of trust to light their welcome way, the middle class fell
into the trap of allowing their emotions to run unchecked
over their intellects.

The working class saw the same

phenomena occuring though to a lesser degree since the SPD

II I
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kept their heads.

The mood of the day was ugly: the old

normalcy was gone; the new normalcy had matured into some
thing intolerable: the stage was set for the final agon
izing act.
A strong tradition of unselfishness coupled to the
stable reserves of courage which the SPD had displayed on
other momentous occasions drove the SPD to continue its
activities with no loss of vigor during the first two
months of 1933.

Whether it was an SAJ meeting to discuss

the teaching of Karl Marx or the local Reichsbanner lead
ers gathering in Eberstadt to organize their strategy, the
SPD never gave up its intention to remain in the thick of
the political fight for Pfungstadt. 3
Life's pleasant distractions also gave the people
something other than politics to involve themselves in.
The SAJ opened an outdoor ice rink on January 21.

Light

ed at night and charging children only RM .05 admission,
it drew a large contingent of eager youngsters out into
the chilly air of winter.

The soccer fan could revel in

the knowledge that the Arbeiter Fussballverein team led
its league. 4

But these were small consolations for the

promise of work and food for many of Pfungstadt's inhabi
tants •. MOney, the lack of it, was at the root of Pfung
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stadt's problems declared the chairman of the SPD during
the yearly general meeting on January 18.

This over

riding difficulty was echoed in the yearly Reichsbanner
meeting which occured on January 21.

People could not pay

their dues because they simply did not have the ready
cash. S

Looking back on 1932, the SPD/Reichsbanner lead

, ership acknowledged that they had never invested so much
time and money in the many years the SPD had existed in
Pfungstadt.

Despite the optimistic words of hope, the

general feeling was that the party had done everything
possible to meet the challenge of the day--without being
able to register tangible results.

Nevertheless a change

in party and Reichsbanner leadership was not considered
at the meetings since the people knew that their leaders
had spent more time on party business than any man could
expect.

The leadership remained respected and esteemed

despite the party's setbacks in 1932. 6
Heinrich Huxhorn and his KPD associates were not
ready to abandon the town of Pfungstadt to the NSDAP
either.

A

con~ination

of an iron will and endless hours

of work had produced the largest KPD vote returns in the
history of Pfungstadt during 1932.

None of the KPD mem

bership saw any reason that the steady growth of the KPD

II),
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power would not continue, while others argued that the
KPD's time was surely coming. 7

The most powerful weapon

in the KPO's arsenal throughout the years 1929-1933 was
unemployment.

Unemployed workers were the basis for the

e:::pansion of the KPO.

Therefore, to utilize the unemploy

ed as political tools for the eventual take-over of power

came naturally to the KPD.

Huxhorn sponsored a wide

range of unemployment meetings and street corner discus
sions in Pfungstadt and expanded his scope to all of Oarm
stadt county after he was appointed chairman of the KPD's
unemployment commission for Darmstadt. 8

His masterly,

cunning, tactical mind was then challenged to produce the
same results for the rest of Darmstadt county as he had
produced in Pfungstadt.

Those that might have believed

'that the task was too great for the man soon had to reacknowledge Huxhorn's organizational genius.

In the bit

ing cold on the morning of January 24 over seven thousand
of Hessen's unemployed, including a contingent from Pfung
stadt, trecked toward Darmstadt from several directions.
Arriving almost exactly at noon with the slogan, "We
demand work and food!1I broadly displayed on signs, the
crowd surged onto the Louisenplatz.

The leaders of the

demonstration demanded, unsuccessfully, entrance to the

i/I
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official buildings which faced onto the square.

Unable

to attain thei.r immediate goals a delegation of the
crowd managed to arrange to meet an official delegation
of the lIessen government later in the afternoon, after
which the crowd peacefully disbanded to return to their
homes. 9

Huxhorn considered this rally the highpoint of

his years of work in Pfungstadt, a masterpiece of co
ordination and timing.

Huxborn's image among the unem

ployed of Pfungstadt increased immensely.lO

At the same

time the demonstration revealed the inability of the KPO
to rally more working class representatives to their side.
Caught in the trap of predicting the end of capitalism
through a disintegration of the present stata, the KPO
could not see that the designs of the Nazis meant any
'thing more than a replacement of one set of "capitalists"
by another.

The KPD was not prepared to see that the

NSDAP could stay in power for any length of time, nor
were they prepared to moderate their views in order to
accommodate the SPO within a unified system of antiNazism fox any period of time.

Se~ing

their own goal as

the replacement of the Weimar Republic by a soviet style
system, they had effectively closed the bridges that would
be so essential if the NSDAP successfully challenged both
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the KPD and the SPD at one time.

This put the entire

burden of defending the Weimar Republic in Pfungstadt
upon the shoulders of the SPD.

Since the middle class

had made their opposition to the democratic style of
socialism plainly evident, an effort to defend democracy
in Pfungstadt had two strikes against it before Hitler was
ever vested with the administrative apparatus of the
national government.
Having utterly failed the test politically, the
middle class fell into a moral stupor during the months
January and February.

Only a reminder in the Anzeiger

that the Handwerker was facing his most serious (fiscal)
test in years, plus a plea to young craftsmen not to open
any shops in

Pfungstad~

felt upon them. ll

relieved the pressure which they

The farming community tried to influ

ence the course of events at the highest levels during
the period.

On January 4 the "neutral" Landbund sent a

telegram to Hindenburg demanding that "his excellency
make the government stop talking and produce some action
for the hardpressed farmers. ltl2

This burst of energy

played out, the farmers went back to their daily affairs.
There was virtually no political activity by the old
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middle class parties, although some leaders hinted that
the Nazis had lost their momentum and would never come to
power in Germany.

The NSDAP did seem to be inordinately

quiet throughout January.

Only the burial of a SA man on

January 15 provided the NSDAP

with public exposure.

Im

pressive exposure it was considering the approximately
one thousand NSDAP men who marched behind the coffin to
the cemetary.

The Protestant minister, Zinn, said a few

brief words, ,while the main oration was delivered by a
SA

declared that the funeral was anotheJ.' example

man'~who

of a Volksgemeinschaft which recognized neither rank nor
class. 13

A strange quiet then redescended among the ranks

of the NSDAP.

The lack of NSDAP activity signified both

a drop in the level of self-confidence and lack of con
crete aims.

There was no election in sight to focus upon,

no particular action in the town council.

The party need

ed new instruction if it was not to start the process of
disintegration.
~ority

One must not forget that the vast ma

of the NSDAP's electoral support had never been

turned into solid party members.

Some had joined the par

ty, the majority had taken a wait and see attitude.

If

the Nazis did not produce the results they had promised
for so long

the~e

was nothing to hold their supporters to
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the party.14

This then was the main worry of the party

leaders during the month of January.

Someone had to sup

ply a reason for their continued political dominance.
President von Hindenburg and his associates were to sup
ply it.
The news that Adolf Hitler had been appointed the
chancellor of Weimar Germany reached the town of Pfung
stadt on January 30.

The Anzeiger carried only a small

extra article because it was ready to go to press by the
time the news was received.
NSDAP members was great.

The excitement among the

The party secretary, Sand, ran

from house to house announcing the news to various mem
bers.

The same evening the loyal party memb.ers gathered

at the restaurant

~

Krone to hear Pfungstadt's SA lead

'er, Homburg, and the Ortsgruppenleiter Graff offer their
appraisal of the change of government.

At

a

P.M. the fes

tivities of the day were climaxed by a torch light

pa~

rade through the streets. 1S
The stunning news of Hitlor's appointment produced
no panic within the ranks of the SPD or the KPD.

As soon

as the announcemen't that Hitler was chancellor arrived,
the SPD plan for stopping a Nazi putsch went into effect.
Guards were posted on all of the main roads leading into

I
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Pfungstadt, the water and electricity works were watched
and the post office (telephone communications) and the
town hall were surrounded. 16
took place.

No public meeting of the SPD

The KPD leadership moved immediately to

counter any NSDAP attempt to seize power by moving to
discuss joint action with the SPD and Reichsbanner leader
ship.

The average SPD member had been waiting for some

thing to happen; the average KPD man had been waiting,
but then went into the streets for a parade and then
gathered for. a meeting.

The parade took place at 5 P.M.:

Huxhorn and other KPD leaders met the Reichsbanner/lron
Pront leader Walke and his subordinates at 8 P.M. to plan
a unified response to any NSOAP push for power. 17

Walke

and Huxhorn agreed that they would have to act in unison
to prevent the NSDAP from assuming dictatorial power, but
Walke was not ready t,o commit himself and his associates
completely until he received orders from "above."

The

Reichsbanner/lron Front response to the NSDAP would de
pend upon Leuschner and his decisions.

If he was prepared

to fight the NSDAP then he only had to give the order and
the working class of Pfungstadt would have rallied around
the Reichsbanner to defend the weimar Republic. 18
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ability ofwalke to join with the KPO stenuned in part from
his lack of knowledge of the exact intentions of the KPD.
In such a confusing and pressure-packed situation, the
KPO became a wild card.

They certainly were not going to

support the NSDAP physically in a takeover attempt, but at
the same time what they would do if they saw the chance
to seize power themselves left the SPD with the uneasy
feeling that the KPO offered almost as much of a trap as
the activity of the NSDAP.

Besides this worry, the SPD/

Reichsbanner leaders were confident that any confronta
tion would become an elementary lesson in numbers.

The

Reichsbanner outnumbered the SA by at least six to one.
Only the introducti(m of numerous weapons into the SA
ranks would sway the balance.

This overwhelming balance

in favor of the Reichsbanner/lron Front allowed Walke to
accept the KPD offer of a unified front only conditional
ly.
Reaction among Pfungstadt1s Jewish citizens was al
most uniform.

They were scared for their futures which

seemed to be very insecure.

Many wanted to leave Germany;

a few prepared to do so.19
Hitler's appointment to the chancellorship of Ger
many was accompanied by the announcement that yet another
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Reichstag election would be held--this time on March 5.
The SPD set out almost immediately to prepare for the
election and begin to influence the voters.

The first

responee was to the announcement of Hitler's becoming the
German chancellor.

On February 1 the Iron Front marched

through the streets to the Rathaus where Fritz Dachert
(Eberstadt) gave a short speech. 20

The next meeting set

the tone for the entire election and served to clarify the
position of the SPD regarding cooperation with the KPD.
At the Iron Front meeting of February 10 Karl Pringsheim
set down SPD policy.

Organization of a Unity Front would

proceed at the local level only because of the critical
political situation¥

He reassured the members in attend

ance that socialism would triumph when he declared "We
are now seeing in Germany the last actions of a critical
ly

old and sick capitalistic system which is falling to

pieces because of its inherent contradictions.

A social

ist ordered economic system will take its place."

He

warned that preparation for action against the NSDAP did
not mean .,,;ild and disordered thrusts against the Nazis,
but a hard struggle through the election campaign.
closed by saying that "we are ready to fight!,,2l

He
The

Reichsbanner!I=on Front had demonstrated its determination
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not to be cowed by the SA earlier in the week when they
marched through the nearby farming communities (which were
strongly pro-NSOAP).

When the marchers returned to Pfung

stadt another strong dose of encouragement was given to
them by a leading Reichsbanner figure.

This was follow

ed on February 19 by a coordinated march of all Reichs
banner units in Kreis Oarmstadt. 22
As the election neared the pressure upon the SPO
mounted higher and higher.

SA men boldly hooted and hol

lered at SPD,meetings, an unheard of event.

The news

paper publisher was reluctant. to print SPO advertisements
:1

in the Anzeiger so the SPO worked day and night to print

,I

and distribute leaflets saying, "Whoever votes for Hitler
II

is voting for war! a

The SA had become bold enough to tear

these placards down as

fas~

as they were put up which led

to numerous fights. 23

SPO members became edgy as the

election drew closer.

No one knew what was going to hap

pen; it was like a leap into the unknown, only with menls
lives at stake.

The minister of finance, Korell, saw the

overwhelming sentiment of the middle class for order, so
that at the Iron Front meeting on February 24 he appealed
to the biirgerlich to vote SPD stressing the "deutschness
of the workers.

Pringsheim returned to lend a word of
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warning to the Nazis that they could expect massive worker
action if they tried to seize the government by force. 24
Events were moving faster than anyone had anticipat
ed.

While the SPD/KPD felt that they could effectively

repulse any NSDAP move in Pfungstadt the seat of their
power was being jerked from beneath them.

On February 13

the Anzeiger announced that a representative from the Reich
Interior Minister had been sent to Hessen to "try to give
the 'national right' the same feeling of protection as
the 'left' enjoyed."

Just four days later the Anzeiger

carried a small announcement that Hessen's interior minis
ter, Leuschner, would leave his post for a job in the In
ternational Trade Union office in Geneva on April. 1. 25
These articles made little impact on the working class of
'Pfungstadt at the time, but news they contained was to
shape the fate of everyone in Pfungstadt for the next
twelve years.
KPD members, who had had some instruction in the
use of firearms openly boasted that Nazism would never
assume pOwer in Pfungstadt.

The

~D

was put into a del

icate poSition by the entrance of Hitler into the inner
sanctuaries of national power.
,ould

They realized that they

be too small a group to resist Nazi encroachments
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if it came to an armed struggle.

They did not have many

guns, despite the rumors to the contrary, nor did they
have much of a chance to secure them.
weapons they offered

v~npower,

In the place of

manpower enough to see that

their election material was distributed and that the NSDAP
placards were torn from walls in Pfungstadt and in many of
the villages which surrounded Pfungstadt.

Night after

night the KPD was under way to confront SA men on similar
tasks. 26

Fear had not grasped them by the throat, but

they were unfamiliar with the road they were following.
They had never prepared for the possibility that they would
have to stare at a Pfungstadt controlled by the Nazis.

The

time was too short for them to prepare an alternative
course of action, therefore they pleaded with the SPD to
join forces.

It seemed the only logical course of action.

Aside from the constant activity of the SPD and the
KPD, the NSDAP was

the only party to actively campaign

for the Reichstag election.

The old middle class parties

staged no electoral meetings; only the DNVP had the stren
gth to place one advertisement in the Anzeiger.

The other

old middle class parties despondently left the major cam
paigning to the NSDAP.

The NSDAP began its campaign to

convince the people of Pfungstadt that they were the ruling
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party on February 3.

The Kreisleiter Zurtz (Darmstadt) was

invited to address the crowd and spell out the aims of the
NSDAP since Hitler had assumed the chancellorship.

A new

energy had filled the ranks of the NSDAP since it had
been announced that Hitler was in charge of the govern
ment. 27

This fact had been demonstrated in SPD meetings

when SA men had boldly objected to the speaker's words. It
continued in the NSDAP meetings themselves.
sociated union chairman, Peter

cr5~mann

When the As

attempted to speak

in the February 3 meeting he was bluntly told to "shut
up" or face the consequences_ 28

January 30 had put a new

face on the NSDAP.
The main theme of the NSDAP during the election cam
paign was that work would be provided everyone once order
was restored.

No unusual activities were planned by the

party since they thought that they had a very good chance
to win the election without special outside help.

Indeed,

besides posting handbills, tearing opponents handbills
down, suffering and giving a certain amount of physical
pain, the campaign resembled, on the surface, any other
they had staged over the preceding years.

Included in

NSDAP events was participation in a mass Nazi march in
Darmstadt on February 6 and the introduction of the
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National sozialistische gmpfbuhne Gieaen into the cam
paign on February 19.

The Nazi actors presented the play,

"Only then will Germany be free," to a large aUdience. 29
The presentation was in response to the spots "Roten
Spatzen" which had increased its activity in relationship
to the amount of Nazi propaganda which filled the town.
Although the NSDAP play did not contain the same high
quality work as the SPD'S group constantly presented.

It

was, though, a boost to the morale of the local Nazis who
faced the election with some drawbacks, since they did not
have the manpower to take over Pfungstadt even if they had
wanted to.

The sensitivity of the normal middle class

citizen was not shaken by the introduction of Hitler into
the highest circles of the nation.

The general feeling

dictated that the prudent man wait and see how things
veloped.

de~

There was fear among many people that the Nazis

would not be able to hold onto the power that they.would
claim after the election, since the SPD/KPD did not seem
willing to gi\"e up without a fight.

Therefore, a wait of

several weeks would not hurt the image of the middle class
citizen.

Reenforcing the desire of most people to hold

one card in reserve was the statement of several commun
lats who boasted that when the Nazis failed, then the time
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would be ripe for the KPD to assume power. 30
The majority of the middle class saw the March 5
Reichstag

election as a chance to decide between

ism and the NSDAP.

commun~

On such a basis the NSDAP was assured

of receiving a solid number of middle class votes in their
total, plus any working class votes of those who felt fur
ther struggle against the Nazis was useless.

Hitler's re

assuring words on the radio on February 10 and February 23
did not succeed in dispelling the notion that the NSDAP
would bring only the best to the people of Pfungstadt. 3l
Thus the middle class marched happily into the lion's den
unaware that they were committing themselves to twelve
years of dictatorship.

By and large, the average middle

class voter was completely unaware of the consequences
his vote might have.

They lived in a dream world of illus

ions and promises, following the pied-piper of destruction
as if they were children.
take

~lace

Pfungstadt.

Part of the reason this could

has to do with the nature of the NSDAP in
outside of a dozen hard core fanatics who

would have killed for any excuse, the body of the party
was made up of men with accepted moral principles and nor
mal aspirations.

Some were idealists who truly believed

that only the NSDAP could supply them with an answer to
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the years of hardship the town had had to endure.

others

were pragmatic opportunists who felt that only Nazism of
fered an alternative to the KPD.

Yet others sincerely be

lieved that they had to accommodate themselves to the
facts.

All in all, they singularly failed to present the

image of a group of men who would begin wars and murder
innocent citizens.

No one saw the truth.

~he

most ob

vious reason for this vast breakdown of common sense had
to do with ingrained prejudices which almost every middle
class child had learned from birth.

The ttstink" of pre

judice and blind hatred hung over many a grown middle
class citizen because his father had instilled in him the
seeds of wrath.

The maturity of the men in question seems

to have not been a positive factor.

More than likely"

it gave them the knowledge and hatred to destroy their
foes, the socialists.

The utter lack of responsibility

which the middle class citizen exercised in regard to the
workers was almost pathological.

A few middle class citi

zens had extended their hands in friendsnip to the SPD:
the old purgerlich publisher of the Anzeiger was a secret
member of the party, and found understanding and thought
fulness. 32

The majority would not.

The utter, unreason

able contempt of the majority of the middle class, the
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fearful effects of the depression upon the financial
security of many burgerlich, plus the honey-sweet pro
mises of an action-orientated NSDAP, combined to seal the
the fate of a town that deserved a better fate.

The very

soil that produced a man of Wilhelm Buchner's stature and
wisdom almost one hundred years earlier had lost an under
standing for his principles.

There were few tears shed

for the withered dream of liberalism.
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CHAPTER XII
THE NAZI SEIZURE OF POWER - MARCH, 1933
Like a highpowered rifle, the March 5 Reichstag elec
tion was aimed at the heart of Pfungstadtts body politics.
Whereas the first part of the election campaign had not
differed markedly from previous campaigns, the last week
of the struggle for vo,tes compressed in a vice-like manner
the problems of three years of depression into an explos
ive mixture of hatred and fear.

Ready to detonate this

dangerous brew was the news that the Reichstag had burned
to the

g~ound

on February 27.

Most people greeted the

news with a silent shake of the head.

Nazis and Nazi

sympathizers leaned to the idea that the KPD had been
responsible for the fire, although few thought that it had
been a signal for a general KPD uprising, since, as one
farmer said, "Berlin was too far away from Pfungstadt
for me to worry about what happened there."l
thought permeated much of the middle class.
observers were simply confused.
think.

This same
More cautious

They did not know what to

The SPD and especially the KPD labeled the Nazi

I
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charges that it had been caused by the KPD, a complete
falsehood.

Most KPD/SPD members thought that it was

another of Hitler's tricks.

But the most basic re

action of the KPD was one of discouragement and worry.2
If Hitler was willing to sacrifice the Reichstag building
to gain his goal, they reasoned, what must he have in
mind for them?

The major effect of the burning of the

Reichstag was to spur the Hessen government,into banning
all KPD publications and forbidding the KPD to stage
election meetings. 3

In Pfungstadt the KPD went about

their business without hinderence, but the members" knew
that their position in the community was becoming unten
able. 4

A bold face could not hide the misgivings that

individual members barely concealed from one another and
the general public.
A more meaningful political occurrence for the people
of Pfungstadt occurred in the not-to-distant Hessen town
of Lindenfels (Odenwald).

After a morning filled with

political parades and speeches, several young Hitler
Juqend

~mbers

had taken it upon themselves to remove op

position party flags from the working class district of
Lindenfels.

As a small group of HJ tried to tear down a

Reichsbanner flag from the home of a worker, the young
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Pfungstadter Christian cro~mann, a HJ member was stabbed
repeatedly by the offended owner of the flag.

A Reichs

banner man was shot in the face during the wild melee
which followed. 5

cro~mann's violent death provided the

perfect vehicle for the NSDAP to cap its increasingly
belligerent campaign.

On March 2 uncountable numbers of

NSDAP and SA members and curious onlookers flooded into
Pfungstadt to observe cro~rnann I s funeral.

Calling on naIl

of the nationally inclined people of Pfungstadt to

dutifu~

ly attend his burial" the Nazis proceeded to turn the oc
casion into a massive display of NSDAP might. 6

Thousands

of Nazi people lined the streets as the body of cro~nn
passed in procession.

The Schupo set up a command post

in Pfungstadt and deployed an enormous number of its
forces in order to prevent trouble.

The KPD a.nd SPD

people generally expected some sort of retribution to be
dealt out by the Nazis, so they stood ready at various
locations throughout the town.

But the 3:00 P.M. funeral

did not spark the tension filled atmosphere off.

The

burial of Christian cro~nn took place without incident. 7
More than the Reichstag fire the death and burial
of cro~rnann proved to be ~he decisive event before March 5.
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The normally restrained middle class hurled charges of
"red murderers" indiscriminately at the SPD and the KPD.B
Everyone seemed to have been sorry that he had to die,
but blame was generally affixed to the "reds" more and
more.

The SPO tried to defend itself by claiming that

cr8pmann should not have invaded the private property of
the Reichsbanner man, but the tidal wave of recriminatory
remarks did not let up.

The NSDAP call for the restora-.

tion of order struck the middle class as representing the
most logical alternative in the frenzied days before the
election.
The SPD/lron Front attempted to set their own cam
paign in motion again on March 3, but met th'! determined
opposition of the Kreisamt when they scheduled a march
through the streets before the gathering. 9

Arndt (~ies-

baden) reminded the SPD membership that order had to pre
vail within the ranks of the party if they were to.remain
an effective force.

Many KPD sympathizers attended the

SPD meeting seeking to bolster the determination of the
working class to resist any Nazi seizure of power.
many people felt that the best tactic

But

would be to let the

NSDAP into power so that everyone might see that they
couldn't do anything differently.10

The leadership of
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the SPD did not endorse such thoughts, hut a strong trend
favored this approach.

That was the last formal meeting

of the SPD to take place for twelve years.

Both the KPD

and the SPD relief upon the distribution of handbills to
fortify their supporters' determination to go to the polls.
Several confrontations involving the NSDAP and KPD/SPD oc
curred over who would control the nost advertisement
space on the walls around the town during the days before
the election. ll

Many people wanted to settle the issue

of control even before the votes were cast.
The NSDAP encouraged its still small (in comparison
to the SPD and KPD) membership to spread the Nazi word
among prospective supporters.

Added to that effort was

one final act the night before the election--a parade.
'~~ereas

the SPD parade of March 3 had been banned, the

Nazis took to the streets on March 4 to hear one of their
leaders deliver some last words of encouragement.

Again

the police miraculously kept the peace between the warring
factions. 12

The campaign would close without a major

fight taking place in Pfungstadt.

The Nazis openly

boasted that they would achieve enough support to clean

,
i.

up Germany on March 5.

In comparison to the KPD and SPD

who went into the election grimly determined to hold their
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own, the NSDAP expected to be swept into power. 13

The con

fusing web of economic stagnation, political and social
prejudices, ideological one-sidedness, and self-righteous
(self-serving) indignation had altered the town of Pfung
stadt fundamentally.

Gone were the days of mild dis

agreements over day to day affairs; Pfungstadt stood face
to face with its fate on March 5.
Four thousand nine hundred and thirty-one people,
the largest number ever to take part in an election in
Pfungstadt, went to the polls on March 5.

This repre

sented 95.5% of the eligible voters in Pfungstadt.

The

results of the election were:
RESULTS OF THE MARCH 5, 1933, REICHSTAG ELECTION14

KPD

1,026

(1,148)*

21.0)%

(23.6~)

SPD

1,427

(1,446)

29.25%

(29.81%)

NSDAP

2,231

(2,049)

45.74%

(42.24%)

OTHERS

2,231

(2,049)

45.74%

(42.24%)

The NSDAP had triumphed, picking up almost two hundred
votes in the election, but had not achieved the magic
fifty percent figure they had anticipated.

The SPD and

the KPD still controlled two thousand four hundred and

*Novenfuer 6, 1932, Reichstag Election
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fifty-three votes (50.29% of.:the vote).

The obvious loser

of the election was the KPD which saw over one hundred and
twenty of its supporters wander into other parties.

The

SPD dropped only nineteen votes, continuing to prove that
its support was solid.

But matters of majorities and

pluralities in Pfungstadt became unimportant as the na
tional returns had provided the NSDAP/DNVP with the re
quired fifty percent to rule.

The Nazis were prepared to

set their rush to power into motion.
ed for the Nazi

Pfungstadt prepar

"revolution~"

ADdd the shouts of joy which surrounded the news
of the results of the election late on March 5 among the
ranks of the NSDAP was the knowledge that the SPD (and
KPD) had vowed to fight any Nazi takeover in Pfungstadt.
-Heinrich Huxhorn addressed a gathering of KPD men and
women the night of the vote while in the streets Iron
Front/KPD patrols watched for any sign of the Nazi$.15
Patrols were particularly heavy in the working class
section of Pfungstadt.

The KPD also put out a special

edition handbill proclaiming, "Hitler, the strawrnan of
the capitalists."l6

While the SPD/KPD members mingled on

the street and at previously arranged strategic points
throughout Pfungstadt (as on January 30), the leaders of
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the KPD and SPD were meeting. 17
expected Nazi blow.

Everyone waited for the

The NSDAP itself was waiting for word

from its own higher authorities on how to proceed. 18

Many

~ople

spent the night of March 5/6 awaiting any develop

ment.

l~othing

happened.

The failure of the NSDAP to move during the night
did not indicate a lack of resolution on their part, for
early on the morning of March 6 word that the Nazis had oc
cupied the Rathaus and hoisted the swastika flag--this news
flashed

thro~gh

the working class.

Other strategic in

stallations were not occupied by the Nazis.

Just as

quickly as word was received the workers of Pfungstadt
rushed to the town hall to view the development for them
selves and to take counter measures. 19

The working class

was not prepared to give up Pfungstadt without a fight.
Hundreds of working class people, men and women, sur
rounded the Rathaus within twenty minutes.

After a brief

discussion the SPD/KPD leaders presented the occupiers
with an ultimatum to either remove themselves and their
flag or face the wrath of the workers.
ticked by; the tension mounted.

Slowly the minutes

Word came back from the

occupiers that the flag would only be taken down "over
their dead bodies."

But outnumbered by at least one
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hundred to one, the occupiers had little prospect of hold
ing their position in the Rathaus.

Commands were shouted,

the crowd surged forward and within a few short minutes
the occupiers were no longer in control of the town hall.
Almost solemnly the Nazi swastika flag was lowered to the
ground where it ",as burned amid general jubilation. 20

The

workers of Pfungstadt had stood their first test.
Shortly after the Nazis were routed from the town
hall the KPD and Iron Front leadership met to
situation.

assess the

Huxhorn demanded that the workers occupy the

town hall themselves while Albert Walke put off a de
cision until he received instruction "from above. ,,21
Nevertheless the
stadt.

wo~kers

controlled the streets of Pfung

Large masses of people milled about everywhere,

speaking in excited tones of the morning's events, and
pledging their determination to defend the town against
the Nazis.

Frantically the SPD/Iron Front attempted to

establish and maintain contact with higher officials in
Darmstadt, above all with the Interior minister, Leuschner,
upon whom they were depending to lead the charge against
the Nazis.

Communications with the Interior minister and

other SPD officials was on again, off again, throu9hout
the day.

News that the Nazis had occupied the offices of
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the Interior minister reached PfUngstadt in the afternoon~2
If the town of Pfungstadt was to defend itself against a
Nazi take-over it would have to do it by itself.

The

Iron Front plan to place themselves at the service of
Leuschner as reserve police was shattered by the news that
Leuschner had apparently given in without a fight.

Min

ister-president Adelung's power along with the last ves
tiges of democratic freedom were buried together with the
chances of Pfungstadt to survive for very long.

This

fact was not lost on the leadership of the KPD or the
SPD.

Although the workers controlled the streets and

therefore the town on March 6, they could not expect to
retain their hold if the Nazis had control of the Inter
ior ministry and with it the guns the democrats of Pfung
stadt had expected to employ against the Nazis •.. t~ow,
ironically, those same guns would end up in the hands of
the Nazis, to be used against the workers of Pfungstadt
if they continued to object to the Nazi takeover.
Throughout March 6 the leaders of the SPD remained
convinced that their state leaders would soon order a
move against the NSDAP. 23

~ven after word that the state

police had turned over their guns to the Nazis in the
courtyard of the Hessen Interior ministry the leaders
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continued to hope.

Leuschner, they argued, was still in

control of the situation no matter how things looked.
would soon send word.

He

An uneasy calm settled over Pfung

stadt as the evening spread.

Taking all precautions the

KPD leadership and the SPD/Iron Front leadership met for
one final time in the forest near Pfungstadt late in the
evening to await news from a special messenger they had
sent to Leuschner.

The messenger returned in tears with

the sad message that no resistance to the Nazis would be
offered by the higher authorities. 24

The men who were pre

pared to fight would have to be sent home.

Nazism would

triumph over an inert leadership, over a negative action.
The implication of the sorrowful tidings was not lost on
the KPD/SPD leaders.

They realized that the end of the

Weimar Republic in Pfungstadt was at hand.

A local re

sistance movement might prove an interesting footnote in
some future history book, but would not alter the fact
that the NSDAP controlled the state government and with
it the weapons the SPD had counted upon. 25
nothing more to be done.

There was

Some of the leaders returned to

their homes: others, including Huxhorn set out to escape
the arrest warrants that they had been informed awaited
them in Pfungstadt. 26

Pfungstadt was handed to the
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Nazis by

circumstan~es

which were out of the hands of the

local leaders.
Confusion had been the order of the day within the
NSDAP's ranks after the workers had torn down the swastika
flag from the town hall.

Throughout the day the SA and

NSDAP members feared to go into the streets. 27

The lead

ers of the NSDAP nervously awaited a message from their
higher authorities in Darmstadt as to how they should pro
ceed.

Word had been given to raise the swastika flag on

the town hall again but it was not heeded. 28

Throughout

the day conferences and meetings of the NSDAP leaders were
I

I

carried on.

Late into the night they planned their next

I·
step.

It was to be a giant step for the NSDAP: a step

from relative powerlessness to complete control--from the
shadows to the center of the stage.

Early on the morning

of March 7 the second attempt of the NSDAP to seize power
began in Pfungstadt.

This time the SA was armed and re

enforced by SA from Darmstadt and by local farmers who
were pressed into service at the insistance of Ortsgrup
penleiter Graff.

Where the fiery words of the workers had

once promised stiff opposition to the NSDAP on the day be
fore, now roamed armed bands of men on patrol.

Through the

streets they went warning inquisitive onlookers to shut
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their windows and to remain indoors.

Several SPD and KPD

people who ventured into the streets were beaten on the
spot, while one KPD man who defied the new authorities
too vigorously was shot in the leg. 29

New masters had

come to P£ungstadt and they were determined to assert their
authority in no uncertain terms.
Members of the Nazi patrols were on the alert to
an anticipated KPD/SPD counter attack.

When it did not

come many concluded that the majority of the people wanted
order, not the "marxist

tt

leaders. 30

Little did they know

that the SPD only stood back from active opposition at the
eleventh hour at the insistence of the state party leaders.
But that did not matter to the SA and NSDAP.
controlled the streets.
order.

They now

They now commanded the public

The town hall was re-occupied, the flag of the

Republic burned, and the police evicted from their head
quarters.

A curfew was also put into effect.

All

busi~ ..

nesses had to close by 8:00 P.M. and all the inhabitants
of Pfungstadt had to clear the streets by 8:30 P.M. 31
The NSDAP indecision of March 6 had been replaced by a
firm resolve to seize power in Pfungstadt on March 7.
Physical hindrance to the Nazis was no longer organized
or effective.
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Primarily responsible for the lack of organized op
position were the police searches of homes which began
sporadically on March 7 and swung into full force on March
8.

Ostensively the police and SA Hilfspolizei
were looka

ing for guns.

In reality they intimidated SPD and KPD

people while they collected all of the

~~D

and SPD re

cords, typewriters, and hand printing presses. 32

Some

people were taken to the town hall for interrogation,
others were ordered not to leave their homes.

The middle

class enthusiastically greeted the stringent measures of
the NSDAP.
put it. 33
again.

"We felt relieved#" was the way one farmer
Others spoke of the streets being "clean"

The middle .-:lass looked forward to better times.
Besides the Nazi show of strength in Pfungstadt the

old democratic government of Hesse-Darmstadt played a role
in holding the working class in line.
government announced that:

On March 9 the

liThe transfer of police power

to the (NSDAP) Commissioner, Dr. Muller, does not indi
cate that other governmental functions have been redele
gated.

The government of Adelung-Krinberger is still in

charge and at their posts.1I 34
effect upon Pfungstadt.

This notice had a profound

The SA even felt secure enough to

call off the curfew although it restricted groups of people
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to less than three at one time and ordered special watches
in the working class section of town. 25

The job of the SA

Hilfspolizei was made easier by several turncoats from
among the KPO and SPD.

A number of SPO and KPO members

turned over information to the SA which was instrumental
in revealing the location of secret hand printing presses
which had been employed during the Reichstag campaign and
in the days after March 5.

Some even pointed out the

hiding places of their former leaders. 36

Peter cro~mann

fled to the Odenwald where he hid for six weeks hoping to
finally make his way to Switzerland.

He returned for his

wife who had to bear the brunt of repeated SA searches in
his absence.

Only~he

from making the trip.

recent birth of a son prevented them
He finally returned to Pfungstadt

in April and was promptly arrested.

Huxhorn got as far

as Mannheim before he was captured and returned to Pfung
stadt under police guard. 37
On March 11 the national government gave the order
for the arrest of all KPO and Reichsbanner leaders which
led to the wholesale rounding up of men in Pfungstadt.
Almost all were questioned at the town hall and released.
A new pattern was emerging for the SPO and KPO members.
They waited night after night for the SA to knock at their
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doors, to seat'ch their homes and sometimes take them in
for questioning.

But such actions did not stop the KPD

.
and SAJ from prl.ntl.ng
handbl.lls agal.nst the new "order"
in Pfungstadt.

Morning after morning the citizens of

Pfungstadt awoke to find new evidence of opposition to the
Nazis in their mailbcxes. 38

An organized revolt against

the NSDAP might not have been possible, but a resolve to
launch anti-Nazi counter attacks had not been lost.

The

handbills were mere pin-pricks in terms of overall effect
iveness although they made the local Nazis angrier on
each successive day.

One such handbill aimed at arousing

resentment against the Hilfspolizei by claiming that they
were costing the state an enormous amount of money.

The

NSDAP felt so threatened by this rumor that they published
a special notice in the Anzeiger proclaiming that the
Hilfspolizei were doing police work as "honorary" offici
als without pay.39

The situation in Pfungstadt was

still fluid: the NSDAP had seized power, but it had not
consolidated or legitimized it.
The first tentative step in ra~lying the people of
,

Pfungstadt to the new government was ,taken on March 12.
I

The day was set aside

CI.S

a tribute tq the fallen soldiers
,

of World War I.

A church service anq memorial ceremony at
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cemetery were heavily attended by the middle class which
no longer felt it needed to hide its NSDAP leanings. 40
The Nazis were considerably heartened by the response of
the middle class inhabitants of Pfungstadt.

As soon as

the workers had been deprived of the means of putting them
under economic pressure, a large number applied for party
membership.

The party secretary, Sand, had to work for

hours processing names and addresses of the long

~ine

of

people which daily camped before the door to his horne
anxious to enroll in the party.41

The mask of "non-po

litical" politics fell from the faces of many people as
soon as they felt the Nazis were securely in power.
On March 14 the Hessischer volksfreund was banned
for five days (to March 19) and the ban was later extended
until March 26. 42

At the same time the SA demanded that

all guns be turned in to the town hall.

The results of

the initial SA sweep through working class homes had been
frightfully disappointing for the Nazis.

They had expect

ed to find a large number of guns, but they found only a
balf dozen.

·To rectify that apparent oversight the new

order was issued.

This also gave the SA the opportunity

to re-examine any home they wished to.

The people of

Pfungstadt were. ready to believe anything.

The mother of
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one of the school teachers was accused of hiding a machine
gun in the attic of her home because her son was a demoe:
crat. 43

Wild rumors floated about the streets telling of

this or that person having stashed his arsenal in the
forest or in his garden.

The credulity of the people led

to the strengthening of the NSDAP's hand vis-a-vis the SPD
and KPD.

Although a complete search of suspicious homes

was made again and the time for turning in weapons was ex
tended until March 21, the results of the SA determination
to uncover

g~s

was again poor.

A number of crude home

made brass kl'lUckles, billy clubs and other street-fight
ing gear was uncovered, but the anticipated cash of arms
was never found (because it had never eXisted).44
In quick succession the NSDAP staged several events
designed to win over the uncommitted and to isolate the
opposition.

On saturday March 18 all of the Pfungstadt's

"nationally minded citizens"

'~ere

urged to join in an

NSDAP celebration in the yard of the school.

Several

speakers called the moment an historic one for Germany
that left the way free for the rebuilding of a great
German Reich.

All of the citizens were urged to join in

the work to be done.

The easiest way for that to be done

was to join the NSDAP said Wilhelm Martin. 45

The cloak of
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impartiality which he had wrapped so tightly around him
self in the years before 1933 was discarded publicly on
March 18.

The extent to which he had hidden his affili

ation with the NSDAP was testified to by a KPD man who
first realized Martin's political affiliation when he saw
him in an SA uniform shortly after March 5.

Other people

who had been too timid to reveal their true allegiance
before March 5 also shed their "non-political· cocoons
1

after the Nazis were in control. among them Georg Stein
metz.

Many middle class people also attended the March

19 church services of thanks that Germany had avoided
civil war and the dangers of communism. 46

The middle

class moved quickly to adjust themselves to the

reality~

of Nazi authority.
The opening of the Reichstag on March 21 provided
another occasion for the Nazis to rally "all people who
count themselves among the masses of national Germans" in
Pfungstadt into the streets. 47

A parade began the events

of the evening which included speeches in front of the
town hall.

Earlier in the day all businesses had been

closed (from 10:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M) to allow the popula
tion to listen to the opening of the Reichstag.

Loudspeak

ers were set up in the streets so that no one could miss

I!
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a thing.

Besides the

s..~,

the volunteer fire department

members, the teachers from the school, postal workers,
train and town officials, the Krieger-und Militarverein
associates, the "German" sportsmen, singing clubs and
other groups took part along with a large number of inhab
itants who were not covered by one of the participating
clubs. 48

The attention the Nazis paid to the inclusion

of politically inactive associations was in marked dif
ference to the situation as it had existed before March
5, 1933.

The participation of the clubs added to the size

of the crowd and undoubtedly brought individuals to the
festivities who would otherwise not have participated.
Besides it gave the middle class (all of the clubs parti
cipating were burgerlich) the chance to feel that they

I

were part of the ruling circle once agaip in Pfungstadt.
At the town hall the torches most of the parade's parti
cipants had carried were thrown into one large fire which
impressively illuminated the front of the town hall and
the eager faces of the crowd.
opened the festivities with a

The ortsgruppenleiter
gree~ing

for the assembled

people and turned the main speaking duties over to Georg
steinmetz.

Steinmetz took the opportunity to thank the

people of the

NSDAP

who had prepared the way for the :.... 
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ascension of the Volkskanzeler Adolf Hitler.

He then in

vited anyone who had not joined the party to do so, so that
they might become a part of the rebirth of Germany.

Clos

ing his speech with three Sieg Heils, he introduced the
Musikverein band which played the German national anthem,
the Deutschlandlied. 49

Another small step had been taken

toward total control of Pfungat.adt by the Nazis.
No part of the citizens of Pfungstadt was overlook
ed by the Nazis after they had seized power.

The first

thrust had been by inclination toward the middle classes,
the second was toward the workers.

The main instrument at

the disposal of the party for the assimilation of the work
ers was the SA.

The means at the disposal of the party to

enlist the support of the workers were many.

There was

direct physical threat (rarely used) and the more effect
ive, indirect pressures which could be brought to bear
upon men who in many cases had been without work for long
periods of time since 1929/30.

The propagation of the doc

trines of the NSDAP/SA took second place, at first, to the
enrollment of the maximum number of workers in the short
est period of time.
on March 31.

To that end the SA staged an assembly

The dissolution of the established organs

of the workers was a direct assistance to the SA.

The SA,
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for its part, encouraged the workers to believe that they
were only replacing a set of worn out leaders with fresh
faces who understood the wishes of the working class.

But

the emphasis of the SA was on replacing the class hatred
of the "marxists" with class cooperation of Nazism. 50

The

SA theory often was overlooked by prospective members who
joined simply to escape pressures to join the party itself.
Others firmly believed that the dismal showing of their
leaders on March 5/6/7 really indicated that the days of
the SPD/KPD were over. 5l

In any event the response of the

workers to the call of the SA to join in
schaft was respectable.

N:.a_2:_i~

Volksgemein

Few workers rushed into the arms

of the Nazis, but few could escape its growing influence
in all sectors of the life of Pfungstadt.
to power was not slowed by the

wo~king

The NSDAP march

class once the

issue of the town's control had been decided.
The issues at stake in Pfungstadt between 1928 and
1933 were often complex, they were always formidable for
the people involved with them.

That the power to unravel

the difficulties would shift so drastically in Pfungstadt
between March 5 and March 8 was unforeseen by everyone.
Nazi and non-Nazi alike.

The opportunity for the SPD/KPD

to retain their power had been handed to them by the

"II

"I

I

i

I'

: I~

Ii ,Ii!
I"

i

i

I

353
enraged vitality of the workers on March 6; the decision
of "higher authorities" not to oppose the encroachment of
the Nazis into the seat of power in Hessen thwarted the
pent-up energy of the local groups in Pfungstadt.

There

can be no doubt that the SPD/KPD would have fought (and
most likely beaten) the Nazis if they had been given the
signal to proceed.

Unfortunately the decision was not

made, which left the leaders of Pfungstadt's SPD and KPD
free to involve themselves in a hopeless struggle against
a Nazi party which would have called in reserves from
other towns until the issue was resolved.

The leaders

instead bad to admit that they were without the resources
to prevail.

Their numbers on the local level were suffici

ent: unhappily that was not the case either on the state
or national level.

II Ii

i

!I~

[II ill·

354
CHAPTER XII - FOOTNOTES
1Interview with Ludwig Gunkel.
2Interviews with Georg Herth and Jacob De1p.
3pA : March 2, 1933.
4Interviews with Georg Herth and Jacob De1p.
SpA: March 27, 1933 and HVF: March 27, 1933.
6 pA : March 1, 1933 and interviews with Jacob Han
buch and Wilhelm Kaffenberger.
7pA : March 4, 1933 and March 3, 1933.
8Interview with Peter cro~mann.
9

HVF: March 4, 1933.

.

10Interviews with Georg Liebig and Jac~)b De1p.
11Interviews with Heinrich Schaffner, Jacob De1p,
, Karl Emig and August Hechler.
12 pA : March 6, 1933.
13Interviews with Heinrich Sand, Wilhelm Kaffenberg
er and Heinrich Schaffner.
14pA: March 6, 1933.
l5Notes from the file of Heinrich HUL~orn and inter
views with Jacob Delp and Georg Liebig.
16Interviews with Jacob De1p and Georg Herth.

!

!IHI!

il

'I

II

II !

l'l Ilnl

f

355
17Notes from the file of Heinrich Huxhorn and inter
views with August Hechler and Peter croPmann.
18Interview with Heinrich Sand.
19Interviews with August Hechler, Johann Kolsch,
Julius Winkler, Ludwig Wenz, Heinrich Schaffner and Jacob
Hanbuch.
20pA : March 6, 1933 and HVF: March 13, 1933.
21Interviews with Georg Herth and August Hechler.
22 pA : March 7, 1933 and interviews with Georg Liebig
and Georg Herth.
23Interviews with Johann Kolsch, August Hechler,
Georg Liebig and Peter cro~mann.
24Notes from the file of Heinrich Huxhorn and
interviews with Georg Liebig, Georg Herth and Peter
mann.

cro~

25Interviews with August Hechler and Jacob Delp.
26Notes from the file of Heinrich Huxhorn.
27Interviews with Heinrich Sand and Jacob Hanbuch.
28Notes from the file of Heinrich Huxhorn.
29 pA : March 7, 1933 and interviews with Jacob Delp,
Heinrich Schaffner, Maria Schulz, Ludwig Gunkel and Peter
cro13mann.
30Interviews with Heinrich Schaffner and Wilhelm
Kaffenberger.

I

lUll

III

I: Ii

'II

i II ~II

356
3lpA : March 7, 1933.
32 HVF : March 11, 1933 and interviews with Jacob
Delp, Johann Kelsch, Jacob Hanbuch and Heinrich Sand.
33Interview with Ludwig Wenz.
34 pA : March 9, 1933.
35pA : March 10, 1933.
36Interviews with Georg Herth, Jacob Oelp, Peter
croemann, Heinrich Sand, Jacob Hanbuch and Wilhelm Schaff
ner.
37Notes from the file of Heinrich Huxhorn.
38Interviews with Maria Schulz, Julius Winkler,
Jacob Oelp and Peter Cro~mann.
39 pA : March 11, 1933.
40pA : March 13, 1933.
41Interview with Heinrich Sand.
42HVF: March 14 and 19, 1933.
43Interview with Julius Winkler.
44Interviews with Heinrich Schaffner and Wilhelm
Kaffenberger.
45pA : March 17 and 20, 1933.
46pA: March 22, 1933.
47pA : March 21, 1933.

I

!I!!

II
II

II

Iii'!

II

357
48 pA : March 20 and 22, 1933.
49 pA : March 22, 1933~
50pA : March 31, 1933.
51Interviews with Karl Emig, Johann Kolsch, Peter
Croemann and August Hechler.

'U IY

III

I, ,

1

,I

I

CHAPTER XIII
LEARNING TO MARCH IN STEP - APRIL TO JULY, 1933
Seizing power was the first aim of the NSDAP in
Pfungstadt:

this had been accomplished by the bold stroke

of sending both armed SA men and farmers into the streets
of the to\'m.

The" sensible" response of the SPD/I<PD

leaders to the fact that Leuschner would or could not sup
ply them with the guns they needed to resist the Nazis
had, in the fi.rst instance, decided the fate of Pfung
stadt.

The events of March had been decisive.

The

NSDAP's actions in the ensuing months were also important,
if not dramatic, for the installation of Nazi authority
in Pfungstadt.

Once the Nazis had overcome their fear

of the SPD/KPD they proceeded to install a vast array of
party programs.

The persecution of the Jews was one of

the very first.
Late in March the first signs of overt anti-semi
tism surfaced in Pfungstadt.

Mostly, the anti-Jewish

actions were directed from sources outside Pfungstadt,
but a small group of early Nazi believers spurred hatred
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hatred against the Jews from inside Pfungstadt also.

A

few really hardened SA men stole wood from a Jewish lum
ber yard in broad daylight.

Others went to Jews to whom

they owed money and forced them to mark their bills
paid. l

This sort of despicable practice found little

echo among wider circles of the population.

Efforts to

spread the terrible desease among the general populace
failed.

Even NSDAP members were to be found who did not

approve of the robbery perpetrated upon the Jews.

Sever

al Nazis secretly paid their bills to Jews at night, while
others went to the Jewish dentist in town despite the
warning of their associates. 2

The farmers, always a

stubborn band, continued to trade with Jews in spite of
several threats.
were alright ••• 3

Nearly everyone agreed that "our Jews
Thus the instigation of a boycott against

the Jews came from outside of Pfungstadt.

It is very

likely that the ruling Nazi.- leadership in Pfungstadt would
never have been original enough to develop such an idea
without the explicit instructions of their superiors.
There simp::'y was not enough "traditional" hatred of the
Jews in Pfungstadt.

The first signs of an impending boy

cott against Jewish-owned businesses came on March 28
when the Anzeiger carried an article decrying the "Jewish
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slanders of the German state.,,4

As in other parts of

Germany this was the signal for the formation of a Nazi
committee to "defend our country."

The specific charge

against the Jews was that they had inspired foreign prop
agandists to belittle Germany.

Most of the citizens of

Pfungstadt neither understood the merit of the charge nor
the basis for it.

But the Jewish inhabitants realized

very well what was happening after they were forced to
send a telegram to the British ambassador in Berlin stat
ing that there had been
stadt. 5

OQ

persecution of Jews in Pfung

Having been forced to send the telegram, the Jews

expected something worse.
saturday, April 1, 1933, was set aside by the na
tional Nazi leaders as a day to boycott all Jewish busi
nesses and other businesses who employed Jews.

In Pfung

stadt placards were posted on the windows of Jewish firms
and SS men stationed before the entrances of each store
controlled by 'a Jew.

Each person who attempted to enter

the store was then warned not to, and if he persisted
and

entere~

his name was written down.

On several oc

casions photographs were taken of people entering and
leaving Jewish firms. 6

The burqerlich in Pfungstadt were

particularly offensive on April 1 while the working class
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by and large continued to shop as they always had, partly

in defiance of the Nazi order. 7

Even the determined re

sistance of large numbers of working class citizens did not
delude people into thinking that they would hold out
against Nazi power if, indeed, the NSDAP wanted to close
all of the Jewish shops in Pfungstadt.

But outside of a

minority of middle class Nazis, the people of Pfungstadt
did not adjust themselves to the new orders of the NSDAP.
Indeed, the Nazis announced on April 5 that the boycott
of Jewish business would not be repeated. 8
pailure to stir up the hatred against the Jews,
they had predicted did not deter the Nazis from keeping
pressure on the

Jew~.

Only a small number of SA were need

ed to remind people that those who shopped at Jewish stores
were not in accord with the new leaders of Germany.
!~he

Over

months the party effectively reminded people of their

new obligations without resorting to heavy-handed physi
cal pressure.

Slowly the Jewish businesses closed

their doors. 9

The success of the Nazis was not widely

welcomed.
Officially the mayor and vice-mayor remained the
chief arbiters of Pfungstadt even after March 5.
ity the Nazis and thei.r Hilfspolizei ruled.

In real

Among the
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various measures pushed through by the NSOAP after it as
surned power was the order for the removal of all SPO (and
KPO) mayors and vice-mayors in Hesse-Darmstadt. IO

For ten

days (from March 23) until April 3 Pfungstadt was devoid
of executive authorities.

On April 3 the Kreisleitung of

the NSOAP named a new mayor and vice-mayor for the town.
Replacing Johannes Schwinn* would be Georg Steinmetz and
replacing Paul Weigel (SPO) would be Wilhelm Martin. ll The
no~al

procedure for the Nazis was to appoint the Orts

gruppenlei~

to the position of mayor thus assuring him

not ,only party control but also administrative control of
the town under his jurisdiction.

In the case of Pfung

stadt several factors merged to produce a different out
come.

Ortsgruppenleiter Graff was judged not to possess

the requisites and abilities needed for the job, and
Steinmetz and Martin had built a solid reputation among
the middle class.

Those who were involved in advising the

Kreisleitung about replacements for Schwinn and Weigel al
most to a man recommended Steinmetz and Martin over Graff!2
Besides, &teinmetz and Martin had earned the respect of the

*Schwinn did not belong to any party, a fact which
few people, even SPO members, knew. He was dismissed be
cause he had constantly sided with the SPO in the council.

,
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privileged few who knew of their pre-l933 membership in
the NSDAP which was evidenced by their appointments to the
Kreistag.,.:The~·choice

was.natural considering the NDSAP

ties of Steinmetz and Martin and the following they had
molded together in Pfungstadt before 1933.

Indeed they

might very well have provided a solid obstacle to the
Nazis if they had not been included in the new government
of Pfungstadt.

The burgerlich of Pfungstadt greeted the

news of Steinmetz and MartinIs appointments with approval
and even the working class acknowledged that the two men
were highly intelligent, even if somewhat egotistical. 14
In addition to a new mayor and vice-mayor for Pfung
stadt the town laws of Hesse-Darmstadt were altered after
March 5 so that the town council would be composed of only
fifteen members.

(Before March 5 there had been twenty

members of the town council.)

To effect the change in the

town council a committee was established by the NSDAP on
April 21. 15

The job of the committee was to approve a

list of candidates submitted by the parties still eligible
to participate in the work of the council.

(In the case

of Pfungstadt this was only the NSDAP and the SPD: the
KPD had been banned.)
(plus the two

o~

The NSDAP would hold nine seats

Steinmetz and Martin) while the SPD was
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limited to six places on the council.

The SPD decided to

submit a list of names despite warnings from various
sources ot the consequenses they could expect.

August

Hechler, as the chairman of the party, submitted the names
to the newly installed Mayor, Steinmetz.

As Hechler

en~

tered the room in the old town hall, official Buchholz
waved his arms wildly for Hechler to stop.

He just had

time to whisper to Hechler, "Why do you want to risk more
trouble? •• 16

Resolutely Hechler read the names to Mayor

Steinmetz, knowing that Buchholz's words boded ill for
the men involved.

On April 24 the town council met to

approve the lists of town council members which had been
introduced previously.

The SPO would be represented by

old established names:

Ernst Walke (brother of the

Reichsbanner leader, Albert), Michael Hechler (a long-time
member of the council), August Hechler (no relation to
Michael Hechler, and chairman of the SPO for two years),
Ludwig Clemenz (second in command to Albert Walke in the
Reichsbanner), Georg Schulz (a long-time member of the
council) and Albert Stock (another long-time member of
the council).

The NSDAP produced a list of people who

were chiefly noted for their NSDAP membership, not for
their town council experience.

Included were:

Georg
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Riehl (an associate of Steinmetz and Martin in the now de
funct party of Steinmetz-Martin), Wilhelm Graff (ortsqrup
penleiter and four-year memoer of the council), Karl
Polster (a high official in the local SA), Heinrich May
and Ludwig cro~mann (both farmers and leaders of the drive
to bring farmers into the party), Jacob Polster (activity
unknown), Wilhe1m Kaffenberger (early member of the SA
and NSDAP, and Hans Otto (first member of the NSDAP in
Pfungstadt).l7

The meeting was closed.

On May 8 the "new" council met for the first time.
Steinmetz opened the first official session by announcing
that the work of the council would be done totally by com
mittees.

He then delegated a seat on the various commit

tees to each of the NSDAP members of the council.
was systematically excluded from each committee.

The

SP~

They

were also excluded from voting on the change in street
names which the Nazis demanded.
named the

The

Heinrich-Kottmann-stra~e;

Bahnhofstra~e

was re

the waldstraBe acquir

ed the name the stra~e der SA: the Lindenstra~e received
the name Adolf-Hitler-stra~e, and the seeheimer-stra~e was
renamed the Christian-cro~-mannstra~e.l8

The changes of

names did not strike at the heart of the political system
the way that the exclusion of the SPD from the committees
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of the town council did.

As the meeting reached an end

any notion the SPO town council members might have had as
to their remaining in the council was dispelled when
Albert Stock and August Hechler were given written notice
that they would not be eligible to continue in their
posts because they had been members of the SAJJs
.!!n.

~

Spat

This NSDAP manouver drove the entire group of SPO

people to tender their resignations in unison. 19

There

was to be no accommodation with the NSOAP in Pfungstadt.
At a meeting of the town council later in May the
problemsof money and the unemployed reared their ugly
heads once again.

Financial and social difficulties did

not respect the change in the government.

The new admin

istration of Pfungstadt moved into the field of unemploy
'ment with a tougher approach to the problem than had
previously been the case.

On April 22 the town

a~~inistra

tion handed down the order that no unemployed person
would be able to receive his payment if he did not sign
up for the work service. 20

To the seven hundred and

twenty-six unemployed who depended upon the town to supply
them with the barest necessities of life, this did not
come as good news.

And unles8 the town had in mind to

employ the men in some meaningless sort of work, the
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gathering together of the unemployed could constitute a
real burden for the town budget in that supplies would
necessarily have to be purchased before the unemployed
could begin to build or repair anything.

The old fears

of the burgerlich were indeed aroused by the thought
that they might possibly have to provide tools or sup
plies before constructive jobs could be found for the un
employed.

At the May 18 council meeting the NSDAP de

cided to reject a fifty-six thousand mark loan that they
were offered to introduce new projects for the job
less. 2l

The function of government in Pfungstadt after

March, 1933, did not seem to have been improved in the
slightest after that quick bit of hide-and-s,'!ek had been
played at the expense of the unemployed.

Leadership

'ability had not gained from the change in the government.
The reordering of the political system did change
the role of the NSDAP in Pfungstadt.

l~ereas

less ·than

one hundred people had been associated with the party be
fore March, 1933, after that time people had begged to
get into the party.

The swelled roles of the NSDAP meant

that the close association that had been the trademark of
the early members would be lost.

Also, the party gained

many "pragmatic" citizens who knew little or nothing of
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the aims of the party.

This threatened to dissolve the

ideological purity of the party into a very weak brew.
To counter the influx of lIuneducated" comrades into the
party, the leaders of the NSDAP instituted a series of
Schulungskurse (political education meetings).

On April

24 the NSDAP held its first meeting lito give the people a
ehance to learn about the NSDAP."
tory. 22

Attendance was manda

The second Schulungskurse on May 8 was concern

ed primarily with "National Socialism and the German
woman . .,23

On June 8 the Nazis scheduled yet another po

litical education meeting concerning "The lies of the
marxists."

In his speech Dr. Schmidt blamed the "marx

ists" for the disorder which occurred in the time of the
Weimar republic, the defeat of Germany in the First World
War, and the power of the Jews. 24

The Schulungskurse

scheduled for May 22 was replaced by another mandatory
NSDAP members' meeting.

At the meeting the mayor (Stein

metz) was vested with the responsibility for all town
policies.

This, the speaker claimed, would allow for the

quicker integration of the town into the Nazi system of
government. 25
Against the darkening sky of political dictator
ship the Nazis attempted to gather any burgerlich behind
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the new government.

1

To further the aims of the Nazis, all

non-party burgerlich were urged to join the Kampfbund fur
~

gewerbliche Mittelstand, League of middle class busi

nessmen. 26

Dr. Schmidt (Kreispropagandaleiter and leader

of the Schulungskurse) was the first representative of the
NSDAP to greet the assembled burgerlich businessmen on
April 1 at the first meeting.

Claiming that the entire

Handwerker and tradesmen of Pfungstadt had to work to
gether to help the new state, Schmidt confirmed the ap
prehensions of some when he notified the people present
that association with the group would be mandatory for the
businessmen of Pfungstadt.

several businessmen joined

the new group in the weeks that preceded its second meet
inq on April 22 simply to avoid the pressure that had
been applied to them to join the NSDAP. 27

If anyone

thought that the Kampfbund would not become the tool of
the Nazis he was rudely shocked to find that by the middle
of May the Handwerker- und Gewerbeverein was also urging
its members to attend the joint NSDAP-Kampfbund meeting. 28
NSDAP member Ludwig stetter opened the meeting as the
chairman of the Kampfbund.

warned that while many

that marxism was now dead, that really

bur
was not

He

rue.
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The marxists only appeared to be dead--in
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reality they were continuing their program of stimula
tion of clasR hatred.

If the middle class did not throw

off its politically disasterous ways, then, he warned, the
marxists rright yet cause Pfungstadt's citizens much trou
ble.

A brief review of German history with a NSDAP twist

proceeded the call of ortsgruppenleiter Graff for all of
the assembled businessmen to join the NSDAP in order to
save Germany.29
l~,the

The tactics of the Nazis were twofold:

Nazis desired that the greatest portion of the

burgerlich join the party. but, failing that, that they
2) associate themselves with an organ of the middle class
chat stood in close contact with the NSDAP leadership.
If direct belief in the ideology of the NSDAP would not
do, then the Nazis were prepared to force the middle
'class to action by spurring their fear of the "marxists"
(a word which meant not only the KPD but also the SPD).
One way or another the Nazis would have their way •.
Pfungstadt's workers were not forgotten during the
Nazis rush for total control.

Having deprived the work

ing class of their leaders through physical force (such
as sending a number of KPD leaders to the proto-concen
tration camp Osthofen) or by intimidation,30 the Nazis
moved to capture their support.

371
Although the NSDAP party was the basic unit of the
Nazis the most representative organization, in terms of
variety of classes, was the SA.

Within the SA were to be

found the workers who shortly before had been the most
bitter enemies of the Nazis.

Few workers joined the

party itself because the working class was not favorable
to the Nazis.
pragmatic.

But the working class people were also

Lik~

many other people they realized that the

Nazis would not allow them to remain outside of the Nazi
system for long, and therefore many joined the SA in the
belief that they would then not have to join the party
itself. 31

For those that could not make up their minds,

the Nazis decided to take action.

After the Reichsbanner

and Iron Front had been banned, the Nazis assembled the
workers in the Sportplatz and "enrolled" them in the SA~2
Direct physical pressure was not needed since it had be
come abundantly clear that anyone who was not a mewber of
the SA would find it impossible to find work.

This fact

was pointed out at the factory before the operation took
place. 33

More subtle methods were used on the burgerlich.

The SA staged a "display" of its various activities on
April 9 at the town hall square.

Mayor Steinmetz deliv

ered a rousing dose of promises to the assembled crowd
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which was then able to ponder his thoughts to the music of
the Musikverein.

The gathering left for home after sever

al Sieg Heils. 34
The extent of the Nazi success in organizing former
Reichsbanner and KPD members, together with willing middle
class citizens was soon apparent.

When the SA was review

ed by the leaders of the NSDAP in May, it had grown to in
clude three sturm brigades and one motorized brigade plus
a band. 35

Pfungstadt's SA made an impressive sight as it

marched to another one of its meetings or rallies.

On

June 24 the whole SA, led by its band, marched to Darm
stadt to take part in a Nazi program. 36

Following the in

tegration of the vast majority of the workers into the SA,
the NSDAP had two valuable levers with which they could
control the working class of Pfungstadt.

On the one side

stood the officials of the state (town administration),
on the other stood the Nazi party.

The chances of <a man

escaping the power of both to direct his life were very
remote.
To balance two months (March and April) of harass
ment the NSDAP staged, in coordination with the national
party, a most memorable celebration on May 1.

First a

notice of the impending festivities was released to the
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public on April 22. 31

It was the signal for all of Pfung

stadt's clubs to swing into action under the guidance of
the NSDAP.

The preparations for the National Day of Work

became so complex that many clubs had to place notices in
the Anzeiger to alert their members to last minute chang
es. 38

One of the most sad groups in the work surrounding

the day was the Hessischer Volksfreund.

Deprived of its

real purpose the Volksfreund carried the unheard-of
slogans "A strong Germany must have a strong army," and
"the national Union calls on all union members to take part
in the National Day of Work. ,,39

I .

(For the efforts of the

Volksfreund they incurred only false respect.

The Volks

freund was banned completely on May 2 when it was no long
er needed.)40

But the degree of respectability which the

SPD paper lent to the occasion was a rich source of support
while it lasted.
The zeal of the NSDAP was so great on the occasion
of the National Day of Work that the actual celebrations
began on April 30 with church services and an SA parade
through the streets. 4l
plex~42

The plans for May 1 were more com

They included:

6:00 A.M.

SA band marches through the streets to
wake up everyone.

I

:ill

II

r

I

: 1:1

I!

.. 11'1 .

ill II!

~H

i

374
8:00 A.M.

Raising of flags on official buildings
and businesses

8:15 A.M. to 8:45 A.M.
Ringing of bells
8: 30 A.M.

Gathering of school children at the
school

9:00 A.M.

Retransmission of the rally from the
Lustgarten in Berlin on loudspeakers.

11:00 A.M. to 12:00 Noon

Concert at the town hall.
3:00 P.M.

Parade through the streets of Pfung
stadt.

7:30 P.)l.

Retransmission of the rally from Tempel
hof field in Berlin and the speech
of Adolf Hitler.

The response of the populace of Pfungstadt to the plans of
the NSDAP was overwhelming. Excluding the disgruntled Un
ion leaders, KPD and SPD officials, nearly every living
person in Pfungstadt took part in the Nazi festivities. 43
It was by far the largest gathering of Pfungstadt's in
habitants to have ever taken part in a parade.

If there

were any remaining doubts in the mind of anyone as to whom
the people considered the ruling authority in Pfungstadt,
they were buried on May 1.

Everyone took part in the

parade, which was led by a band composed of city offici
als.

Following them was a contingent of mounted SA, the

SA band, the NSBO group, the postal and railroad workers,
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the school children and their teachers, the Protestant
children's group, the Hitler Jungvolk and Hitler Jugend,
the carpenters, the brewers, newspaper workers and print
ers, construction workers, the bakers, the butchers, bar
bers and hair dressers, the Krieger- und Militarverein,
"German" gymnasts, the Germania soccer club, all of the
burgerlich and some of the workers singing clubs, and
bringing up the rear the farmers and the "old fighters"
of the NSDAP. 44

Reaching the town hall, the large crowd

was entertained by a mass choir under the direction of
the SA man, Hoffmann (formerly chairman of the DVP), be
fore the appearance of the main speakers ortsgruppen
leiter Graff and Mayor Steinmetz.

The message of the two

men was that Germany would exist for Germans, that every
one had the right to work and to food, and that unrelent
ing firmness of purpose would guide the redevelopment of
Pfungstadt. 45

The mixing of promises of relief from the

depression far outweighed the vailed threats that were con
tained in the speeches of both men.
ed forward to a brighter future.

People generally look

Closing out the events

of the day were dances and singing in restaurants through
out Pfungstadt.
The importance of the National Day of Work for the
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further development of Nazism in Pfungstadt should not be
under-estimated.

In the place of the normally well attend

ed May Day parade of the SPD the Nazis had substituted a
day on which both the employee and the employer came to
gether.

In place of recriminatory charges from the "work

ers" and the tlcapitalists" the Nazis had substituted har
mony, however tenuous it was.

The thought that they could

march in the same parade on May 1 was totally new to many
of the working class.

Many thought it was the correct

thing to do,_ however.

The hatred of the workers was

mellowed, and many people decided to see if the Nazis
could produce what they had promised.

Opposition to the

Nazis was weakened once again.
The tools at the command of the NSDAP were many and
varied.

Besides the party itself, the SA and the NSDO were

at the disposal of the Nazis.

The NSBO, the Nationalsoz

ialistische Betriebsorganization (the union wing of the
NSDAP) was substituted for the Associated Union shortly
after May 1.

Attached to the change of unions was an

ultimatum; either one joined the NSBO or one would lose
the right to hold a job. 46

Such tactics were common for

the NSDAP in Pfungstadt when they dealt with their enemies.
The threat to deprive a man of his livelihood was very
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real: several men who did not display enough enthusiasm
for their change in union status were summarily dismissed
from their jobs.
similar fate. 47

Others were only threatened with a
The working class learned quickly that

their own organization would no longer serve the needs of
the Nazis.
By late May the role the Nazis had planned for the
workers beJame clearer.

When the t;SBO called a meeting

they no lon<;Jer "requested" the workers to attend, they
ordered them to do so.

At such meetings the working class

people were challenged to become ureal Germans" and con
structive members of the IInew" society.48

The possibility

of existing outside of the Nazi system was not a viable
alternative.

The base of the Nazi control had continual

ly been expanded while the base of those who were opposed
to the Nazis crumbled.

By April there had been no ques

tion that the NSDAP was in physical control of Pfungstadt;
by May there was hardly any question who the people had
to support.

The controls were increasingly evident in

the town of Pfungstadt.
Any aspect of the Nazi program that had not found
its beginning in the period before 1933 was instituted
after the Nazis seized power in Pfungstadt.

As in the
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cases of the SA and the NSBO, the Hitler Jugend and other
groups did not have a solid basis.

The Nazis soon realiz

ed that they would have to rectify the situation.

The

Hitler Jugend could claim very few adherents before the
events of March, 1933.
in that sector.

Thus the NSDAP moved first of all

With the encouragement of their parents,

the sons of middle class citizens eagerly joined the HJ~9
The Nazis did not have to force anyone to join because
they created something unique--a club for the sons of the
burgerlich.

There had never been a group which had been

responsive to the needs of those children.

For most mid

dIe class children the HJ was an adventure, since they
were given many interesting tasks to carry out.

Also, the

camping, hikes, singing, and dances were all part of a
new world the children had never known before.

Albert

Hochschild, the leader of the HJ, made sure that the out
door activities of the children were part of the Nazi
image, but this the children did not mind. 50

They enjoy

ed the rallies and recruiting drives that they were a part
of.

The idealism of the youngsters gave the party a fresh

look and a forward-looking image.

Many an HJ member firrn

ly believed the words of Hochschild when he

sai~

"You will

be what your parents cannot be--real National Socialists."Sl
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Appended to the HJ was the Junqvolk for those too
young to take part in the HJ.

The Jungvolk were under the

direction of the Nineteen year old Alwin Nungessor who
many parents thought was not mature enough for the job?2
Nungessor was an idealist.

He believed unswervingly in

the righteousness of the NSDAP.

He followed the lead of

the leader of the HJ in organizing his own group.

Inter

spersed between wholesome activities were the political
messages of the Nazis.

A typical week for the Jungvolk

included the weekly meetings, sports, exercises, and a
c'lass concerning the political theories of the NSDAP. 53
The Nazis never lost sight of the fact that they had
promised to make the children "real" national social
ists.

The third sector of the NSDAP in regard to the

. children was organized later than the other groups.

The

Bund deutscher Madels (BdM) was not a part of the Nazi
system before June, 1933.

On June 15 the Anzeiger.:re

ported that "because of popular demand

ll

a meeting of in

terested girls and their mothers would take place on
June 16 to found a group in Pfungstadt.

Sponsored by the

Kreisleitung of the BdM, the meeting was designed to re
cruit girls between the ages of ten and twenty-one. 54

As

in the case of the HJ and the Jungvolk the daughters of
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the middle class responded favorably to the new group.
Within a few weeks the BdM came to rival the size of the
HJ.

Throughout the entire process the sons and the daugh

ters of the middle class citizens eagerly marched into the
ranks of the Nazi sponsored groups.

The same was not true

of the sons and daughters of working class parents.

With

few exceptions they remained at a distance from the Nazi
institutions, preferring to retain their old ways.

The

SAJ had been one of the first casualties of· the NSDAP,
but the spirit of the SAJ lived for a long time in the
hearts of its former members.

Since the Nazis did not

use the same methods of persuasion to enroll working
class children in the HJ, BdM, and Junqvolk as they had
done to enroll their fathers in the SA, the children
stayed away.55

Before 1933 the working,class youngster

had had the opportunity to partake in a variety of out
door activities while burgerlich youngsters sat at home.
Now the situation was reversed.
As if playing with a large puzzle, the NSDAP put
the pieces of its plan for the total control of Pfungstadt
into place one after the other.

The workers had been

first, the town administration second, the children third,
and the middle class clubs were to be fourth.

The SPD/KPD
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clubs had suffered a fairly quick death at the hands of the
Nazis, although SPD clubs did outlast their KPD counter
parts.

The main thrust of the Nazis was then against the

.burqerlich clubs, the clubs of their supporters.

The

move against those clubs came somewhat later because of
the sensibilities of the Nazis to the support of the mid
dle class in general.

The "coordination" of the middle

class club to the Nazi state1thUS took more time and in
volved more diplomacy than many Nazis wished.

One by one

the clubs received a notice that they would be required to
hold special election meetings in order to vote on new
chairme~

for their clubs.

ceived such notices

wa~

The list of clubs that re

without exception, complete. 56

Every club, no matter how loyal it might have sounded in
the ears of its own members, was subjected to the Nazi in
doctrination.

The Germania soccer club was one of the

first to feel the pressure of the Nazis even though a
large number of NSDAP
roles.

members were on its membership

The "German" gymnasts' club held two meetings to

elect the proper representatives of the Nazi party to its
governing committee. 57

The cast of characters changed

with the club; the outcome never varied.

The NSDAP was

determined and aBle to control, totally, the town of
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Pfungstadt and the lives of each and

eve~y

citizen.

No

matter what a person's age, be he six or sixty, the NSDAP
had created a group, a club, an organization for him to
belong to that brought him into contact with the power
and the propaganda of the "Hitler movement.

II

As the people of Pfungstadt, both young and old,
were learning to march in step to the Nazi will, they
were provided with many celebrations to ease the trans
ition.

This provided

them with the intellectual excuse

for taking an active part in the Nazi system.

Justifying

the controls of the NSDAP played a prominent part in Nazi
thinking.

There was something for everyone.

Hitler's

birthday was celebrated by the members of the NSDAP on
April 20.

The members collected money and food for the

. poor, giving anyone who contributed a receipt. 58

The

newspaper reported that the party had collected a sub
stantial amount of money, but not too much food.

~or

the

religious there were the Nazi's drives to increase church
attendance.

The Protestant churCh in Pfungstadt was

again becoming the organ of the people--this was the
slogan of the Nazis. 59

This provided the perfect basis

for the integration of the religiously minded to accept the
Nazis.

The Protestant church responded by sponsoring a
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political discussion on May 10.
•

Minister Thullner spoke

of the plight of the German-speaking people of Hungary
on that occasion and called on all Protestant and Germanthinking people to support the Hungarian outpost of Ger
many.60
The NSDAP itself sponsored the showing of the film,
"Blutendes Deutschland,.rr on May 11, encouraging "our Volks
qenassen from the former opposition

ll

to view the film. 6l

For those with a bent to the literature of a national
nature there were frequent advertisements in the Anzeiger
describing newspapers, magazines and books that could be
purchased at local bookstores. 62

For those interested in

music the party and the SA sponsored concerts and recit
als. 63

No one was forgotten by the Nazis as they strove

, to install their system in Pfungstadt.
In quick succession the town was presented with two
celebrations in late May.

The first was Schlagter.Day.

Albert Leo Schlagcer was raised to the rank of hero by
the French and the NSDAP.

The French sentenced him to

death for his activities in the Ruhr during the French oc
cupation.

The Nazis made him a hero of the Third Reich.

The people of Pfungstadt were presented with a packaged
celebration to commemorate his feats, and his death. 64
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The SA provided the second part of the festivities on May
28 with the presentation of a Vaterlandische veranstaltung.
The theme of the meeting dealt with the rebuilding of
Germany under the direction of Hitler.

The people were

once again exhorted to "begin the work of rebuilding Ger
many. 1165

Capping the successive efforts of the NSDAP to

instill in the people of Pfungstadt the Nazi values was
the Day of Sorrow for the Treaty of Versailles on June 28.
Once again a sea of black-white-red national flags, swas
tika flags and.banners swirled from the houses of the
people.

In the town school there was a special assembly,

while adults were urged to attend the rally against the
Versailles Treaty which took place in Darmstadt the same
night. 66

The Nazis were becoming masters of the art of

'bringing the citizens of Pfungstadt together to directly
or indirectly support the new order of the NSDAP.
Winning the allegiance of the people of Pfungstadt
was the goal of the NSDAP.

The means that they employed

to accomplish that task had two sides.

The one consist

ed of public displays and festivities, the other was the
descriminating use of force.

Anyone who had had a hand in

the SPD, the KPD, the Associated Union, or one of the
organs connected to those groups was subject to the
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search of his house at any hour of the day or night,
questioning and sometimes detention at the town hall, and
threats against himself and his family.67

While the mid

dle class citizen could report that his life was little
changed by the Nazi seizure of power, the worker lay
awake at night not sure if he would be the target of some
new Nazi charge.

The SA Hilfspolizei were particularly

obnoxious in their handling of individual workers.

At one

point the Hilfspolizei had to be warned that only the
regular police had the authority to arrest and hold sus
pects. 68

Over fifteen former SPD/KPD leaders were ar

rested on the night of May 4/5, some receiving a severe
beating from the "authorities."

Other people were intro

duced to the power of the Nazis through a visit to the
proto-concentration camp osthoien. 69

Rumors spread so

fast and with such amazing intensity that the party was
forced to publish an article in the Anzeiger which attempt
ed to depict the concentration camp as a "rehabilitation
center for 'former oppositional leaders.,,70

While Osthofen

was not the model institution which the NSDAP tried to
depict it to be, it was not as fearful as some concentra
tion camps which were to come later. 7l

Osthofen was a

crude collection of barracks-like buildings which had
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once been a paper factory.

Some of the first inhabitants

of Osthofen were brought to the camp more for their skill
in a particular trade than for their political errors.
Thus one former .KPD mewher was arrested and taken to Ost
hofen because he was a bricklayer.

Carpenters and electric

ians were also recruited in a similar manner. 72

The ex

istance of Osthofen was well known, although little dis
cussed in Pfungstadt.

Middle class citizens generally did

not believe that it was a jail, preferring to believe that
it would really be used to re-educate people.

The Anzeiqer

sustained the view of the burqerlich by reporting that
Osthofen was the center of re-education by referring to
"marxists" and"opposition leaders" when it reported any
thing about Osthofen.
been a resident of

No one identified by name as having

Osthofe~

and the Nazis soon realized

that all of the publicity given to the camp was building
up pressure in the ranks of the workers.

After a report

of the crash of a car from Pfungstadt which was taking
"marxists" to Osthofen on May 23 the Anzeiqer reported on
the camp only once again and then ceased Inentioning the
camp entirely.73
Resolved to eliminate all of the remaining vestiges
of the KPD and the SPD, the NSDAP went to the extreme
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measure of publicly inserting an article of warning in
the Anzeiger against any firm that they considered to be
"cummunistic."

A person did not have to be a KPD member

to qualify for such label.

Nearly all of the firms in

Pfungstadt had been against the KPD and, for that matter
the SPD, throughout the period before 1933.

A few were

not or had had some member of the family that had been
associated with one of the groups, most often the SPD.
The old owner of the Anzeiqer, Jacob Helene, had been a
secret member of the SPD while his nephew, Gottfried
Helene, the actual editor of the paper, was a member of
the DVP.

Gottfried Helene was in charge of the paper

as the NSDAP gained more and more support.

He pragmatical

ly refused to carry any KPD or SPD advertisements before
the March 5, 1933, election, but was, none the less,
threatened by Mayor steinmetz with the loss of the own
ership of the paper unless he joined the party.
did.

This he

The activities of the paper were closely supervised

by the local NSDAP and the Gaupresseamt.

Gottfried Hel

ene had to attend a monthly meeting of the Gaupresseamt
and submit daily a copy of his paper for their approval?4
In another case the wrath of the NSDAP was more complete.
A bakery was closed by the police on May 23 after the
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citizens of Pfungstadt had been notified of the manls
connection with the KPD and warned not .to buy from him.
The SA sent a detachment of its people to watch the people
who entered tne establishment and to write down their
names. 7S
The objective of the NSDAP was to take over all
public links to the people, from any source, that they
considered to be at odds with the Nazi state.

This in

cluded the director of the school and three of his teach
ers.

The director was removed from his post at the be

ginning of May while the three teachers were informed
that they were being transferred to other towns on June
1. 76

The teachers had first been forbidden to teach

history, then religion; then they were moved.

One of the

teachers involved was actually thankful to the authorities
for their decision to replace him, because he feared that
he and his family would have been subjected to severe
retribution if he had stayed in Pfungstadt. 77
On June 22 the final blow fell against the organized
workers of ?fungstadt when the SPD was officially banned?8
Long before the decision was made to forbid the SPD the
group had ceased to operate in Pfungstadt.

But the bann

ing of the party began a new round of searches and
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intensive police surveillance of the former leaders of the
SPD.

One day shortly after the banning of the party, the

old leaders of the SPD found out how welcome they were in
Nazified Pfungstadt.

All of the leaders of the SPD and

the KPD were ordered to report to the town hall.

Once as

sembled there they were informed that they would not be
allowed to hold any jobs in Pfungstadt or the surrounding
area and that they would have to register with the police
everyday--at 8:00 A.M., at noon, and in the evening. 79

So

began a period of intensive hardship for the men and
women who had carried the banners of democracy and com
munism: the period of trial was to last over one year.
The leaders reacted by feeling a complete aversion to any
thing that had to do with politics. 80
control had been closed.

The circle of Nazi

There was no escape.

With deliberate purpose the Nazis had moved to .
choke the life out of any remaining opposition to the
NSDAP.

At the same time they had moved to place their own

organizations and groups before the people.

The member

ship of the NSDAP had taken control of the clubs of Pfung
stadt; the Protestant church was tacitly supporting the
party: the administration of the town was firmly in the
party's hands.

Nazism, the "solution" no one really

'M

I

!

I(

tI''!!

390

understood, had become the master of Pfungstadt.

They,

the people, would now learn what Hitler and his followers
haa said, but which the people had failed to understand.
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5Interviews with Julius Winkler and Peter Cr8pmann.
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34 pA : April 10, 1933.
3S pA : May 8, 1933.
36 pA : June 26, 1933.
37 pA : April 22, 1933.
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39HVF : April 29, 1933.
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69Interviews with Georg Herth, Peter croBmann and
August Hechler.
70pA : May 8, 1933.
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CHAPTER XIV
ADJUSTING TO NAZI ORDERS - JULY rro OCTOBER, 1933
Splitting the executive authority of the town admin
istration from the direct control of Ortsgruppenleiter
Graff gave the members of the town council more power than
was normally the case in Nazi Germany.

rrhe Ratsherren,

as the town council members were called after April, 1933,
did not possess the independence of their pre-1933 pre
decessors, but they did hold a large quantity of power in
relationship to the Nazi party organization.

Mayor Stein

metz and Vice-Mayor Iv'lartin were loyal members of the NSDAP
who could be relied upon to follow the broader dictates
of the Nazi party, but they had firm beliefs of their own
on strictly local matters. l Since their political for
tunes had not been molded in the caldron of Nazi election
victory, they moved with speed to enact their financial
philosophy.

The objects of Steinmetz-Martin's fiscal

"reform" would first of all be the unemployed and second
ly the middle class businessman.

The middle class busi

nessman wculd still have to pay the major portion of the
bill, while the unemployed would have to suffer the re
sults of Steinmetz-Martin's fiscal policy.

Small amounts

of the funds were cut from the budget at the July 1

I

'I'
J

1

II

397
meeting at the expense of the unemployed.

Funds were cut

from the appropriation for the use of the town's swimnling
pool and rent support. 2 A:so on the agenda was the appoint
nebt of Karl Polster as a policeman which enhanced the
NSDAP image in Pfungstadt because his reputation for fair
ness. 3
By

August 18 the Nazi members of the town council

were ready to tackle the budget for 1933/34.

Mayor Ste1n

metz quickly made it clear that with the "bolsheviks"
eliminated :i'rom the council and "unnecessary" criticism
curtailed that the council could approve the budget in
one session instead of the many it had taken in previous
years.

Taxes he said would not be raised (but not lower

ed either).4

The budget itself would be nearly one hund

red and ten thousand marks smaller than the 1932/33 bud
get, the most notable cuts coming in the areas of town
unemployment assistance (cut one hundred and three thous
and marks) and town administration (cut. nearly ten thous
and marks).

Smaller cuts took place in the allotments

for the construction and maintenance of streets and town
owned housing. 5

The sharp drop in the amount of assist

ance allotted to the unemployed fit into the program of
Steinmetz-f1artin and the other Nazis perfectly.

The warn

ings of the SPD (and KPD) that they were anti-labor, anti
union, anti-social were proving to be all too true.
It is not clear if the drastic curtailment of the
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town unemployment compensation section of the budget was
a calculated gamble on the part of the Nazis that they
would cret.l.te jobs by the t ...me fundl3 ran out or not.

In

any case the councilor the state would have to balance
the potentially disasterous cuts in the budget with em
ployment for those still without work if a wave of dis
content was not to sweep through Pfungstadt.

A step to

ward providing the necessary alternative to unemployment
compensation expenditures was taken as early as July when
the town administration announced that sixteen emergency
homes would be constructed on the Seeheimerweg in the
near future.

The labor for the project was to come from

the unemployed, the land from the town, and the money from
the Reich.

The most important factor in the calculations

of the town administration was the money from the Reich.
Nearly fifty thousand marks would be needed to set the
project in motion. 6 A conflict of interests and philos
ophy developed speedily over the program since Steinmetz
and Martin had built their reputations on the determined
resistance they had shown to all of the pre-1933 spend
ing

p~ograms

of the SPD.

Only a few months earlier they

had turned down a fifty-six thousand mark loan offer with
the remark that the,:,"town could not afford it.

But in the

case of the settlement on the Seeheimerweg the policies
of the NSDAP had to take precedence.

Orders were deliver

ed to the Mayor and the town council that the state govern
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ment and the Nazi party were pushing such projects as a
means of alleviating some of the rampant unemPloyments. 7
Tt~

power of Steinmetz and Martin

~o

control the fiscal

as well as the political destiny had certain limits,
limits that the fixed ideas of the town men could not
breach.

Naturally the town administration moved to take

full credit for the institution of the settlement once
the issue of the propriety of the project was decided
by Nazi authorities above tthe local level. 8 The strange
twist of fate that had brought Steinmetz and Martin to the
leading offices of the town now made them into the pro
phets of "reasonable debt" in the cause of the Nazi party.
The utter opposition that they had shown to the SPD pro
posal to build streets, also with a fifty thousand mark
Reich loan, was replaced by a self-serving readiness to
accede to the will of the Nazi party.

The political dance

they would do would become even stranger as the hold of
the Nazis over the levers of power became mor'e assured.
The worst type of political expediency had triumphed.
In conjunction with the Seeheimerweg settlement
project was the construction of a road to connect the
towns of Seeheim and Pfungstadt.

Running through the

settlement homes the road was also intended to provide
jobs for the unemployed.

The project was also to be
financed by a Reich loan. 9 In this particular case the

Nazis had not even shown any originality--the Seeheimerweg
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project was the direct decendent of a SPD proposal of ex
actly the same specifications.

But the most lasting re

lief from the unemployment problen: i'lould have to consist
of something bigger than either the road to Seeheim or
the settlement on the Seeheimerweg.
t~

That something was

be for Pfungstadt the construction of the autobahn.

The first notion that the people of Pfungstadt had that
the plans for the autobahn had progressed very far (they
had known of the existance of the plans for the Hafraba
autobahn for some time) past the mere plannign stage came
on July 7.

The Anzeiger briefly mentioned that the auto

bahn would go through quite a section of Pfungstadt's
westerly forest and farm land.

The paper noted that "\V'e

can be thankful that our town's administration is doing
so much to try and .,:,elieve unemployment. ,,10

No mention

was made of the men who had originally designed the Haf
raba system when the paper made the announcement on July
14 that the final approval had been given for the con
struction of the autobahn section between Frankfurt and
Mannheim.

If

A note accompanied the article stating that

"the 'new' plans of Adolf Hitler have absolutely nothing
to do with the Harraba ideas. nIl

If the Nazi town ad

ministration of Pfungstadt could claim credit for the
autobahn with a straight face, then there was no reason
If

The first section of autobahn constructed anywhere
in Germany under the Nazis,
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Hitler could not do the same.

By August I the owners of

property along the route of the autobahn (for the route of
tL3

autob~hn

near Pfungstadt see page.3.) had been given
notice that they would have to 5811. 12 The owners of the
property were exclusively farmers.

The authoritarian

manner in which the prices were set (there was no bargain
ing) upset the farming cOIn.'Tlunity.

Some farmers took theil'

complaints directly to the mayor--without success--as t08
a change in price. 13 While the farmers disputed the fair
ness of the purchase of their land when they met for a
glass of beer, the construction company owners of Pfung
stadt were rejoicing.

The mayor specifically promised them

that they tlould receive a fair share of 'the construction
business when the time for building began. 14 The mayor
also promised that all the unemployed would find a place
for themselves available--with one exception.

Those who

did not belong to the SA would be unable to find work.

The

workers had been informed of this threat as early as March
(although it did not concern jobs on the autobahn at that
time), but had not taken it as seriously as they did in
August since there had been few jobs for the Nazis to of
fer the unemployed. 15

Now a real reason for the unemploy

ed existed, a concrete carrot with which the Nazis could
coerce the wavering unemployed into the ranks of the SA
once and for all.
For all of the promises of the NSDAP in the months
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after March" 1933, the economic'tempo of Pfungstadt did
not pick up.16
c~eated,

To be sure there were a few new jobs

Jut the fundamenatl breakthrough to full employ

ment was still a way off.

Nothing special was undertaken

for the small businessman of Pfungstadt although the de
partment stores of Darmstadt had been closed.

Nothing

special was done for the farmer although he had provided
a solid block of Nazi votes.

Nothing special was done

for the workers although he might expect a job working on
the autobahn if he corrected his political outlook.

Noth

ing special was done for any segment of the town's economy;
the

su~mer

months saw the perpetuation of the depression.

The Nazi answer was still to corne.
In the place of jobs and useful work the Nazis pro
vided the people of Pfungstadt with an endless

strea~

of

programs, meetings, gatherings, celebrations and assemblies.
The series of Schulungskurse which had been earlier was
continued" although at a slower pace.

Membership meetings

of the newly enrolled "March recruits increased markedly.
Attendance at the July 21 meeting was mandatory and the
members were instructed to bring their identification cards
with them to prove their presence.

Kreislelter Zurtz used

the opportunity to reenforce the support of the NSDAP for
Ortsgruppenleiter Graff whose ego had been bruised when he
was not appointed mayor.

The Kreisleiter praised the work

of the NSDAP in Pfungstadt, but reminded the members pre
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sent that they had to attend at least one if not two poli
tical education meetings a month.

He warned the members

not to listen to "criticism that re did not have a
lution.

~evo-

The Fuhrer did not want a blood bath, he wanted

an internal reordering of the German.soul." He then pro
mised the "old fighters" jobs and tood. 17 The Nazis con
tinued the policy of interspercing political education
meetings between NSDAP membership meetings.

A Schulungs

kurs was scheduled for July 31 While a membership meet
ing took place on August 21. 18 Kr~isleiter Zurtz return
ed to Pfungstadt for the August 21 meeting bringing with
him the message that the unemployment problem had its roots
in seventy years of bad governmental administration.

Bis

marck was the only promenient statesman to be spared from
his anger.

His two hour

~peech

ended with the promise

that the NSDAP would restore the workers to the jobs they
needed. Three Sieg-heils closed the meeting. 19 The NSBO
joined in the spate of Nazi meetings that took place in
July, August and September with an assembly of their own
on August 13. 20 The women of Pfungstadt were also not
forgotten; the Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft held
meetings in both August and September. 21 A highpoint 1n
party activity:was reached in the early days of September
when the SA bafd lead an NSDAP parade through the streets
!

just before a thirty-two member contingent of party faithI

ful left for the Niirnberg party meeting.

The process was
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repeated when the party members returned on September 4. 22
For those who did not relish all of the party activi
ties there were a number of other events that they could
join.

A glider club was established in early July. Justi

fication for the undertaking was provided by the new
leader of the group, Adolf Ruckelshausen (no relation to
Adam Ruckelshausen), with the words, "Flying is important
for the Fatherland. n23 Even in the Fliegernest meet
ings the role of the NSDAP as the leading group in Pfung
stadt was strongly accented.

When a former SPD member

raised an objection to the speech of the town school's
director, Born, because of his attack on the Jews, he was
pointedly told to keep quiet by

O~tsgruPQenleiter

Graff.

The next day he was taken to Mayor Steinmetz and told he
would not be allowed to attend any more meetings unless he
registered with the mayor's office ahead of time. 24
The school children were busy with their own project.
Over a two day period they collected one hundred and
eighteen marks for the Association for Germans in Foreign
Countries. 25 The NSDAP itself tried to use non-political
occassions for their own ends often.

In July the SA

sponsored two concerts which contained a dose of propagan
da along with the music.

In August the NSDAP furnished
the town with a Singstunde. 26 An inordinate emphasis on
"nationally inspired 11 songs found their way onto the pro
gram.

Other activities included the Sorrmerfest dances
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sponsored by various clubs and
tics club Sommerfest itself. 27
cclebrate~

r~staurants,

and the gymnas

The gymnastics club also

the departure of twenty-eight participants in a

gymnastics rally in Stuttgart with a parade and speeches.
The SA band was on hand to honor the gymnasts when they
returned. 28

No event was to small for the Nazis to playa

role in, and exploit for their own propaganda image.
The same was true of the out\'lar'dIJt innocent fire
T

department exercises on July 9.
tor was on

ha~to

The district fire inspec

see the demonstration, as was Mayor

:~~i

Steinmetz who used the occassion to say that "the citizens
of Pfungstadt still do not appreciate the fire department
enough. "29

He was referring to the fact that since the

"coordination" of the fire department some workers had
quietly crossed their names off the roles.
Nothing, no one was overlooked by the Nazis in their
search for the total control of Pfungstadt.
~.

The Krieger

Militarverein preserved its independence during the

first four months of the Nazi regime, but late in July suc
cumbed to the Nazi demand that they coordinate their group
also.

In the Rheinische Hof restaurant" decorated with

the picture of Adolf Hitler and the black-white-red and
swastika flags, the membership learned that they were to
become another cog in the Nazi's political machine.

The

NSDAP par·ty member Peter Seeger replaced the previous
chairman of the group and announced that the club would

"IWI'II
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promote more awareness of the necessity of Germany being
well armed.

He also informed the members that the club

would cooperate with the SA in the construction of
ing range in Pfungstadt.

shoot

The Verein contributed one hun

dred and ten marks for the SA project. 3D
shooting range was opened.

do

By Aqgust 26 the

Everyone who was sixteen and

not a member of the SA was asked to jOin.

The cut off

date for enrollment was set for September 2.

Additional

inspiration was supplied by reminding the populace that
"Shooting is a Volkssport tOday."31
For those hwo would not mold themselves in the Nazi
system, or the Nazi system would not accept,. life was very
hard.

A young man was accused of stealing apples for his

mother and had to parade around the streets, shouting that
he had robbed a Volksgenossen on several street corners.
Two men had to march around with potatoes they were accused
of taking with a sign "stolen" on their backs in the mid
dIe of August.

The ready sentenCing of people accused of

stealing found another victim on September 9, when,Franz
Cro~mann (no relation to Peter Cro8mann) had to wear a

banner saying he had stolen potatoes from a farmer. 32

The

NSDAP wanted to identify itself closely with "order" and
for the solution of the problems the farmers had had for
years ll1ith the unemployed who tried to suppliment their
me~~unemployment

pay with stolen food.

The numerous

cases of people taking foodstuffs from farmers also illus

:'111 I: ilil '
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trates the continued impact of the depression on Pfungstadt.
Nothing upset the Nazi masters of Pfungstadt more
t~an

to think that there were still pockets of resistance

to their rule.

The most stringent measures were called

for when the Nazis believed that someone broke the outward
ly solid facade of their realm.

On July 21 the Kreisamt

and the Burgermeisterei of Pfungstadt

~posed

the most

string,n.t rules fOl' those who were implicated in the dis
tribution of pamphlets of opposition.

The mayor ordered

that: 1) anyone who found or received a pamphlet was to
turn

i~

over to the police or face tbe severest penalty,

2) all former SPD and KPD leaders be placed under arrest
and

st~ict

police observation when a pamphlet was discover

ed and 3) the police were to immediately use their guns
to suppress any distri.bution of Flugbll.ttern. 33

The heavy

hand or the Nazis fell on Georg Liebig who was arrested
for distributing leaflets.
,

He was sentenced to two and

one-ha~f years in prison. 34 The Nazis had moved o~ce again
to utterly destroy even the most insignificant opposition.

Nazi hatred-of their former political opponents had not
mellowed since they had seized power on March 7.

The ugly

portion of the Nazis had first been eYidenced during March
when qightly searches of homes for guns had gone on; when
SPD, KPD and Associated Union officials were arrested and
lodged in the town hall's jail.

An iDd:1eation of the

hatred that remained in the hearts of some NSDAP members

408
was

reveal~

to many when SPD/KPD people were routinely

taken to the Osthofen concentration camp.
n~ght

But on the

of .lugust 22/23 the most reprehensible, the most

detestable sort of Nazis emerged from behind their masks
of "equality for all Germans."

They were to scar their

souls with guilt for a lifetime.
Late on the evening of August 22 rifle-toting SA men
rounded up all of the former Reichsbanne:r:, SPD, Associated
Union and KPD leaders the Nazis had some su.spicion of. 35
The SA later claimed that the entire operation was aimed
only at KPD members who were hiding guns, but the truth
was they wanted to settle some old scores. 36 At the town
hall over eighty men were herded into the town's small
ja1l.

There they were informed that they were in protec

tive custody.

Half the night was spent in the cramped

quarters of the jail before the men were taken one by one
to the ground floor of the town hall where
fuhrer sat surrounded by armed SA men.

a~SA

Sturm

In the middle of

the desk placed in front of the Sturmfuhrer was the man's
knife, which he pulled out every so often only to plunge
it viciously back into the table while he warned the
man he was questioning, liThe night of the 'long knives'
is still to come."

August Hechler had the luck to be the

first man brought before the SA tribunal.

After being

questioned about the location of the guns the Nazis felt
were still hidden in Pfungstadt, Hechler was escorted by

i'l
I!

the same SA men who had brought him to the town hall to
his parents home and released. 37 The men who followed
lkchler were not so lucky.

As each man claimed that he

knew nothing about any guns, the anger of the Sturmfiihrer
grew more intense.

Of the over eighty men who were brought

to the town hall only seven were spared a beating.

Over

seventy men were mishandled, at least two had to spend
several weeks in a hospital recuperating. 38
future mayor ofPfungstadt Ludwig Clemenz.

One was the
For all of the

Nazi effort only two guns and one hundred and eighty rounds
of ammunition were discovered in two hotwater bottles. 39
The severity of the Nazi action unleashed a reaction
with the ranks of the NSDAP itself.

Several long-time

members of the party, who had idealistically viewed the
Nazi rise to

power~

complained bitterly that the beatings

were the worst sort of propaganda for the party and con
trary to their ideals.

The majority of the membership

kept their thoughts to themselves.

They were not the

masters of the party, the party was their master.

The

average citizen did not want to know anything about the
beatings. 40
Conquering the power structure of Pfungstadt had
been one problem for the NSDAP, remaining in power was
another.

The Nazis had attempted to dent the animosity

of the workera and some burgerlich through a series of
displays, celebrations, and events which stressed the
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nationalistic spirit of the Nazis.

But the Nazis were

playing the game of power for keeps; they would tolerate
n~

opposi;lon, no matter how small.

The events of Aug

ust 22/23 were more representative of the true nature of
Nazism than anyone of the NSDAP members would believe.
~ne

SPD (and KPD) had warned the people that that sort of

thing was part of the very soul of Nazism but the burger
lioh

had refused to listen.

The fruits of that enormous

failure to perceive the truth were plainly evident for.
all but the most naive citizen of Pfungstadt to see.
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410-414.
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Pfungstadt fur 1933734, pp. 35 and 96.
6

PA: July 5, 1933.

7Interviews with Wilhelm Kaffenberger and Heinrich
Sand.

BpA : August 1, 1933 and November 1, 1935
9pA : August 26, 1933.
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19 pA : August 22, 1933.
20 pA : August 12 and 14, 1933.
21 pA : August 25 and September 21, 1933.
22pA,: September 2 and 5, 1933.
23 pA : July 4, 1933.
24Interview with Georg Liebig.
25 pA : Ju1ay 1, 1933.
26 pA : Jy1y 8 and 29 and August 8, 1933.
27 pA : July 8, 1933.
28 pA : July 25, 31 and August 1, 1933.
29 pA : July 10, 1933.
30 pA : July 22, 28, 31 and August 4, 1933.
31pA: August 26, 1933.
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33pA : July 21, 1933 and interviews with Jacob De1p
and Gerog Berth.
34Notes from the file of August Hechler and inter
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35Interviews with Peter Cro~mann and August Hechler.
36Interviews with Heinrich Schaffner and Wilhelm
Kaffenberger.
37Notes from the file of August Hechler and inter
views with August Hechler and Jacob Delp. The NSDAP
claimed that the entire operation was ~nder the leader
ship of SA men who were not from Pfungstadt. Wilhelm
Kaffenberger said that the men were from Berlin.
38Notes from the file of Heinrich Huxhorn and inter
views with Georg Herth, Peter Cro6mann and Karl Hechler.
39 pA : August 23, 1933.
40Interviews with Heinrich Sand, Jacob Hanbuch,
Maria Schulz, Peter Cro6mann and Ludwig Wenzl

CHAPTER XV
THE NEW MASTERS - OCTOBER, 1933 TO JANUARY, 1934
By October, 1933, the new mastera of Pfungstadt had
become accustomed to firmly sitting in all of the seats
of importance in the town.

So self-assured had the leader

ship of the Nazi party become that they declared that any
one who accepted the new state had to fly only the swas
tika flag.

The authoritarian order of the Nazid followed

similar pronouncements that the HitlergruB was mandatory
in the school and that every citizen should use the Deuts
chegr¥p in everyday conversation. l The degeneration of the
NSDAP members into Nazis (the tearing down of all normal
restraints) was typified by the speech of

tl

race relations"

at the November 15 NSDAP members' meeting given by school
director, Born.

Born also brought his illogical assort

ment of half truths and outright lies to the NSDAP's
Schulungkurse in the middle of December. 2 Born's display
of ignorance represented the ultimate lowness to which the
Nazis ofPfungstadt could fall.
no one

le~t

Unfortunately, there was

to publicly balance the distorted propaganda.

Inflicting warped political views on the citizens of Pfung
stadt

had become a full time habit of the NSDAP.

A joint

and the NSDAP
meeting of the Krieger- u. Mi1itarverein
........
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provided a forum for the distribution ofa complete set
of twisted nationalistic diatribes. 3

At the December 19

Schulungsabel!.q of the NSDAP party ::nember Borchert e::
plained how proud he was that "the German worker had found
the way to the Fuhrer without having had to engage in
civiI l'lar. II
accepted

Acknowledging that many workers had not fully

the Nazi state, he predicted that it might be

fifty years before Nazims was fully infused into the people.
The children he said had been won to the Fuhrer.

He closed

by saying that lithe order we again have in Germany is the
4
work solely of Adolf Hitler."
Anything and everything was
claimed by the Nazis as proof

f~r

their party.

The NSBO recaptured the momentum it had lost to
other clubs and groups during the summer late in the year.
Applications for the group, the leader Fritz Gunkel (no
relation to Ludwig Gunkel) reported, would only be accept
ed until December 31.5

I Working within the Nazi system preved for the most
part an easy task for the members of the town council.

In

all but the most important cases (work projects) the eoun
eil followed the principles of Steinmetz and Martin.

The

law of the two men was to cut expenses wherever possible.
The end of 1933 saw the council making real strides in eut
ting various small expenses.

Martin was so overjoyed at

the progress that had been made concerning the payments to
the unemployed that he predicted that the town would have
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eliminated the welfare payment burden by the end of the
year.6

While his assesment of the situation proved too

optimistic, the town had t,ken, at the insistence of the
state and national governments, the first faltering steps
back toward economic recovery.

One means at the disposal

of the town council was the Arbeitsdienst (labor service)
which had enrolled two hundred and sixteen men by November,

1933. 7 The construction of special projects, projects
the SPD had proposed earlier, was the basis fer the re
covery of Pfungstadt.

A case in point concerns the Ar-

I

beitsdienst.

In November the council approved plans for

the construction of an Arbeitsdienst headquarters in
Pfungstadt.

The SPD had not pushed for the project be

fore 1933 for fear that Steinmetz, Martin and their associ
ates

would veto the plan.

But times had changed.

In

place of the vicious attacks of Steinmetz and Martin on
the "irresponsible economic policy"

of the SPD were the

orders of the Reich government and the Nazi party.
Seeheimer settlement is yet another example.
heimer road project yet

anothe~.

The

The See

For the building of the

Seeheimer road, Martin happily reported to the council,
fifty to seventy men would be employed for up to six months
thus reducing the rolls of the unemPloyed. 8 A commendable
redirection of the labor force, the Seeheimer

p~oject

had

been fought by Steinnletz and Martin as wanteful before 1933.
The change in

burEerli~h

thinking concerning fiscal matters
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undoubtedly benefited the average man in Pfungstadt; the
Nazis took full credit for the economic recovery they had
f~ught

su~h

a short time before.

Work on the Seeheimer

settlement proceeded fairly rapidly.

only six

Initial~y

teen homes had been planned, but the number was raised to
eighteen by October with the majority of the homes curious
ly designated for former SPD and KPD members.
fighters" grumbled. 9

The "old

The Seeheimer road cost the town

over thirty-one thousand marks and was according to Nazi
propaganda, a project designed to "fulfill the wishes of
the people. II1D

The wishes of all the people were certain

ly a new concern for Steinmetz and Martin who had so often
jumped to their feet before 1933 to label any talk of more
housing and more roads "foolishness in light of the eco
nomic state of Pfungstadt."ll
Near Darmstadt construction of the autobahn began in
the middle of October when detours and other essential pre
liminary work was completed.

By November 14 the autobahn

project had penetrated the forest of Pfungstadt.

Survey

ors were busy mapping out the route through the area under
Pfungstadt's administration.

Cold weather slowed the huge

project somewhat late in November, but the Anzeiger was
finally able to report that actual construction had begun
on December 4. 12 The autobahn work, the Anzeiger reported,
was the chance for everyone to find employment.

Indeed

the job-creating potential of the autobahn was enormous,
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especially since the work was to be done with a minimum of
machines.

The political consequences of the construction

of the autobahn and the other projects is very difficult
to measure.

Ma~Y'men

resented their forced entry into the

SA, while at the same time they felt grateful at the
chance to find work. 13 The burgerlich businessmen greeted
the work with glee, because they were often directly res
ponsible for some of the construction.

Those that were

not involved in the project expected the reemployed work
ers to begin pumping some money into their stores.

There

was no sudden burst forward -in the economy as the autobahn
neared Pfungstadt; rather there was a slow, almost imper
ceptable, gathering of momentum.

Workers who had not seen

regular paychecks in some time were proud to bring home
money which they had earned than their welfare checks. 14
[n the political sector life did not seem as if it
would ever be normal again to the workers.

Several SPD

leaders expressed the notion that they would not outlive
the Nazi state. Politics was the last thing they had on
their minds. 15 But a political system surrounded them and
their neighbors in Pfungstadt.

The Nazis saw to that,

The SA had a particularly significant part to play in the
Nazi plan for Pfungstadt.

Since they were by far the

largest group (estimates of the size of the SA range from

seven hundred and fifty to one thousand six hundred~6)
under the direct control of the NSDAP and they represented
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more classes of people than any other organization, special
emphasis was laid to SA events.

Special meetings were

held in order to set out the politically acceptable party
line and to make sure that each man knew his responsibility
to attend SA functions.

On December 3

~n

exceptional dis

play of honse mounted SA from outside of Pfungstadt put on
a show.

On December 10 the SA company 143 dedicated a flag

with full pomp and circumstance.

December 13 the SA laid

special emphasis upon "all German people" seeing the film
SA-Mann Brand.
the Winterh::l.lfe.

On December 17 the SA collected money for
Each ten pfennig donation brought with

it a badge for the contributor.

One hundred and sixty-six

marks were donated.

On December 18 the SA held a Christ
mas party complete with a tree and songs. 17 The activities
of the SA varied under the leadership of Obersturmfuhrer
Homburg; the goal of completely int,egrating the workers
into the Nazi state did not change.

Despite the favorable

impression Homburg made on the average member (he gained
an enviable reputation for his fairness and opposition to
excessive drinking) he toed the line as to party disci
pline. l8 When orders did not keep someone in line, mean~
ingful threats were employed.
Osthc

~n

No one had forgotten that

was less than an hours drive from Pfungstadt.

Physical force still lay at the base of the Nazi hold on
Pfungstadt.
day.

Threats did not have to be enunciated each

An article in the Anzeiger, a rumor from a friend
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were enough to keep almost everyone in line.

While

threats provided the discipline, there were very few
wh:.llehearted working class converts to the Nazi state. 19
A man bore his burden without saying much of anything,
content at times that he had been lucky enough to find
work on the autobahn and stay clear of the authorities.
The mass of the working class still clung to their old tra
ditional notions, but not openly, only with the most in
timate of long-time friends were words of defiance hurled
at the new masters.
Spreading out from the body of the Nazi party were
the tentacles of control--the organization, clubs, associa
tions which were directly or indirectly linked to the
party.

The farmers were as much a part of the Nazi net

work as any other group.
rich May.

Their leader was the Nazi Hein

May had acquired a name for himself from the

role he had had in supressing the workers on March 7 with
a contingent of his farming colleagues.

Many people, be

hind his back, said that he had a mean disposition.

A more
fanatical Nazi would have been hard to find in Pfungstadt. 20

May was the driving force behind the organization of the
nationally propagandized Erntedankfest (Thanksgiving) in
Pfungstadt.

At a special meeting of the Bauernbund, May

pledged to the farmers that the Erntedankfest would rival
the National Day of Work is size.

A large announcement in

the Anzeiger declared that the Erntedankfest was to show
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the ties between the town and the land. Everyone was or
dered to attend. 2l The list of events included:

6:30 A.M.

Songs by the SA band to wake everyone up

7:45-8:00

Dr. Goebbels' speech on the radio

9:30

I
ThankSgiVing~hUrChiservices

11-12:00

Concert at the town hall

2:00

Parade

5-7:00

Retransmission of Hitler's speech in virtual
ly every restaurant and hall in the town

The punctuality that had impressed everyone so much
on May 1 was missing from the festivities on October 1.
The parade ztarted a full forty-five minutes late.

Wagons

decorated in various motifs were strategically placed
throughout the parade to separate the mounted SA from the
NSDAP memberscand so on.

The farmers were divided by the

crop or animal they specialized in raising.
the parade came the SA.

At the end of

Mayor Steinmetz and Bauernfuhrer

May each spoke at the town hall when the parade came to an
end, thanking God that He had given the German farmer Adolf
Hitler.

The Horst Wessel song came at the conclusion of

the speeches.

After listening to Hitler speak on the radio

the large crowds adjurned to various restaurants where
dances began. 22 Pfungstadt had never seen anything like
the Ernteda£kfest before.

The farmers had never been

singled out for special attention in such a way.

While

the crowds were not quite as large as those that had par

ticipated in the f4ay 1 events, the distinct impression
uppermost in many minds was that Hitler really cared for
the farrnel' and the German

Many people went away

~)ecple.

from the festivities a little more convinced of the right
eousness of the Nazi cause.

In others it made the Nazi

control of Pfungstadt seem just a little more complete.
May 1 had been set aside for the workers, October 1
for the farmers, October 15 was to be a day for the
craftsmen.

Again there

w~the

SA to awaken everyone early

in the morning, again there was the church serVice, again
the concert at the town hall and again the parade.

Only

a speech by Hitler was missing from the carbon copy of
previous "Days."

The Anzeiger once more reported the in

evitable success of the event.

Adolf Hitler was again

characterized as having saved "German craftsmanship" from
ruin in the paper.23

Some people began to grow tired of

the constant stream of parades, celebrations,and festivi
ties. 24 But if some people were worn out from celebrating
they were not members of the NSDAP.
Autumn brought with it the NationalsQzialistische
Volkswoblfahrt (National socialist welfare organization).
The NS Volkswohlfahrt introduced the people of Pfungstadt
to a new dimension in organized collections.

The Nazis

pushed the program to seek a contribution for the poor and
needy from everyone.

Special Sundays were set aside for

the SA, the NS Women, the HJ and

B~

or others to gather
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funds.

Those who contributed received a button they were

to display "so as to remind everyone to give"25 and also
tc make it easy for the collection gatherings to identify
an10ne who was attempting to avoid giving.

Also in the

master plan for squeezing money out of the people was a
most peculiar invention--the Eintopfsonutag.

Basically

the idea was for the woman of the house to use only one
pot to cook the family's Sunday meal and contribute the
amount that the family saved over a regular Sunday dinner
to the Volkswohlfahrt.

To see that people observed the

practice SA men who went house to house collecting the
money which had been saved also often stuck their heads
into the kitchen. 26 Ironically many people in Pfung
stadt had to make do with Eintopf meals every day of the
week.

Four hundred and eighty marks was contributed on

November 5, the first of several Eintopfsonntagen to come.
Farmers were informed that they too would be expected to
give a small portion of their crops to the Volkswohlfahrtj
many did not like the idea. 27
Driven by the Nazis from one celebration or event
to another, the average man in Pfungstadt could not imag
ine what was to happen next.

On October 25 they found out,

for on October 25 the first in a series of "election"
rallies was held in order to stir up enthusiasm for the
November 12 Reichstag "balloting. 1I

On October 25 the

NSDAP presented a "Rally for freedom and equal rights."
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Actually it was three separate rallies on the same night.
At one restaurant Ortsgruppenleiter Graff and the SA man
Stumpp (Neu Isenburg) spoke to the crowd.

At another hall

Mayor Steinmetz and Kreisleiter Zurtz evaluated the elec
tion, while at still a third point Graff's second in
command Georg Riehl and Gaupropagandaleiter Treffz lec
taned at the gathering on the value of Nazism. 28 The
Nazis had begun to prepare the people for "voting" on
November 12.

Supplementing the effort of' the NSDAP in

Pfungstadt were events in surrounding towns.

Of dis

tinct importance was the speech of Hitler on October 29
for which a special train was arranged at minimal cost t9
interested parties. 29 For those who could not attend,~tbe
speech was carried over the radio. Another feature of the
Nazi campaign to win the support of the people of Pfung
stadt was advertisements placed in the

An~eiger.

One

such propaganda piece urged "Whoever loves his people and
his fatherland, whoever hates war and the armaments race
in Europe--he should vote 'yes' on November 12."

Another

contained the reputed l'lords of Hitler to the effect, !!We
know only one goal on this world:

not hatred of other
people but the love of the German Nation!,,3 0 The Nazis

drove themselves nearly to a state of exhaustion before
the ·'election" as they prepared one activity after another
for the people.

On November 8 the Nazis notif1ed the

populace that "all people must attend" the rally of the
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NSDAP scheduled for that evening.

The SA was out early to

see that the people followed the dictates of the party.
The halls were packed. 3l On November 10 the party staged
a slightly different type rally.

Exactly at 1:00 P.M. a

siren blew to stop all traffic for one minute.

After

traffic returned to normal the rally of the Nazis began at
the town hall square.

Also included in the festivities

were the school children.

Mayor Steinmetz addressed the

crowd after they had listened to Hitler's speech to the
workers at the Siemens factory in Berlin.

The school

children then entertained the crowd with songs,
/

dances.

and
The rally was closed with the Horst Wessel song. 32
~oetry

The day before the people were to go to the polls the An
zei6er_ran Nazi advertisements on four of its eight pages
and editorialized that November 12 was the day to decide
Germany's fate.

Complicated arguments were dropped; ~~a

simple approach was adopted.

The people were told, "Vote

'yes'. it is your duty. ,,33

The NS

V~lkswohlfahrt

did

its part to stir up the people by distributing the first of
its gifts to the poor and needy the day before the "vote. ,,34
One might have actually believed that the Nazis had
had an opponent in the campaign for votes, if one had
judged the strength of the opposition on the energy the
Nazis expanded.
real election.

There was no opponent and there was no
The "voting" was somewhat complicated s1nce

the people were actually lIapproving" a list of Nazi candi

,
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dates for the Reichstag and were endorsing Hitler's actions
with regard to the League of Nations. * According to the
Na ~is, who counted the ballots, 98.31% of the electorate

l~

went to the polls and 97.44% of the people approved Hit
ler's foreign policy activity while 93.77% agreed to the
list of Nazi candidates.

The complete falseness of the

election was noticed by some who noted that the Nazis had
reported that 92.77% of the inmates of the Osthofen con
centration camp had agreed with Hitler's taking Germany
out of the League of Nations and 90.80% had voted for the
NSDAP list of candidates. 35 The election was quite obvi
ously rigged.
Rigged or not the people of Pfungstadt undoubtedly
voted overwhelmingly for the NSDAP and Hitler.

Many citi

zens went so far as to write their names conspicuously
across their ballots before they turned them in. 36 The
'small amount of opposition that 'was still left in the
workers found its expression at the polls.

In the work

ing class sections of Pfungstadt nearly ten percent of
the vote was against the Nazis.

People who did "vote" got

a button for their efforts to wear throughout the day. Few
pepple were foolish enough to ohallenge the NSDAP by ab
staining from the election.

Only four percent of the vot.

erlS in the predominately middle class/farmer sections of'

•In

f~om

October., 1933, Hitler withdrew the German Reich
the League of Nations.
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Pfungstadt votes against the Nazis.

The exact returns for

Ptungstadt as a whole were:
hESULTS OF THE NOVEMBER 12, 1933 ELECTION AND PLEBISCITE
Reichsta~

election

Plebiscite

4,186 (93.77%)

For the NSDAP
Against the NSDAP

315

(6.23%)

Yes
No

5,104

4,866

(97.44%)

156

(2.66%)

5,115

Realizing that a portion ot the working class still tenaci
ously clung to the right of opposition publically, Orts
gruppenleiter vowed to bring them into the Nazi system.
On October

+9

three people had been taken to Osthoten for

disrespectful remarks about the Nazi process of govern
ment in Pfungstadt.

Graff and other Nazis vowed they would

again send people to Osthofen if the opposition showed its
face in Pfungstadt. 37 The valiant display of opposition
on November 12 was to be turned against the workers.

One

form of Nazi action against the "marxists" had been to
drive them into Nazi cottrolled clubs.

When it seemed as

if an inordinate number of SPD members had joined the Ger
mania soccer club after the dissolution of their own group
the Nazis ordered that anyone joining after March 5, 1933,
could only be considered a guest.

By October the Germania

club was openly being attacked for having !!too many former
'marxists' in the club. 1t
solving the Germania. 38

The Nazis openly talked of dis
There was to be no way to separate

oneself from the Nazi state, the Nazi ideology, the Nazi

\!
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threats.

The Protestant youth group in Pfungstadt learned

that lesson late in December when it was announced that its
mrmbers wore henceforth members of the Hi~ler Jugend. 39
Even the Handwerker und Gewerbeverein..; which had supplied
the Nazis with any number of party members and whose
ranks generally stood solidly behind the Nazis, was not
spared.

On December 22 they learned that their group had

been dissolved and that they should apply for membership
in the employees arm of the Work Front. 40 No one would
be able to escape the Nazis.
In front of the town hall during the Christmas season
stood a large Christmas tree, representing, the Nazis said,
.
41
the spirit of Christmas they had installed.
The system
that they had really installed had little to do with the
spirit of love that is traditionally attached te that per
ied.

The Nazis were the masters, the people were merely

the tools at the disposal of the party.

No criticism of

the basic structure of the Nazi state was broached, no
opposition, however minute, was accepted.
existed in Pfungstadt by the end of 1933.

No real freedom
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CHAPTER XVI
NAZI PFUNGSTADT - 1934
f,', .

Contrasting the New Year of'1934 with the New Year
of 1933, the people of Pfungstadt noticed that profound
changes had occurred.

In the place of an unknown political

future (in January, 1933), the reign of the Nazis seemed
secure from attack in 1934.

The undecided factors which

had existed at the beginning of 1933 had all vanished; the
Nazis had replaced indecision with orders, threats, ral":'
lies, clubs and the party itself.

Gone was a town council

ot opposing Viewpoints, gone were the clubs and groups of
which the SPD had been so proua, gone also was the right
to freedom of speech, assembly, press and political pre
ference.

Nothing stood outside of the Nazi state,

neithe~

man, woman nor child.
The Nazis constantly reminded the people that the
NSDAP was the entrenched authority in Pfungstadt.

On

January 30 the party sponsored a celebration of the first
anniversary of Hitler's appointment to the chancellorship
of

German~.

Early in the morning of the thirtieth the

school children and their

teachers held a formal commemor

ation of the event; the NSDAP itself staged a large r'ally
at the town hall.

The mayor of

Darmstad~,

Lang, spoke to
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the crowd along with Mayor Steinmetz and Ortsgruppenleiter
Graff.

The messages of all three men were essentially the

same: "Forward with our Fuhrer for the German people and
the fatherland."

The same evening the NSDAP held a member

ship meeting at which songs were sung, speeches were made
and history distorted.

The meeting closed with the words:

"We begin the second year knowing that our task had not
been completed, but with the firm conviction that our task
now will be finished if we are always true to the Fuhrer.
He will lead us to our goal."l
In 1933 the Nazis had presented every conceivable
commemorative day to the public--some thought; in 1934 the
Nazis used many more opportunities to drive their thoughts
On February 26 the party honored the "hero" Chris

home.

tian Croemann.

The fi~st anniversary of his death was a

chance for the party and the school to lead the children
of Pfungstadt closer to Nazism.

A number of speeches pre

ceded the unveiling of a special memorial gravestone in
the cemetary.

The children were told to follow in the
footsteps of Cro6mann for the good of the Reich. 2
April 1 brought with it a rally for the people in
the Saarland.

The citizens were again directed to attend

the festivities which were planned for the town hall
square.

On that day over fifteen hundred people took part
in the Nazis' design. 3 The topic for celebration had
changed J the means to carry it out had not.

Hitler's birthday, on April 20, was the occasion for
the Nazis to exhort the people to assemble once again.
Or'ders went out for each homeowner to put out his flags.
The NSDAP sponsored the showing of the film "Hans Westmar"
based on the book Horst Wessel by Hanns-Heinz Evers.

The

SA band played several tunes before OrlsgruEpenleiter
Graff delivered his speech.

The SA gathered in several

restaurants throughout Pfungstadt to celebrate the birth
day of Hitler over a glass of beer. 4
May I received the full attention of the Nazis as it
had the previous year.

A more prominent part was played

by the Hitler Jugend in the festivities; the whole morning
was devoted to various events for their pleasure.

At

2:00 P.M. an impressively long parade, divided by occupa
tions, rolled to life.

Mayor Steinmetz and Nazi Union

leader Fritz Gunkel (no relation to Ludwig Gunkel) res
ponded to the occasion with long speeches.

A part of the

day's activities were set aside for the presentation of a
plaque for forty years service to a brewry worker.

As

with other affairs Hitler was given complete credit for all
of the achievements of the past year and for saving the
"German worker" from the cluching grasp of the "reds;"
their "opportunistic bosses" the union leaders. 5

A cult

about the goodness, the justice, the farsightedness and
the power of Hitler grew

perc~pt1vely.

At every event the

Nazis hammered home the notion that the people had Hitler
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alone to thank for all of life's pleasures.

The freshness

of some of the Nazis' gains was dulled in the minds of
many by the superhuman treatment and regard the Nazis
showed for their Fuhrer.

The same sort of thing, with re

gard to the local leaders, did not occur.

Steinmetz, Graff

and Martin always gave the credit for their achievements
to Hitler, rarely did they try and capture some of the
spotlight. 6 The precocious twins, Steinmetz and Martin,
had found their master in the Fuhrer.
The pace of the Nazis did not diminish as Spring
gave way to Summer.

Work on the autobahn continued, more

men found jobs building it.
recovery speeded up.

Slowly the economic rate of

Late in July the houses in the See

helmer settlement were finished.
new occupants moved in.7

With great fanfare the

The town's expenditure for the

unemployed sank to less than two thousand marks per week
and the businessmen reported a noticable pickup in their
business.

Life ha.d assumed a different, but not altogether

unpleasant appearance.

The Nazis did everything in their

power to cultivate idea.
The NSDAP continued to meet on a regular basis once
or twice a month.

The town was divided into sections by

the party for the distribution of information and for
meetings.

Hans Otto, Wilhelm Sauer and Karl Fey assumed

a position somewhat lower than Graff as the leaders of
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the tlcells. tt 8

Individual n~ell" meetings were then called

to organize the people even more strictly along Nazi lines.
The party functioned more

~fficently

on its redesigned

basis.
The death of Reichspresident Hindenburg plunged a
large section of the populace into

mou~nlgg.

A series of

memorial services were held, directed by the Nazis. 9

In

addition,- a few days later, plans for a plebiscite were
announced.

The people were to "decide" if Hitler's as

sumption of the presidency met with their approval.
page advertisements sprouted

Full

in the pages of the Anzeiger

on August 14 and ran every day until the plebiscite on
August 19.

The NSDAP scheduled only one mass rally before
the "decision" of the people was called for. lD To the

miaic of the SA and Jungvolk bands the people went to the
polls; over seventy percent "voted tl before noon, the rest
were reminded of their duty to vote by the SA, HJ and Jung
volk.

The Itskill" of the Nazis to turn out the vote was

revealed the following day when the election returns were
printed 1n the paper.

Nearly ninety-eight percent of the

eligible voters had cast theirlballot, 93.8% were marked
yes and 6.2% were marked no, according to the Nazis. ll
Pfungstadt's Nazis were proud to boast that their percent
age of "yes" votes was above the average reported 1n the
Reich, in Hessr-Darmstadt and in the county of Darmstadt.
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But in one working class district of Pfungstadt over thir
teen percent of the vote was no, despite the obviously

m~naged "ulection."12
The predictable result of a thirteen percent "non
vote being reported was Nazi anger.

The Anzeiger printed

an article attacking grumblers and alarmists; they would
be punished warned the paper.

The Anzeiger also announced

that "protective custody" detention meant certain loss
of one's jOb. 13 Life would be made very unpleasant for
anyone who made his opposition to the Nazis too public.
To speak of a public opposition to the Nazis in 1934
is nonsense.

There was no public oPPosition nor was there

likely to be any.

Private oPPosition was limited to indi

viduals, not groups.
,

.1

Few people had friends loyal enough

to be entrusted with the full extent of a man's private
thoughts about the Nazis. 14 The Nazis, for their part,
carefull nurtured activities for non-party members anyone
could take part in.
catagory.

The NS Volkswohlfahrt fell into that

The donations to the NSV went to the needy; few

men refused to give to the cause even if it was run by the
Nazis.

The collections for the poor began in October, 1933

and continued until the beginning of March, 1934.

The

Nazis became adroit at involving the people in the process
by conspicious displays of the food and goods collected at
the town hall before they were distributed.

They also had
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contributors wear a badge.

Citizens who had not given

were easy to identify and corral for the next collection.
Even when the period for collections had come to an of
ricial end in Pfungstadt, Martin, the chairman of the NSV,
ingeniously though of a way to gather more funds--he
staged a day in rememberance of various collections, a
Day in Rememberance of the Eintopfsonntag, a Day in Remem
berance of the HJ Collection and so forth. 15 The process
had unlimited possibilities.
Behind the direct pressure on the people to accomo
date themselves to the Nazi administration were inner
forces which worked on a man or woman to tacitly accept
the Nazi state.

People were constantly reminded that,

"Hitler is making work for everyone.,,16

From every side,

from every part of a person's day, the Nazis shouted., sung,
described, displayed, paraded, pictured and wrote of their
accomplishments.

The physical means of repression which

were at the disposal of the Nazis were held as a reserve.
The Nazi film "Sieg des Glaubens"

provided the Nazis with
an example of an effective propaganda weapon. 17 There was
nowhere one could escape the public pronouncement of the .

NaZis, even the privacy of one's home was not sacred· if
one was in any way suspected of critizing the party.

At

one time the children of the school were instructed to
notify the authorities if their parents said anything un
complimentary about the NSDAP. 18
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Refining their stranglehold over the political pro
cess in Pfungstadt was a full time task for the Naz1s, one
they engaged in with ferver and determination.

As new

clubs were formed they staked out a position of dominance.
A meeting of former navy members, something that had not
taken place in Pfungstadt since World .War I, occurred in
June. 19 Other branches of the service received similar
attention.

The Krieger- u. Militarverein became an 1m

portand link in the Nazi leash on Pfungstadt.

There was

simply no escape, no way out of Nazi control •
. The year after the Nazi seizure of power was a very
difficult time for former SPD, KPD and Associated Union
leaders.

There was

work for them, there were no sup

flO

plements for their nonexistant incomes.
to publically help them out.

No one was eager

In private a few members of

the working class community did support their old leaders
as best they could. 20 But the risk to those people was
I

very great since exposure of ,their activities placed them
in line for some sort of Nazi reprisal.

The former lead

ers l1ved, but without hope and without confidence 1n the
future.
The Nazi propaganda machine, which Mayor Steinmetz
headed in addition to his other duties, ground on.

There

were preparations made, at the insistence of the NaZis,
for air raid shelters and practice with gas masks. 21 There
were swimming contests for the HJ, BdM and Jungvolk.

The
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Kraft durch Freude sponsored several activities for the
citizens of Pfungstadt.

There was a German Rose Day,

Memorial Day, German Volkstums Day. Thanksgiv1ng.:. DJ.Y
(Erntedankfest) and others. 22 A celebration took place on
November 28 for the Day in Rernemberance of Nationalsozi
alistische Gemeinschaft, the first anniversary of the
establishment of the Kraft durch Freude unit in

Pfung~tadt.

On December 7 a Day of National Solidarity was staged~23
I

But the tlazis had only succeeded in creating a solida:rity
based on the burgerlich around which a thin veneer of
workers moved.

The working class of Pfungstadt did not
I

oppose

the Nazis, but the cooperation on the part oflthe
I

workers was based on a pragmatic reading of the balance of
power.

The

ve~led

threat, the informer and Osthofen-

they were essential if the Nazis were to stay in full con
trol.

I
I

The period of history through which the people bf
Pfungstadt were living created its own kind of respectable
man.

Many of the Nazis sincerely believed in their clause

and the means by Which they had set about to reach their
goals •. There were Nazis who tried to achieve the best of
all possible worlds.

But outweighing these men were the

people who were

along with the tide, who had not

swep~

known where they were leading themselves and the

tow~

be

fore 1933 and did not see any more clearly after 1933.
There were idealistic Nazis, there were vengeful Nazis,
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there were respectable Nazis and there were despicable
Nazis--Pfungstadt's great loss was that there were too
many Nazis.
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10pA : August 14, 16 and 17, 1934.
11 pA : August 20, 1934.
12 Ibid .
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CHAPTER XVII
AN ASSESSMENT
"Jeder bleibt so in seinem Kreis, nur die Augen nich.t
aufmachen was druben passiert."l

The years after 1934

were filled with trials, tribulations, and closed eyes.
Trained to obey their masters during the 1933-1934, the
people of'Pfungstadt were powerless to halt the march of
Nazi history.

The Nazi party remained the one almighty

force in the town; the Nazis went on about their business,
the people participated when told to do so.

For many it

was a time of calm and moderate prosperity.

A few re

flected on the price that was being demanded.
Nazi controls were complete, but not altogether
stifling for the many men and women who did not question
their significance.

The average man generally believed

that he was living in a decent, if not outstanding, time.
Economic expansion continued, many construction companies
received a share of various building projects throughout
Germany.

An ammunition dump was built to the east of

Pfungstad~,

employing many men; others found work in Pfung

stadt or in nearby towns as they had before the depres
sion. 2
Mayor Steinmetz retired from his position as head
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of the town's administration in 1935, turning over the
reins of command to Georg Riehl, Ortsgruppenleiter Graff's
second in command. Steinmevz became vice-mayor along with
Martin.

Tne council met less and less often until in 1939

only one session was conviened the entire year.3
An anti-religious campaign of sorts broke out when
it became apparent that the Protestant minister Strack
was an anti-Nazi.

(Strack had replaced Minister Zinn

1n November, 1933 when Zinn retired.)

SA men were sta

in front of the church on Sundays, dutifully writ

tio~ed

. ing down the names of each individual as they entered the
service. 4 Kristalnacht (1938) brought out the very worst

of the Nazis to burn the town's very small synagogue to
the ground, ransack several Jewish

::·b~~inesses

(the fur

niture from one store was thrown in the Modau) and beat
up many

a

'Jewish inhabitant

of Pfungstadt.

All of

Pfungstadt's clubs were consolidated into one large unit
late in 1939. 5 The terror of the Nazis was very real;
they did not lose sight of their goal for a moment.
Just before the war broke out three citizens of
Pfungstadt were sent to the concentration camp at Dachau.
The reasons they were sent are not clear. 6

The war de

pleted the town of its young and so young able bodied men.
The only real damage suffered by Pfungstadt during the war

•547

people from Pfungstadt were killed 1n WW II.

•
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came as Allied

1944.

bomb~7

struck the city of Darmstadt in

A few stray bombs hit the working class section of

the town ,destroying the post office.

Ortsgruppenleiter

Graff was killed in Darmstadt during those same Allied
raids. 7 The town faced the advancing American army almost
defenseless.

A few tank traps were dug to the west of

the town and the old men
a militia.

~nd v~ry

young boys enrolled in

But Pfungstadt was spared the destruction re-

sistance to the Americans would surely have purchased when
on March 23, 1945 Ludwig Clemenz (Albert Walke's assistant
1n the Reichsbanner) took a white sheet from his home and
bravely marched in the direction of Eschollbrficken to meet
the Americans.

The town was surrendered.

Shortly there-

after Clemenz was named by the commanding officer of the
Americans who were occupying Pfungstadt to the post of
provisional Mayor.

A Burgerrat, composed of former SPD

. and KPD members, soon followed.

Clemenz never saw the

dramatic changes which came to Pfungstadt after the war
since he died of blood poisioning on August 15,

19~5.

Another SPD man, Georg Roth, was named to replace him. 8
The transition from the Nazi state to American control arid
then self-administration was carried out swiftly, although
not without blood flowing.

Former Mayor Steinmetz was

captured as he tried to secretly reenter the city, taken
to the town ball and severely beaten--he hung himself.
Other Nazis were not driven to such drastic extremes, but
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receive physical punishment for their participation in the
Third Reich. 9
The population of Pfungstadt reached nine thousand
as the war drew to an end (1939: 7,959) and increased to
over ten thousand in 1947 as a steady stream of refugees
found their way to the town.

By 1970 the total population
of the town was over seventeen thousand. 10 Recovery from
the war was rather slow until after 1948, then Pfungstadt
began an economic serge that has created the most stable
economic development Pfungstadt ever experienced.

The

golden days of the 1850's, 60's and 70's, long since for
gotten, were far surpassed.

For Pfungstadt the 1950's,

60's and 70's have become a golden age economically.

Po

litically the SPD has dominated the town, first in coop
eration with the KPD and then alone after the KPD was bann
ed.

(Interestingly enough, the SPD today receives an

average of about sixty percent of the vote, compared with
the combined SPD/KPD average of just under sixty percent
before 1933.)
Pfungstadt's Nazis found the move into the Bundes
re2ublik difficult, their sons and daughters did not.

De

mocracy has established a strong and vital base in the
town.

There is little talk of the "good old days" when

Hitler was in power, except among the very old.
cratic forces contol the town.

The demo

Did they learn a lesson

from the period 1928 to 1935, the years in which the pop~
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ulace fought its life and death struggle?
The single most important reason for the triumph of
Nazism was the division of the town along strict class
lines.

The rare instances of class cooperation, as in the

pre-1929 town council, were far outweighed by a not-too
subtle demarcation line between der
Arbeitnehmer.

Arbeitg~ber

and der

The ownership of a business seemed to con

fer a badge of distinction on the person which the burger
lich took very seriously.

Not every member of the middle

class was afflicted with this malady, but a very large
number definitely were.

The middle class called Pfungstadt

"eine rote Hochburg" (a red stronghold) before 1933.ll~" The
naive assumption of the middle class that the choice was
Nazism and Communism led the burgerlich blindly to the
Uazis.

Compromise with the !treds" was impossible in the

minds of the middle class.

The strange hatred of the SPD

and the KPD was not directed toward individual members
of those groups, but toward the organization itself.

The

myth of the workers' power nurtured the hatred of the
middle class.

The Nazis entered the picture, in part, be

cause of this paranoid position of the burgerlich.

The

traditions and prejudices handed to them by their own par
ents had much to do with their stand.

It is difficult to

believe that the nature of the SPD had much to do with the
plight of the middle class.

The middle class members of

Pfungstadt's society who dared to stick out their hand to
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the SPD were warmly welcomed.

The SPD had shown an amaz

ing degree of restraint in the town council during the
t~'~enties

nnd Georg Raab stood as an· example of the best of

the SPD--a man of the people who worked for the people,
even the middle class respected him.

The trouble of the

middle class lay deeper; somewhere in the middle class
social and political values which were inherited from the
time of Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic lies the.
answer.

The blame for the Nazi triumph in Pfungstadt lies

with the bUrgerlich, not with the workers.
The depression distorted the thinking of most of the
people.

Everyone demanded change, any change, as long as

some solution was found.

Under the influence of a de

pression mentality, both the middle class and the workers
moved toward the extremes.

The middle class to the Nazis

and a sizable portion of the workers to the KPD.
was the order of the day, any change.

Change

The depression

I

threw a .blanket of blindness over the people.
SPD kept its head.

Onl~

the

But the SPD was in no position to

lead ignorant men back to reality.

The bridges of under

standing to the middle class had been burnt by the bUrger
lich and the KPD was steadily building a following out of
SPD members who thought that the SPD was not radical
enough.

To accommodate the demands of the middle class·

would have been political suicide, for the KPD would sure
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ly have captured most of the SPD voters.

Besides, the

SPD would never have been accepted by the

bur~Elich.

Tte chief effect of the depression was to magnify the un
stable political conditions which had existed even oefore
the economic slump set in.

Political senselessness in

creased in direct proportion to the growth of the depres
sion.

Tension mounted, the search for any solution grew

more hectic.

Those tensions, fears and

fr~strations

were

the base upon which the Nazis built their political power.
The old traditional middle class parties of Pfung
stadt (the DVP, DDP and Landbund) were no match for their
greatest challenge.

While the SPD searched for a way to

finance work projects for the unemployed, the traditional
middle class parties were opening the door for the Nazis.
A heavy amount of blame must fallon the leaders of the
middle class parties; they failed to ignite the spirit of
the middle class for ordered change; they failed to hold
their own traditions high; they failed to find a man of
\i11helm Buchner's stature in their time of trial.

If any

two men came close to matching the appeal that Buchner had
exuded than they were Georg Steinmetz and Wilhelm Martin.
They became the spokeslnen of the bu£gerlich in the town
council, blocking the work projects they were later to in
stitute.

They pandered to the wants of the middle class

under the label of "non'politicall! politics; they led the
middle class away from their real traditions toward some
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thing no one understood.
grievous guilt.

Upon their shoulders lies a

They helped erect a frame of mind per

fectly su1ted to the Nazi ~laris.

£hey destroyed the co

hesion that Pfungstadt's society of people so desperately
needed.

Where Christoph

Hanbu~~

(DDP), chairman of the
I' •

town's finance committee in spite 9f his party's minimal
political influence, had stood in the twenties, Steinmetz
and Martin stood in the thirties.

The difference was

profound.
The actual seizure of power by the Nazis on March 1,

1933, did not require large numbers of people.

A moderate

number of well armed men from Pfungstadt, supplemented by
Darmstadt SA men, sufficed.

To consolidate their author

ity the Nazis relied heavily upon the middle class.
workers would have no part in the Nazi plans..

The

The social

division of the town played a significant role even in
March, 1933.

The SPD had prepared itself for a struggle

under the leadership of Interior Minister Leuschner's po
lice.

When Leuschner's forces surrendered to the Nazis

the workers were left defenseless, at the mercy of the
Nazis who did not bungle their opportunity for control.
Once physical control of Pfungstadt was clearly in Nazi
hands the burgerlich streamed into the party, eager to re
gain power from the "reds."
When Steinmetz became mayor and Martin vice-mayor
in April, 1933, the circle was complete.

With the whole
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hearted support of the new leaders of the middle class the
Nazis began the process of integrating Pfungstadt into
their orbit.

The constant parades, marches, memorial days

and charity drives served to draw supporters quickly to
the party.

May 1, 1933 was a very important day for the

NaZiS, the workers were led into the fold unable to offer
any resistance.

Most workers were unhappy with the Nazi

Victory; nearly all resigned themselves to the Nazi con
trols.

Cold blooded political terror played a substantial

part in the Nazi triumph: first in the days of March when
an unlimited number of searches, arrests and trips to
Osthofen convinced any doubters that the Nazis meant busi
ness and secondly in August when the defenseless SPD, KPD
and Associated Union leaders were systematically beaten by
a vengeful band of .'SA men.

It dId not seem to be hard for

the fanatics among the NSDAP to ruthlessly inflict pain
upon',their neighbors.
As the dictatorship of the Nazis grew more mature
its face slowly changed.

Securely in power, the Nazis

found themselves, at times, at odds with each other.
idealists against the zealots.

The

For the idealistic Nazis

many of the events after 1933 were repugnant.
zealots it was only the beginning.

For the

The fanaticism which

had simmered below the surface of Nazism assumed a new
dimension with the outbreak of World War II.

No one, not

Nazi or non-Nazi, was then safe from an informer.

The true
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face of Nazism only fully was revealed to a deluded middle
class with the advent of the war.

Even then there were

J11b.ny who 'blamed something or someone else.
Everyone of the citizens of Pfungstadt was in one
way or another affected by the Nazis.
many did.

The war taught many a

will never learn.

Some did not suffer.

high~priced

lesson, some

No one will ever forget.

No one foresaw the consequences of their actions in
the years before the Nazis grabbed the levers of power.
That is by far the most significant lesson the people of
Pfungstadt have to bequeath to history.

The SPD and the

KPD did not comprehend the utter destruction the Nazis
were to bring or they wO,uld surely have fought it.

The

middle class, the backbone of society, failed the test
much more completely.

When the backbone of the burgerlich

first swayed and 'then broke under the real and imagined
weight of the depression and their prejudices, the way for
j

the Nazis was cleared.

They led the town blindly toward

the brink of destruction, not stopping even once to con
sider the implications of their choice.

Similar cases of

political blindness could occur again--under different
names to be sure--but with fatal results of the same mag
nitude.
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CHAPTER XVII - FOOTNOTES
lInterview with Julius Winkler. Everyone stayed
within his circle of friends, not opening his eyes to what
happened outside of it.
2Kar1 Hechler, Pfungstadt yom Beginn des 20. Jahr
hunderts bis heute in Pfungstadt Vergangenheit und Gegen
wart, (Trautheim, 1965), p. 67.

-

3pA : October 31, 1935 and PGSP: June 9, 1939, pp.

478-480.

4Interviews with Peter

"(l
Cro~mann

and Heinrich Sand.

5Interview with Karl Hechler.
6Notes from the file of Heinrich Huxhorn.
7Interviews with Maria Schulz and Karl Hechler.
8Karl Hechler, 75 Jahre SPD Ortsverein Pfungstadt.
in 75 Jahre SPD Ortsverein Pfungstadt, (
, 1967),

pp.''l-52.

9Interviews with Jacob Delp, Georg Herth, August
Hechler and Heinrich Schaffner.
10Census records supplied by the present town offi
cial Phillip Hanbuch.
llrnterviews with Julius Hofmann, Gottfried Helene,
Heinrich Schaffner, Jacob Brauer and Wilhelm Kaffenberger.
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APPENDIX A
A DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED
Orde~

of jnformation: age (in 1930), marital and dependent
status, oncupation, religious affiliation, party affilia
tion, voting preferance, newspaper purchased, club affilia
tions and other.
Jacob Brauer
33; married, two children, owner of a
construction company; non-practicing
Protestant; DVF; DVP; Pfungstadter
Anzeiger and Frankfurter Zeitung; Hand
werker u. Gewerbeverein, gymnastic-s-
club and Minnerquartett.
Jacob Delp

31; married, no children; stonemason;
atheist; KPD; KPD; Pfungstadter Anzei5er
and Rote Fahnc; Workers soccer club and
Anti-racist League; fought in World
War I.

Karl Emig

24; married, one child; carpenter;
non-practicing Protestant; SPD until
1932 then the KPD; SPD then KPD;
Pfunsstadter Anzciger; Re!chsbanner
then the Anti-facist League.

}'ritz Feldmann

28; married, one child; butcher; non
practicing Protestant; no party affilia
tion; voted middle-of-the-road national
ly and Steinmetz-Martin locally; Pfung
stadter Anzeiger and Darmstad!er
t~gliche Anzeiger; gymnastics club.

Peter crol'mann

29; married, one child; brickla'yer; non
practicing Protestant; SPD; SPD; Pfung
stadter Anzeiger and Hessischer Volks~
freund; SPD gymnastics club-and Reichs
hanner. Cropmann was the chairman of
the Associated Union.

Ludwig

36; married, two children; farmer; non
practicing Protestant; Landbund until
1932 then NSDAP; Landbuii.'d"then-NSDAP;
Pfung!!.~!dteI.'. Arrzeiger; Harmonie singing
cluh; fought and was wounded in World
War I.

GurJn? 1
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Jacob Hanbuch

27; married, two children; carpenter;
non-practicing Protestant; no party
affiliation until he jOined the NSDAP
in 1929; NSDAP; ~f~ngstadter Anzeiger.

Ria Hanbuch

25, single, Protestant, workered in her
father's (Christoph Hanbuch) box fac
tory, no party affiliation, DDP, Pfung
stadter Anzeiger.

August Hechler

24, single, met~l worker, no religion,
SPD, SPD, Pfungstadt~~ An~~iger and
~essi~cher y£!ksfreund, SAJ and Reichs
banner. Hechler was chairman of the
SPD.

Gottfried Helene

26; married, no children; non-practic
Protestant; editor of the An~eiger;
no party affiliation until April, 1933
then NSDAP; DVP; Darms~t~r Tagbl,att a.
Hessischer Volksfreund, Frankfurter
Zeitung; gymnastics club.

Georg Herth

27; married, one child; atheist; KPD;
KPD; Pfgngsta.dter Anzeiger and Rote
Fahne; Workers gymnastics club and Anti
facist League. Herth was an official
in the KPD and chairman of' its unem
ployment committee.

Julius Hofmann

38; married, one child; school teacher;
Protestant; DVP; DVP; Pfgngstadter
Anzeiger and Darmstidter Tageblatt;
gymnastics clu~ and Krieger- ~. Militar
verein; fought in \vor1d War I. Hofmann
was the chairman of the DVP.

Wilhelm Kaffenberger

Johann Kelsch

33; married, two children; owned a
small lumber company; non-practic:i.ng
Protestant; Pfungstadter Anzeiger and
Da~mstadter tagliche Anzeiger; soccer
club; fought in World War I. Kaffen
became a member of the town council
in April~ 1933.

39; married, four children; railway
worker; free thinker; no party affilia
tion; SPD; ?1J!n~stad!er Anzeiger and
Hessischer Volksfreund; Workers gymnas
club and the Associate-d Union.

I
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Georg Liebig

24, single, printer, freethinker, SPD,
SPD, Pfungstadter Anzeiger and Hessisch
er Volksfreund; SAJ and Reichsbanner.
LIebig was the chairman of-the SAJ for
south hesse-Darmstadt.

Adam Ruckelshausen 37; married, two children; co-owner of
a small refrigerator factory; non
practicing Protestant; no party affilia
tion; DVP then NSDAP; Pfungstadter
Anzeiger; gymnastics club, fought in
World War I. Ruckelshausen was a close
personal friend of Georg Steinmetz.
Heinrich Sand

35; married, no children; small busi
nessman; non-practicing Protestant;
NSDAP; NSDAPj Pfungstadter Anzeiger and
Darmstadter tagllche f\.nzeiger; soccer
club; fought in World War I. Sand join
ed the NSDAP in 1927 and became the
party's secretary.

Heinrich Schaffner 28; married, two children; metal worker;
Protestant; NSDAP (joined 1931); NSDAP~
Pfungstidter Anzeiger and Darmstidter
tafliche Anzelger; gymnastics club;
jo ned the SA in 1929.
Luise Steinmetz

36; married, two children; housewife;
Protestant; no party affiliation; DVP
then NSDAP; Pfungstadter Anzeiger,Darm
st~dter tagliche AnzeIger. She was the
wife of Mayor Steinmetz.

J.Judwig

44; ~arried, no children; farmer; non
practicing Protestant; Landbund; Land
bund; Pf~ngstadte~ Anzeiger and Darm
st1fcrter UIg1iche Anzeiger; Harmonie
sining club; fought in World War I.

\~enz

Julius Winkler

34; married, two children; school teacher
Protestant; no party affiliation; DDP;
Pfungst~dter ~~~, H~s~ischer Volk~

freund and Frankfurter Zeitung; fought
in World War I '\ Iron C"ross).

Ks.rl Hechler

Hechler was born and raised in Pfungstadt
but left the town in 1928 to take a
taching position. He did not return
until 1948. He is Pfungstadt's histori
an.

0
\.0

.:::t

txl

><

r/l

r-f

E-t
H
p

0::

~

r/l

Q

H

Z
0

Z

E-t

H

~

A.4
A.4

«
(,)
~

~

H

't8h
/11811

'SIS

hbl,h

OtiS

Leos

831$

Ir&r

1:..~/.5

f:.J'-C h

bJ,,;.,
~

8tf"

>~h

O/b/T

ti{,hS'f

~~.

<V""'bS'C :i;lb .,;"

.

1.;-'1

---- --

hAl

~

~~~

i

l:;~t

.,.~.~

" ;,i/J;J
,·'~~"9
f

<'.,uo
' ;l 9"
, ... {.. J

~! .!.

f~

~
~

50/

~\itt C'9'(
h!,.·<

CtO
.

If'8~J..·~::.r ; t>-t,
.. I
~h. f ·,.;,Lh r::'
'to..

st I

au

i~"

6o

ilLo/r.:O
.-;Iti;"'~

',e I

~

!

j
•~

,/

OOl:'

~

-. rJh

/£bh

08th

IIr <Jf

h

'0
• -. II"'Ii:."

01

~

,

~

-the

-hI:>

;~48('·l
u ,;1

i

rJbEb'{j ~·~·:tI1·C.1 te!~ho'b
I

dJ\N CL

_ . _...,_
....-"""".._...
' . _ " ' - i •• '"
_
d/\O
f t. i j, I f.- t ~j l S I ,,£~
--.. . . . . .-,---+---..->-----

IJtfS',

%3£"

11/17

OE'3h

p

5S

o~ or.' I
.....--

~

0/ ~f7
J. .~. . ...;a't..

8td}h
/58/1
/

'J/J1;,'O

e

6"rO

SIll

b~t·o

o~

"'".,;

'i"U

OK

~

'~/;lat '/

bl ~

OlP
.

.-

/h
!

Q4f.z
09

-tE

~. t

';' ~~ 'ef,

:1./;"'0

~~

~£

.

lih,oCh c{;'Sb', /7 °6'h'lh
..... .,..,... · i
9rO( t i/1bJ
J

bboe

"r:>t·o

S£

O~j~'O

~th",."._~..~~

0-"

~,

-- -_

rilZ

:.::tt.'O

..

Sf

%t8°0

~.~~

'~rl·O I

lh

..... .

-s{ I
Q/.;; /10'/

-os

·-·---i---+----r·---"-····--·-~-·,·~

----+--.. .

!h

461

i ;

r-

.... -

~-

+

__ -+

1

--t

4-

1-

I
,
--1---

·i·

--t

--t

-+

i

'

t

~-

·r

f-

-t

t

+

i

i
I

,

462
APPENDIX C
POPULATION FIGURES 2
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APPENDIX D

UNEMPLOYMENT]
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APPENDIX E
PUBLIC DEBT4

APPENDIX F
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 5
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APPENDICES - FOOTNOTES'
IpA: November 14, 1921, May 6, 1928, September 15,
1930, November 15, 1931, June 20, 1932, Aagust 1, 1932,
November 1, 1932 and March 6, 1933.
2popu1ation figures supplied by the present town
official, Phillip Hanbuch.
3pA : monthly reports from 1928 to 1933, discontinued

after March, 1933.
4Rechnung .,uber Elnnahme und Ausgabe der Gemeinde
Pfungstadt, 1928~29, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933 and 1934,
pp. 124-126, 129-132, 132-134, 145-148 and 1~1-160.

5pA : March 31, 1928, March 23, 1929, April 5, 1930,
March 28, 1931, March 26, 1932 and April 3, 1933.

